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Many corporate governance and disclosure studies in developed countries have 
established links between corporate governance and firm performance. However, in 
developing countries like Nigeria, very little attention has been given to transparency 
and disclosure in relation to firm performance. This study examines the relationship 
between corporate governance, corporate reporting disclosure and firm performance 
in Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE) based on a sample of 62 non-financial companies 
in Nigeria between the years 2010 to 2013. This study considers the corporate 
reporting disclosure in three categories which are disclosure of board process 
transparency, financial process transparency, and ownership transparency. Value 
added intellectual capital (VAIC) is one of the proxies for firm performance other 
than return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q.  The multiple regression analysis with 
panel corrected standard errors (PCSEs) was used in the analysis. The findings of the 
study provide empirical evidence that corporate governance mechanism is significant 
and positively related to firm performance.  The study further reveals that there is a 
significant relationship between transparency and disclosure and firm performance. 
Thus, it is recommended that disclosure of relevant information should be highly 
practiced by public companies in Nigeria. This study contributes immensely to the 
field of corporate governance. Firstly, it introduces Nigerian companies’ disclosure 
and transparency features. Secondly, the study expands the proxy for performance 
measurement by introducing VAIC method of measuring performance in Nigerian 
studies. Lastly and most importantly, this study considers the disclosure and 
transparency and internal corporate governance efficiency in Nigeria and its 
disclosure in the non-financial sectors of the Nigerian economy. 
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Banyak kajian tentang tadbir urus korporat dan pendedahan di negara maju telah 
mengiktiraf hubungan di antara tadbir urus korporat dengan prestasi firma. Walau 
bagaimanapun, di negara membangun seperti Nigeria, sangat sedikit perhatian yang 
diberikan terhadap ketelusan dan pendedahan berhubung dengan prestasi firma. 
Kajian ini mengkaji hubungan di antara tadbir urus korporat, pendedahan laporan 
korporat dan prestasi firma di Nigeria berdasarkan kepada sampel daripada 62 buah 
syarikat bukan kewangan di Nigeria di antara tahun 2010 hingga 2013. Kajian ini 
turut mengambilkira tiga kategori pendedahan pelaporan korporat iaitu pendedahan 
ketelusan proses lembaga pengarah, pendedahan ketelusan proses kewangan, dan 
pendedahan ketelusan pemilikan.  Nilai tambah modal intelektual (VAIC) 
merupakan salah satu proksi untuk mengukur prestasi firma selain daripada pulangan 
atas aset (ROA) dan Tobin’s Q. Analisis regresi berganda dengan panel koreksi ralat 
standard (PCSEs) digunakan dalam analisa data. Penemuan kajian ini memberikan 
bukti empirikal bahawa mekanisme tadbir urus korporat adalah penting dan 
berkaitan secara positif dengan prestasi firma. Kajian ini mendedahkan bahawa 
terdapat hubungan yang signifikan antara ketelusan dan pendedahan dengan prestasi 
firma. Oleh itu, adalah disyorkan bahawa pendedahan maklumat yang relevan harus 
dipraktikkan oleh syarikat awam di Nigeria. Kajian ini memberikan sumbangan 
besar dalam bidang tadbir urus korporat. Pertama, kajian ini memperkenalkan ciri-
ciri pendedahan dan ketelusan syarikat di Nigeria. Kedua, memperluaskan proksi 
bagi pengukuran prestasi dengan memperkenalkan kaedah VAIC untuk mengukur 
prestasi firma dalam kajian di Nigeria. Akhir sekali dan yang paling penting, kajian 
ini mengambilkira  pendedahan dan ketelusan serta kecekapan dalaman tadbir urus 




Kata kunci: tadbir urus korporat, nilai tambah modal intelektual (VAIC), 
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1.1 Background of the Study 
Firm performance is widely recognized as a description of stages of achievement of 
the implementation of activities, programs and policies in understanding the goals, 
purpose, mission and vision of any establishments and presumably as well as 
efficacy of the firms governance structure (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Firm 
performance has been centered on firm survival and growth because it is referred as 
an indicator of managers performance (Zahra & Pearce, 1989) and  crucial influence 
on the investment decision of the executives managers (Jelic & Kingdom, 2001). 
Globally, there are series of research on firm performance, some of which include 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), Rechner and Dan (1989), Zahra and PearceII 
(1989), Johnson and Greening (1994), Short and Keasey (1999), Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006), Barth and Schipper (2007),  Peng, Li, Xie and Su (2009), Durukan, Ozkan 
and Dalkilic (2012), Atinc  and Ocal (2014) and Abdulazeez, Ndibe and Mercy, 
(2016). All these studies used accounting measure of performance, Return on 
Accounting (ROA); the following studies  such as Al-Matari, Al-Swidi and Fadzil 
(2014), Gürbüz (2010), Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) Shan and McIver (2011) used 
market measure of performance, Tobin’s Q to test the market performance of 





Corporate governance is referred to as system, processes and affairs by which 
organizations are controlled and directed and the processes through which 
companies' aims and objectives are achieved in the context of the monitoring by the 
regulatory bodies and market environment (Maury, 2006). Corporate governance 
mechanisms can be grouped into internal and external controlling mechanisms 
(Charlie, David, & Phillip, 2002; Kamardin & Haron, 2011). Due to the weak 
control in the developing market, the internal corporate governance mechanisms play 
an important role in a developing market (Adetunji & Olaniran, 2009). In Nigeria, 
there has been renewed interest in corporate governance reforms amongst business 
organizations (Adekoya, 2012). Scholars have written on the benefits of good 
corporate governance in Nigeria but very few have drawn attention to the challenges 
posed by the inadequacy of the corporate governance mechanisms (Adekoya, 2012; 
Ahunwan, 2002; Akpan & Amran, 2014; Austin Ujunwa, 2012). Thus, in this study, 
the internal corporate governance variables are examined. These mechanisms are; 
board of directors’ characteristics, risk management committee, managerial 
shareholding and corporate reporting disclosure.  
 
Internal corporate governance mechanisms role in the emerging countries are  stated 
by Kamardin and Haron (2011). These roles are classified into four as follows; 
monitoring roles, strategic roles, service role and resource dependency role. The 
focus on this study is on monitoring role as emphasized by the code of best practice 
in Nigeria and the need for effective monitoring to avoid expropriation of company’s 




are considered because they tend to have influence on the decisions made by 
executives (Lemmon & Lins, 2003). The primary determinant of the extent of 
agency problems between controlling insiders and outside investors is the firm’s 
ownership structure (Kamardin & Haron, 2011).  
 
The main external controlling mechanisms are blockholder ownership and market 
for corporate control and managerial labour market (Adetunji & Olaniran, 2009). 
The agency conflicts arises as a result of divergent of interest by shareholders and 
managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Obembe et al., 2010).  The ownership structure 
is the primary determinant of the extent of agency problem between the managers 
and outside investors (Denis, Denis, & Saein, 1997; Obembe et al., 2010). Weak 
corporate governance in Nigeria has resulted in delisting of companies for the 
following reasons; failure to file their financial statements, failure to regularize their 
listing status, stock that are issued are not in compliance with the listing 
requirements of the stock exchange (Ikoh, Nsien, & Tamuno-Inam, 2013; Austin 
Ujunwa, 2012). Table 1.1 bellow shows the summary of companies delisted for 
various reasons.  
Table 1.1   
 Summary of the Reasons for Delisted Companies from 2008-2013 in NSE 
Year Regulatory Nationalization Voluntary Absorbed Merged Total 
2008 20 - 1 - - 21 
2009 11 - - - - 11 
2010 1 - 1 - - 2 
2011 11 3 3 1 3 21 
2012 3 - - - 3 3 
2013 2 - - - 2 4 
Total 49 3 5 1 8 65 




The table above shows that the Companies on regulatory delisting are no longer 
complying with the listing requirements of the NSE which signifies management 
problems. Studies by Ehikioya (2009) reveals that firms with good corporate 
governance  mechanisms  have higher performance, lesser bankruptcy risk and very 
high valuation. Thus, NCCG 2011 is expected to enhance firm performance, 
accountability and higher transparency (Adewuyi & Olowookere, 2013; Austin 
Ujunwa, 2012).  
Additionally, corporate governance explains the legal and established conditions as 
well as the internal system which influence the company’s administration, control 
and thus have consequences on the business financial performance (Xiaoyan, 2013). 
Corporate governance is founded on transparency and responsibilities in regard to 
equity holder’s interest. This brings about increased notice of the corporate 
awareness in respect to their investment decisions. There is potential agency 
conflicts reduction between management and equity holders as a result of excellent 
Corporate governance practices which could lead to maximization of  shareholders 
interest  (Abiola, 2012; Kamardin, Abdul Latif, Taufil Mohd, & Che_Adam, 2013). 
However,  mismanagement, insufficient monitoring and false financial reporting 
impair confidence in corporate monitoring and control structures (Adetunji & 
Olaniran, 2009; Akpan & Amran, 2014). Corporate governance problem is the over 
concentration of power in the hand of few or the top executive  which has led the  
greatest global economic crisis in 2008 (Blundell-wignall, Atkinson, & Lee, 2009; 




Nigeria as an emerging economy is no doubt requiring effective corporate 
governance, which enables establishment to advance business excellence due to the 
presence of corporate code of best practice. Companies perceived as adopting global 
best practices of corporate governance practices are more likely to encourage 
investment from the international community than those whose practices are alleged 
to be lower than global standards (Gill, Sharma, Mand, & Mathur, 2012; Salaudeen 
& Chima, 2015). 
1.2 Corporate Governance and Corporate Reporting Quality in Nigeria 
After 1960 when Nigeria got her independence, the Nigerian accounting 
environment imitated that of accounting practice in the UK. In 1979, Nigeria 
adopted the US presidential democratic system and began to create many of the 
institutions and regulatory frameworks which were presumed to differentiate the US 
from the UK. One such institution created in 1979 was the Nigerian Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) (Wallace, 1988). The body was charged with the 
surveillance and development of the overall securities market, the mobilization and 
formation of capital and the protection of investors. Also included in its mandate is 
the power to regulate corporate disclosure by companies seeking quotations for their 
securities (Wallace, 1988).  
However, the SEC has chosen to exercise the right, and has surrendered it (by 
inaction) to the Nigerian Accounting Standards Board (NASB) founded in 
September 1982 (Wallace, 1988). In 1979, the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) 




printed and circulated by reporting companies to their members for approval at the 
Annual General Meeting. 
The primary source of (mandatory) corporate disclosure rules in Nigeria is therefore 
the Companies Act 1968. The secondary (obligatory or voluntary) source of 
company’s disclosure rules (including accounting standards) are the NSE and 
NASB. International Accounting Standards (IAS) and the accounting standards of 
some developed countries (particularly the UK SSAP) have tremendous influence on 
accounting practices and standard-settings in the country. On the impact of IAS, the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigerian (ICAN) requires its members to 
ensure that the accounts of their clients (reporting companies) comply with the 
extant.  
In Nigeria, the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) in association with the 
Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) on June 15, 2000 inaugurated a seventeen-
member committee. The committee chairman Atedo Peterside N. A., was directed to 
detect the weaknesses in the corporate governance practices as at then and come out 
with necessary variations that will strengthen the corporate governance practices. 
“The terms of reference for the Committee were as follows: to identify weaknesses 
in the current corporate governance practices in Nigeria with respect to public 
limited companies; to examine practices in other jurisdictions with a view to 
adopting international best practices in corporate governance in Nigeria; to make 




examine any other issues relating to corporate governance in Nigeria” (NCCG, 2003, 
p. 3). 
The final report adopted embraces the criticisms and contributions of the various 
stakeholders and the public and signed by the Chairman, Atedo Peterside on 1 April 
2003. The code of best practices on corporate governance in Nigeria (NCCG) was 
approved by the boards of the SEC and CAC which are the regulatory authority of 
firms in Nigeria. It universally established that weak corporate governance has been 
accountable for some corporate draw back in Nigeria.  
 
SEC, in September 2008, set up a National Committee chaired by Mr. M. B. 
Mahmoud for the Appraisal of the 2003 Code of best practices for Public firms in 
Nigeria to tackle the flaws in 2003 code of best practice and to advance on the 
system on the code will be enforceable in Nigeria. In precise term, the committee 
was given the responsibility to pinpoint loopholes in 2003 NCCG weaknesses and its 
limitations and also to identify better corporate governance structure and to advise 
on other corporate issues in promoting good CG mechanism. This good corporate 
governance to be adopted by public firms in Nigeria. The committee is also 
mandated to align the CG in Nigeria with global best practices. The board of SEC 
has confidence in that this new code of CG will guarantee the best standards of 
transparency disclosure of relevant material information and good CG practices 





The NCCG was further revised in 2011. The public companies in Nigeria are 
expected to disclose in detail their transactions as required by revised SEC code of 
2011. The NCCG is available for use by public limited firms in Nigeria and the SEC 
advises other corporations to make use the guideline set out in the Code of best 
practice, where necessary, to direct them in the operation of their business activities. 
The code of best practices on CG in Nigeria (SEC, 2011) acknowledged three ‘main 
players’ in the putting into practice procedure and set the duties for each of them. 
The main actors are the BODs, the equity holders and the Audit Committees (AC).  
 
The NCCG by SEC in 2011 requires that firm should disclose financial report 
beyond the statutory requirements and the board is also responsible to conduct risk 
assessment through the risk management committee of all the business update and its 
risk management framework. In addition, companies should also have whistle 
blowing policy to strengthen their performance. The board of SEC has confidence in 
that the new CG will guarantee the maximum standard of transparency, stewardship 
and good CG and this will make firms to be innovative in their business operations. 
The revision of the code of CG in 2011 is deep-rooted in compliance with the 
corporate global best practice.  The SEC code is believed to take care of transparent 
reporting and presentation of financial statement. 
 
Transparency is the “disclosure of information both in the decision making process 




Nurcahyo  & Sugiharti, 2013, p. 93). Transparency has been explained as a desirable 
characteristic of financial reports provided that transparency reduces information risk 
and information asymmetry  (Barth & Schipper, 2007; Mac & Mae, 2011). 
Transparency in corporate reporting has always been seen from positive stand view 
of users of financial statement and the depth in which the financial report reveals 
firm’s underlining economies (Barth & Schipper, 2007; Phillips & Luehlfing, 2010). 
Transparency is also viewed as allowing “those affected by administrative decisions, 
business operations, or selfless work to know not only the basic issue and figures but 
also the mechanisms and processes” (Barth & Schipper, 2007, p. 175). 
 
Transparency and disclosure leads to high accountability and reduced risk of 
expropriation of investor’s interest by the managers (Mac & Mae, 2011).  
Transparency of financial performance information of any company contributes 
directly to the reinforcement of management and investor trust by lowering 
principal-agent problems. Such transparency gingers firms internally to select 
investment projects more diligently and manage their assets efficiently to attain high 
performance. Enhanced disclosure increases liquidity and reduces the cost of capital 
(Botosan & Harris, 2000).  Researches also link disclosure and cost of capital 
through reduced estimation of risk (Botosan & Harris, 2000). Transparency also 
results in increasing investors’ confidence and enhances other users of accounting 




1.3 Problem Statement  
Before the introduction of code of best practices, the Nigeria, code of corporate 
governance (NCCG), corporate governance has been associated with numerous 
corporate scandals that witnessed across Nigeria. The scandals precipitate concerted 
efforts at evolving codes of best corporate governance practices for companies 
(Adegbite, 2012; Salaudeen & Chima, 2015). There have been issues of corporate 
fraud on the global and local scene, which ultimately led to the failure of big and 
known firms. The Enron case in the United State, Rank Xerox,  WorldCom case and 
Parmalat sagas in European countries are few examples (Aßländer, 2005; Hermalin 
& Weisbach, 2012; Jackson, 2003; Sercu, Bauwhede, & Willekens, 2006; Soltani, 
2013).  
 
Recently, there were also corporate collapses around the world as a result of sharp 
practices by the board of directors (BOD). These corporate collapses are as follows; 
Dynegy an Energy company in US  attempted a series of takeover bids, and a finding 
of fraud in a subsidiary's purchase of another subsidiary in 2012,  Banco Espírito 
Santo (BES) collapsed in 2014 was placed into receivership in Australia in 2014. 
Similarly, the following accounting scandals were uncovered in companies such as  
Penn West Exploration in Canada overstatement of  profit in the year  2014 and  
Toshiba Japan over statement of profit in 2015. Similarly, Valeant Pharmaceuticals, 
Canada overstatement of its revenue in 2015, fraudulent invoice in Alberta Motor 
Association in Canada, 2016 and the case of  Odebrecht, bribery in Brazilian 





On the local scene, there are notable cases such as the collapse of some Nigerian 
Banks between 1990 to 2011 as a result of weak corporate governance and vague 
financial reporting (Akindayomi, 2012), the case of Lever Brothers Plc. (now 
Unilever) in 1998 where overvaluation of stocks running into several billions of 
Naira was uncovered. Another example is the African Petroleum (AP) PLC where 
the company’s BOD covered its liability amounted to N22 billion in its offer for sale 
of its stocks in the year 2000. This case concerning the African Petroleum Plc. share 
has brought to light the concern of corporate governance and best practices in 
Nigeria.  
 
Similarly, Cadbury Nigeria PLC's overstatement and false reporting of its audited 
financial statements in its financial statement between 2002 to 2005 amounted to 
N13 billion is another case of serious concern about firm’s management in Nigeria. 
After the review of Cadbury's report, the SEC wrote to Cadbury a letter in 
September, 2006 stating concern about issues from the report in the areas of 
decreasing return and bad debt ratio, failing cash flow, insufficient disclosure in the 
annual financial statement and report and non-adherence with relevant corporate 
governance Code and procurement of loans for the payment of dividend on 
investment to equity holders conflicting to SEC guidelines and rules (Society for 
Corporate governance, 2010). As a result of this, the Nigerian SEC has imposed a 
fine of N22 billion for falsifying its account (SEC bulletin, 2008). This has led to the 




(Daily Independence, 2008). This scandal has led to loss of company assets and 
decline of its stock in the capital market.  
 
In another vein, the SEC suspended two companies in 2013 for sharp practices and 
lack of performance. In Maven Asset Management limited and Falcon Security 
Limited. Another company, Gosord Security Limited registration was cancelled by 
SEC due to its inability to meet statutory minimum requirements (SEC, Bulletin, 
2014). Furthermore, Cowry Asset Management Limited Failed to honour its 
underwriting obligation in accordance with Rule 318 (2) of SEC Rules and 
Regulations by its directors in 2015. Similarly, International Standards Securities 
Limited non-compliance with security and exchange commission rules, regulations 
and deficiencies observed in its operations during a target inspection in 2015 is 
another corporate governance issue in Nigeria (SEC Bulletin, 2016). The suspension 
of these companies involved in sharp practices is as a result of the corporate 
governance code of best practice (NCCG) that is put in place by the SEC in 
collaboration with the CAC for public corporations in 2003 and revised in 2008 and 
2011 to take care of the weaknesses of corporate practices and to make sure that 
companies perform excellently.  
 
The world economic problem has given reason for a better need to promote excellent 
CG across the world (Adegbite, 2012). The developing countries adopt their 
standards and codes from the international standards which were mainly determined 




rules such as accounting guidelines and information to disclose in the annual report 
and release the code of corporate governance to guide the board of directors and 
management to solve the agency problem between shareholders and management. 
These rules, standards and codes are meant to improve the quality of financial 
reports and corporate performance of firms (Bijalwan & Madan, 2013; Maury, 
2006). However, firms continue to suffer from problem of instability, poor 
profitability, insolvency and sometimes liquidation as a result of lack of governance 
mechanism or complete absence of corporate governance (Chuanrommanee & 
Swierczek, 2007; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Consequently,  owners of firms will  suffer 
as a result of management lapses and weakness in board of directors operations and 
corporate governance mechanism (Ikoh, Nsien, & Tamuno-Inam, 2013; Kamardin, 
Latif, Mohd, & Che-Adam, 2012; Nyor, 2013).  
 
The board of directors (BOD) have been seriously criticized for the deterioration in 
stakeholders wealth as a result of weak governance structure and high corporate 
failures (Abidin et al., 2000). The absence or low oversight roles by the BOD are 
some of the descriptions stated for these corporate failures in Nigeria (Oyewunmi, 
Olusanmi, Olujobi, & Adegboye, 2017). This happens when the board relinquishes 
power to the corporate managers who in turn run the affair of the corporation into 
self-interest instead of the owners interest (Abidin et al., 2000).  
 
In the context of Nigeria, studies on firm performance have not been extensively 




Oyewunmi, Olusanmi, Olujobi, & Adegboye, (2017), Abdulazeez, Ndibe and & 
Mercy, (2016),  Adegbite, (2015), Akpan and Amran (2014), Adewuyi and 
Olowookere (2013), Ehikioya (2009), Ujunwa (2012) and Obembe, Adebisi and 
Adeleye (2010). In all of these studies, firm performance is measured using ROA 
and Tobin’s Q. In addition, previous studies are concentrated in the developed 
countries but few studies in developing countries like Nigeria. In this context, the 
current research attempts to provide empirical evidence on the association between 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance in Nigeria. 
 
Most studies proxy ROA for accounting performance and Tobin’s Q for market 
performance. Value Added Intellectual Capital (VAIC) which is yet to be studied in 
Nigeria as a measure of performance is added in the framework to take care of the 
weaknesses of the traditional method. Knowledge capital is important in achieving 
companies goal (Taufik, Widyastuti, & Yam, 2017).  Realizing the importance of 
intellectual capital to a firm’s performance, companies have made attempt to report 
on intellectual capital which includes the preparation of intellectual capital 
statements that combine “numbering, visualization and narration to account for 
organizational value creation” because intellectual capital is the conversion of 
knowledge into something valuable (Abidin et al., 2000; Degroote, Bontis, Chua, & 
Keow, 2000). Furthermore, literature reveals the link between corporate governance 
and firm performance of firm and such other factors that can strengthen corporate 
governance code of best practices and company performance such as the 




As transparency is one of the requirement in the  corporate governance code of best 
practices released by Nigeria SEC in 2011, it is thus the interest of the current study 
to examine the influence of transparency and disclosure on firm performance 
(Rogers, 2008). 
Most studies in accounting, economics and corporate governance have been on 
direct relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. 
The interests of corporate governance research have been concerned with board 
structure and characteristics. However, mixed results from past studies on corporate 
governance suggest the possibility of moderating variable in the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance. This moderating variable is to 
serve as a monitoring role on the activities of BOD. The BOD is expected to perform 
with diligent if there is a monitoring mechanism in place to check their excesses and 
likely sharp practices by the board (Mustapha & Ahmad, 2013). 
  
As mentioned above, this study attempts to examine the moderating effect of 
blockholder ownership on the relationship between CG mechanisms and firm 
performance. This is because, blockhoder ownership have greater incentives to 
monitor the activities of management (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006).  Block ownership 
acts as  external monitoring by shareholders in the protection of their right and 
interest in the firm (Leng, 2004; Sirmans, 2013). No studies in Nigeria have 
attempted to adopt the blockholder ownership as a moderator to test the moderating 
effect on internal corporate governance mechanisms to the best of the knowledge of 




efficient management in firm resources is most crucial to owners. Good CG practices  
also include having transparent disclosure of management decisions on allocation of 
company’s resources  (Hla, Hassan, & Shaikh, 2013; Jermakowicz & Gornik-
Tomaszewski, 2006; Kasum, 2012; Yeow & Mahzan, 2013).  
Precisely, this research attempts to fill the following gap; examining the moderating 
effect of block ownership by shareholders on the association between corporate 
governance mechanism and firm performance, examining the influence of corporate 
reporting transparency on the performance of non-financial public listed firms in 
Nigeria.  
1.4 Research Questions 
The research questions of the studies are as follows; 
1. Is there any significant relationship between BOD characteristics and 
firm performance? 
2. Is there any significant relationship between management shareholding 
and firm performance? 
3. Is there any significant relationship between corporate reporting 
disclosure and firm performance? 
4.  Is there any significant relationship between risk management 
committee and firm performance? 
5. Does blockholder ownership moderate the relationship between board 




6. Does block ownership structure moderate the relationship between 
managerial shareholding and firm performance? 
7. Does blockholder ownership moderates the relationship between the 
risk management committee and financial performance? 
 
1.5 Research Objectives 
The broad objective of this study is to examine the effect of board characteristics and 
managerial shareholding on firm performance and the moderating effect of block 
shareholding structure on the relationship between corporate governance mechanism 
and firm performance in Nigeria. 
The specific objectives are as follows: 
1. To examine the significant relationship between board of directors’ 
characteristics and firm performance. 
2.  To examine the significant relationship between managerial 
shareholding and firm performance. 
3. To examine the significant relationship between corporate reporting 
disclosure and firm performance. 
4.  To examine the significant relationship between risk management 
committee and firm performance. 
5. To examine whether blockhoder ownership moderates the relationship 




6. To examine whether blockhoder ownership moderates the relationship 
between managerial shareholding and firm performance. 
7. To examine whether blockhoder ownership moderates the relationship 
between risk management committee and firm performance. 
1.6 Scope of Study 
This study investigates the association between corporate governance mechanisms 
corporate reporting transparency, and firm performance among the non-financial 
public listed companies who have adopted IFRS and the revised code of corporate 
governance in Nigeria. Specifically, this study investigates some of the BOD 
characteristics, the shareholding structures and corporate reporting transparency and 
disclosure of the firm. Generally, all these governance structures in Nigeria are 
expected to play key role in enhancing organizational financial performance as 
indicated by previous studies (Al-matari & Al-matari, 2012; Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2006; Latif et al., 2013; Ujunwa, 2012; Weisbach, 1991).  
 
The performance measure intended for this research includes Tobin’s Q, return on 
assets (ROA) and Value Added Intellectual Capital (VAIC). The inclusion of VAIC 
as a measure of firm performance is as a result of the importance of knowledge 
economics. A firm’s intellectual capital is comprised of human capital and structural 
capital which is translated to performance by companies (Chen, Cheng, & Hwang, 
2005). This research covers the population of 136 non- financial public companies 




the revised corporate governance code as released by SEC in 2011. Out of the total 
population, 62 companies were selected from all the sectors that consist of non-
financial sectors in Nigeria to represent the sample after removing of companies with 
incomplete information and those without information on selected variables for this 
research. The reason for the choice of the non-financial institution out of the quoted 
companies is as a result of regulatory and corporate governance code differences. 
The corporate governance code of the financial institutions is released by the Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN) while that of the non-financial institutions are released by 
SEC to govern the activities and operation of management. The non-financial 
companies in Nigeria are all expected to comply with the revised SEC Code of 2011. 
Therefore, the non-financial institutions in Nigeria shall form the sample of the 
study. 
1.7 Significance of the Study 
This study investigates the moderating effects of block shareholding structure on the 
association between corporate governance and firm performance is important to both 
theory and practice as follows: 
1.7.1 Theoretical Significance 
Theoretically, this study contributes to corporate governance and financial 
performance literature. Firstly, the present study reveals if corporate governance 
mechanisms can significantly affect financial performance. IFRS is relevant in 




(Ehikioya, 2009). Therefore, this study will be significant in filling the gap by 
considering corporate reporting transparency in relation to VAIC as a measurement 
of firm performance; there are also few studies that consider VAIC as measurement 
of performance and its relationship to corporate governance code, as this study 
combines traditional performance measurement and Value Added Intellectual 
Capital (VAIC). Intellectual capital (IC) performance or VAIC is used as a measure 
to investigate the efficiency of IC within a firm. Compared to ROA and Tobin’s Q, 
VAIC includes the intangible components which are expected to capture firm 
performance better (Abidin et al., 2000 Pulic, 2004). This measure makes 
information available about the efficacy of tangible and intangible assets of a 
corporation (human capital and fixed capital) which are important  to generate value 
to the company (Kamardin et al., 2013; Pulic, 2004). Secondly, the present study 
will complement the existing literature by demonstrating the effect of corporate 
reporting transparency on corporate governance. Previous corporate governance 
studies were largely conducted in the western contexts, while this one focuses on a 
developing country to see where the findings are consistent or varied from previous 
findings. Thirdly, the study proposes CG model for increasing corporate reporting 
transparency through developing transparency and consideration of block 
shareholding structure as a moderator. It is predicted that the block shareholding by 
its voting power is able to monitor managers to make decision that can increase the 
firm performance. The current study adds to the existing knowledge by 
demonstrating the moderating effects of block ownership structure on enhancing the 




critical in monitoring the activities of the directors in order to achieve the 
organizational objectives. 
1.7.2 Practical Significance 
In addition to theory and literature development, this study is significant in practical 
perspective. Generally, this study is important to public companies by providing 
insight into the mechanisms of corporate governance. To business owners, the study 
shall provide the bases for solving problems associated with shareholder protection, 
especially in the hand of director. The management decision should disclose 
statements that will be of owners’ interest. To managers, the study shall provide 
them with better understanding of their roles in corporate governance and how 
accounting standardization affects this role, thereby, equipping them with adequate 
information on how to effectively discharge their responsibilities, while balancing 
competing interests.  To the academia, it serves as a contribution to the general body 
of literature. Specifically, it provides scholarly reference material for studies in the 
field of accounting, and a basis for further studies in the area of accounting theory 
and business accounting. For the accounting profession, it serves as basis and 
background for further research in accounting practices. It also affects future 
corporate governance code to be issued in Nigerian. To the government and other 
regulatory and monitoring agencies, the outcome of   the study shall serve as a basis 
for policy formulation on regulation and issue standards that will lead to transparent 
presentation of accounting report. To the public at large (other stakeholders), the 




standardization and relationships in organization. These shall provide the public with 
basis to evaluate their stakes in business and to be able to make better judgments on 
governance, to assist them in appropriate decision-making. Furthermore, the findings 
from this study also encourage the public listed companies to adhere to the code of 
best practice that is in operation in Nigeria. In addition, the companies should be 
willing to attend training and retraining of staff in the line of corporate governance 
disclosure.  
1.8 Study Outline 
This thesis is presented in five chapters. Chapter One generally introduces the whole 
work. The chapter is made up of the background of the study, problem statement, 
research questions, research objectives, scope of the study, and significance of the 
study and the outline of the thesis. Chapter Two basically conceptualizes three major 
constructs of this study: corporate governance, corporate financial transparency and 
firm performance. This chapter also highlights previous studies on CG, IFRS, 
disclosure and financial transparency and financial performance. Moreover, the 
potentialities of IFRS as a new governance code and it relationship between CG and 
financial performance are discussed. Chapter Three discusses the conceptual 
framework of the study and the association between the main constructs and 
hypotheses proposed for this research. Moreover, this chapter states the research 
methodology employed for the study. The chapter explains the population of the 
study for the research, sampling technique, method of data collection and method of 




results, key findings, test of hypotheses of the study. Finally, Chapter Five provides 
discussions of findings, limitations of the study, directions for future research, 
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Earlier chapter has discussed the background, motivation of the study, research 
questions, and objectives of the study, scope of the study and significance of the 
study.  Chapter two discusses literature review. It begins with corporate governance 
concepts and followed by corporate governance code of best practice in Nigeria. 
Empirical review on the corporate governance mechanisms and theories employed 
for this study are also discussed. The chapter also provides literature review on 
corporate reporting transparency and its effect on firm performance. 
2.2 Corporate Governance 
The term corporate governance has been recognized to mean different things to 
different individuals. Sunday (2008, p. 16) stated that “corporate governance is about 
warranting that the corporate organizations are run well and stakeholders receive a 
fair return”. Furthermore, The Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) (2004, p. 15) provides a more surrounding explanation of 
corporate governance it defined “Corporate governance is one key element in 
improving economic efficiency and growth as well as enhancing investor confidence 
and a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders”. The OECD sums up in its definition of 




and controlled. The corporate governance mechanism stipulates the sharing of rights 
and tasks among different members in the company such as, the BODs, managers 
and equity holders in business, and states the rules and manner processes for making 
decisions on company matters (Sunday, 2008).  The issue here is the separation of 
duties among the board members and the monitoring of the outside investors in order 
to solve possible problem of conflict of interest that may arise between the BODs 
and the outside investors.  
 
Furthermore, corporate governance is seen as a whole system of governance by 
which firm leadership is dependent on, this entail directing and controlling the 
activities of companies (Cadbury Report, 1992). The focal point of corporate 
governance is the role of the BODs and the shareholders in providing leadership of 
the company. The issues in corporate governance discussed is the potential conflict 
between the parties in business due to the separation of owners from control (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). The presence of good corporate governance will be important to 
instill confidence and trust in the firm. 
 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 737), corporate governance is the “ways 
in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on 
their investment”. This definition is the extent to which the scope of CG to all the 
stake holders in business. Similarly, Denis, Mcconnell, Denis and Mcconnell (2003, 
p. 2) defined corporate governance “as the set of mechanisms-both institutional and 




make decisions regarding how the company will be operated) to make decisions that 
maximize the value of the company to its owners (the suppliers of capital)”. 
 
Furthermore, in countries with high concentration of share ownership, there may be 
conflict of interest between the controlling shareholders and minority interest, the 
focus of the corporate governance shall be on the possible conflict that may arise 
between controlling shareholders and minority interest (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000; Mitton, 2002). The mechanisms of corporate governance 
is used to protect the minority shareholders for being expropriated by the majority 
shareholders and the controlling shareholders (Ishak & Napier, 2006; Mitton, 2002). 
Additionally, Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman (2000) states the essence of 
legal framework in those countries with concentrated ownership structure 
(blockholder ownership) which is tailored towards reducing the expropriation of the 
minority interest by the controlling managers. From the forgoing, the definition by 
La Porta et al. (2000, p. 4) which states “corporate governance as a set of 
mechanisms through which outside investors protect themselves against 
expropriation by the insiders (managers and controlling shareholders)” is therefore 
adopted for this research.  
 
This study explores disclosure and compliance properties of corporate reporting and 
financial transparency, corporate governance and financial statement presentation.  




corporate governance code of SEC, 2011 in a cross-section of Nigerian non–
financial firms and the effect on firm performance is a strong motivation for this 
study because the adoption is said to enhance firm performance. Corporate reporting 
transparency is associated with increasing the degree to which facts are presented in 
the annual reports and statements discloses fundamental economics and reduction in 
information asymmetry among stakeholders in business because the information is 
readily clear and understandable (Barth & Schipper, 2007). Researches supports the 
notion that corporate financial reports with  attributes of transparency  such as 
financial transparency, ownership transparency and board process transparency in 
the annual report can be of economic value by reducing the cost of capital (Adelopo, 
2011a; Aksu & Kosedag, 2006; Barth & Schipper, 2007; Gary Meek, Robert, & 
Sidney, 1995; Tsamenyi, Enninful-Adu, & Onumah, 2007). 
 
To strengthen the corporate governance practices in Nigeria, IFRS was adopted in 
line with international best practices. IFRS have been recognized a standard for 
presentation of accounting which is aimed at increasing the quality financial 
reporting if the standards are demonstrated properly in practice. Study shows that 
there are increasing similarities between IFRS and Statement of Accounting 
Standards in both developed and developing countries (Tefnescu, Alexandrina, 2009; 
Jermakowicz & Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2006). However, good standards are 




corporate governance statement that are needed to produce quality financial 
reporting (Daske & Gebhardt, 2006).  
In 2010, Nigeria has  made IFRS mandatory for registered companies with the aim 
of improving the quality of financial report and comparability between countries, 
this is referred as one of the corporate governance issues  (Madawaki, 2014). This 
can be seen that only countries with robust legal implementation that are able to 
realize substantial capital market benefits (Cuijpers & Buijink, 2005; Sellhorn & 
Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2006 (Verriest, Gaeremynck, & Thornton, 2012). To date, 
disclosure topics in Nigeria receive slight attention in this literature, even though 
disclosure requirements can be significantly increased with the adoption of IFRS 
(Kasum, 2012; Okpala, 2012).  
 
Regulatory enforcement and corporate governance serve as the two most important 
dimensions of financial reporting infrastructure (Healy & Palepu, 2001) because they 
should effectively curb the opportunistic behavior of practitioners to ensure that 
good accounting standards can be carried out by good accounting practices which 
lead to increased firm performance (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Ehikioya, 2009). 
Similarly,  quite a number of corporate scandals worldwide such as the Enron 
scandal, the Parmalat scandal, Rank Xerox crisis and on the local scene such as the 
Cadbury scandal, the AP overstatement of financial statement  and collapse of 
several banks in Nigeria which have affected the performance of companies  have 
promoted the importance of corporate governance (Brown & Caylor, 2008; Cheffins, 





Similarly, given the importance of corporate governance around the globe, 
mandatory reporting practices, the Committee of European Securities Regulators 
(CESR, 2003) came up with a standard on financial information, with the intention 
to establish suitable structure in order to attain a high level of management in 
financial reporting (Daske, Hail, Leuz, & Verdi, 2008; Jermakowicz & Gornik-
Tomaszewski, 2006). High quality corporate governance is viewed to be 
exceptionally essential because it posits that BOD are responsible for the 
completeness, accuracy and truthfulness of the financial information while the  block 
shareholders are required to act as a leading outside line of defense against false 
statement (Jermakowicz & Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2006). 
 
Standard originates in three different ways. The one developed or formed by an 
individual or government to serve as a guide or minimum bench mark for their 
operations, business associations or standard setting committees and the regulatory 
agencies. The three sources mentioned above have serious role in setting ammonized 
standards for business organizations (Kasum, 2012). The following standards are 
relevant to the firm; performance standards, compatibility standards and 
measurement standards. These Standards specify the way of doing things, (Kasum, 
2012).  Standards set the rules to follow at any particular point in time. May, Okoye, 
and Samson (2013)  posit that standard are set in order to conform to basic way of 
doing things and to ensure uniformity of doing things. Similarly,  standards setters 




standards and protect shareholders interest (Beasley, 2014; Edogbanya & Kamardin, 
2014; Madawaki, 2014; Mary et al., 2013). 
 
Furthermore, campaign for the installation of sound corporate governance arises 
from the expectation that it will result in companies being diligently directed by the 
boards and management trustees. Consequently, in the United Kingdom, just as in 
Nigeria, company’s legislation has led to the establishment of audit committees. 
Indeed, independent committees have generated series of reports which include the 
following:  
The Greenbury Committee came into existence in 1995 due to continuing public 
anxiety against the excessive remuneration and perquisites which directors are 
paying themselves, out of tune with the operating and financial fortune of 
companies, and the failure to make adequate disclosure about the former. The 
Greenbury Committee’s recommendation on director’s remuneration is included in 
the Listing Requirements of the London Stock Exchange (Peck, 1998).  
 
Turnbull Report, issued in 1998, the thrust of this report is the institution of efficient 
and effective system of internal control and its continual review and appraisal. The 
report, advocates very strongly the safeguard of a company’s assets and 
shareholders’ interests. The review activity should embrace all controls such as 
administration, security, financial, accounting and risk management. The London 
Stock Exchange includes the installation and nurture of sound internal control 




companies. To buttress this provision, the combined code states that, the directors 
should at least annually, conduct a review of the effectiveness of the groups’ system 
of internal control and report to shareholders that they have done so (Peck, 1998).   
 
Furthermore, Cadbury report issued in 1992 was to address the lack of public 
confidence in the financial reports prepared by company boards and the ability of the 
auditors to attest to their credibility. The reservation held by the public is borne out 
of the perceived relationship between the boards of directors and auditors. On the 
other hand, Hampel Report issued in 1998 was to focused generally on bringing 
improvement to bear on corporate governance. The London Stock Exchange 
considered the report of the Committee and subsequently published what is known 
as the ‘combined code (Boyd, 1996; Dahya, Garcia, & van Bommel, 2009). 
 
The interim report of Hampel Committee was produced in August 1997 and its 
finishing report was made in January 1998. Recommendations were made to codify 
the recommendations of the Cadbury (1992) and Greenbury (1995) reports, to clarify 
the duties of BODs, internal and outside directors, and to disclose information on 
management operations (Song & Windram, 2004). The report made the role of stock 
holder vital and strengthened the role of equity holders in the corporate governance 
process and the importance of self-regulation in the corporate governance process 




This research explores how listed companies in Nigeria pursued such corporate 
governance agenda with their portfolio companies and how possible can corporate 
governance code and IFRS can lead to firm performance.   
2.3 Nigeria Code of Corporate Governance for Public Companies  
There are several rules and regulations imposed on Public Limited Company (PLC) 
in Nigeria. Besides the Nigerian Stock Exchange listing requirement, other major 
acts that regulate the activities of PLC are company act of 1965, Bank and Other 
Financial Institutions Act (1991) (BOFIA), Investment and Securities Act 2007 
(ISA) and Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 (CAMA). “The mandatory legal 
instrument for all incorporated companies in Nigeria is CAMA as it specifies the 
duties and functions the key players in corporate administration of companies 
(Adelopo, 2011). The NSE is responsible for enforcement of listing requirements on 
public companies and its subsidiaries and NSE is under surveillance of the Security 
and Exchange Commission and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) is responsible for 
monitoring the activities of financial institutions and insurance companies.  
 
Poor corporate governance has been element accountable for some corporate failure 
in Nigeria (Society for Corporate Governance, 2010).  As a result of corporate 
scandals in Nigeria, such as African Petroleum crisis in 2000, the case of lever 
brother PLC now Unilever in 1998 and a case of Cadbury Nigeria PLC false 
reporting and overstatement of audited financial statement. As a result of the above 




used by various authorities. This has brought the issue and the need to align Nigeria 
corporate governance practices with the global Best Practices. The SEC in 
association with the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) established a seventeen 
(17) Committee member on June 15, 2000 in Nigeria. The Committee was led by 
Atedo Peterside as a Chairman. The members’ committees were carefully nominated 
to cut across all segments of the economy (SEC2003). The objective of the 
committee is to ascertain weaknesses in the CG practice in Nigeria and to come out 
with necessary mechanism to improve the practices of corporate governance in 
Nigeria. The committee concluded that the code shall apply to all the public 
companies that are listed on the recognized stock exchange market in Nigeria and 
companies seeking to raise fund for company’s operation through the stock exchange 
market in Nigeria. 
 
In order to improve the 2003 corporate governance code, the Nigeria SEC, in 
September 2008 inaugurated a national committee overseen by Mr. M. B. Mahmoud 
for the Review of the 2003 Code of corporate governance (NCCG) for Public firms 
in Nigeria and to address its weaknesses and to improve the mechanism for its 
workability In particular, the Committee was given the responsibility to ascertain 
weaknesses in, and constraints to good corporate governance and to recommend 
ways of effecting compliance and to advice on other issues that are relevant to 
promoting corporate governance practices by public limited companies in Nigeria 
and to be in line with global best practices (SEC 2008, p. 4). The review of the 2003 




earlier code. There was low compliance; therefore, the 2008 committee was given 
mandate to recommend way to enforce the code and compliance by public 
companies and also to align the Nigerian code with international code of best 
practice.  The committee also advised that those not covered by the code are also 
advised to use it.  
 
The Board of SEC has confidence that NCCG 2003 would lead to the maximum 
standards of corporate financial transparency, accountability and good corporate 
governance. The NCCG is primarily for public firms; however, the SEC would like 
to inspire private firms to use the 2003 code. The use of the code would assist in 
guidance of corporate issues and the affair of their business. The code of corporate 
governance was then further revised in 2011 to tackle global best practice 
specifically on the matter related to the committees of the BOD and also to take into 
consideration the new financial preparation regime (IFRS). This is in continuation of 
compliance of the Code of corporate governance in Nigeria with the code of global 
best practices (SEC, 2011). 
 
The Code of corporate governance applies to the following bodies: public companies 
whose stocks are quoted on the NSE market, corporations in quest of to raise capital 
from the capital market through the selling of stock or looking for listing of security 
by introduction. The SEC Code will be applicable to the firm listed on the stock 
exchange market. All listed business that its securities are traded on a known stock 




benchmark of their corporate governance. All corporations in quest of and to raise 
capital from the capital market, through the issuance of securities need to  
demonstrate adequate compliance with the ethics and requirements of this corporate 
code suitable to their scope, settings or operational setting (SEC, 2011).  Table 2.2 























Historical Development of Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
 
 
Period                                                 Corporate Governance Development 
 
Pre-1990 era:             Before 1990, the principal Company Law in Nigeria was the 
Companies Act 1968. This enactment was a comprehensive 
legislation modelled after the Companies Act 1948 of the UK. It 
contained elaborate provisions regarding the running of companies 
in relation to the roles of the board of directors and the members in 
general meeting. However, this statute was not without its 
limitations. As a result, criticisms it was repealed and replaced by 
the CAMD’ of 1990.- Statute regulating companies in Nigeria. 
 
1990 to 2003: The Companies and Allied Matters Act, Cap. C20, Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria 2004. It contained a lot of innovative 
provisions such as provisions on greater and more effective 
participation in, and control of the affairs of a company. The 
provision of the act is for greater accountability by directors. 
However, after the coming into force of the statute, some corporate 
challenges around the world brought the issue of corporate 
governance to the fore. 
2003 to 2011:  The Code of Best Practices on Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
(2003 SEC Code) issued by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in 2003 greatly impacted the corporate governance 
scene in Nigeria. The 2003 SEC Code was a product of a 17- 
member committee headed by Atedo Peterside which was set up by 
SEC in collaboration with CAC in June 2000. All the sectors of the 
economy were represented in the committee and it was mandated to 
identify weaknesses in the corporate governance practices in 
Nigeria and come up with necessary changes that will address the 
challenges identified and improve the corporate governance 
practices in Nigeria. 
 2011 to date:  SEC issued the SEC 2011 Code with commencement date of 1st 
April 2011 and applicable to all public companies in Nigeria. It is 
regarded as the minimum standards for public companies in 
Nigeria.  The board of the SEC believes that the 2011 code will 
ensure the highest standards of transparency, accountability and 
good corporate governance, without unduly inhibiting enterprise 
and innovation.  





2.3.1 The Board of Directors 
According to SEC, 2011, code of best practices, the BOD is the uppermost authority 
in any organization. Boards of directors are charged with overall responsibility for 
the firm, specifically the oversight of management and control. BODs have a 
fiduciary or moral duty to represent the equity shareholders’ interests and to assure 
that there is alignment between the interests of the executives and the shareholders 
(SEC, 2011). In legal terms board of directors have three major important duties: 
1.  Duty of Loyalty – The responsibility to act in the wellbeing of the firm in 
general, and not in their own individual interests. A key pre-requisite to 
fulfill the duty of loyalty is to devote sufficient time to running of the day 
today operation and be well informed about company affairs. 
2.  Duty of Care - The duty to pay attention and strive to make good decisions 
intended to promote and enhance performance of the company. 
3.  Disclosure Duties - The duty to provide reasonable and complete disclosure 
to shareholders in two cases: when equity shareholders are asked to vote, and 
when the organization completes a potential conflict-of interest in 
transaction. The BOD duties, responsibilities and functions are achieved 
through monitoring and evaluation of the company’s leadership through 
mechanisms such as reporting, auditing, and setting and reviewing company 
policies. 
 
Epstein (2012) suggested three primary tasks of the board of directors which 




1. Corporate accountability - Ensure appropriate financial reporting and 
disclosures, provide systems for enhancing governance, transparency, and 
ethical issues, and review policies related to internal controls and check, risk 
management, and code of conduct, financial and all external regulations and 
compliance issues. 
2.  Staffing and evaluation of top management - The selection and 
compensation of executives setting and performance goals and evaluation of 
their achievement, and succession planning. 
3. Strategic oversight - The review and approval of long term plans, risk 
management policies, and major investments decision. 
 
The main responsibility of the chairman is to guarantee the process followed by the 
board to  attain the firm’s long term objectives (SEC, 2011). The daily running of the 
firm should be primary obligation of the (CEO) and the executive team and not the 
responsibility of the chairman of the company. The positions of the chairman and 
CEO shall be separate and held by separate persons as recommended by the SEC 
code of 2011 in Nigeria. If the power is concentrated in the hand of few, it could lead 
to abuse of power and self-interest instead of the interest of the owners (Brickley et 
al., 1997; SEC, 2011) 
 
The board chairman is responsible for directing the board in its activities and for 
serving as the principal liaison between management and the BOD. With respect to 




of committee chairman and other directors, for setting board meeting agenda and 
programme for determining whether and when special board meetings should be 
held. The essential responsibility of the chairman of the BOD in an entity is to keep 
the board in an organized and informed manner.  There should be some elements of 
public associations work involved as well, in addition to stand-in as a guide to the 
CEO. More specifically, the responsibilities of the board chairman include the 
following attributes as stated by the Nigeria Code of corporate governance 2011. 
1. Facilitate or preside over meetings- board chairman is expected oversee over 
organization executive board meetings. More precisely, the agenda of the 
meeting is expected to be drawn by the presiding chairman board meeting.  
The chairman should both encourage constructive discussion and 
participation BODs members in order to move the company forward. The 
chairman should also transmit any crucial information regarding issues 
concerning the running of the company’s business. The divergent and 
professional view of all the board members should be respected by the board 
chairman as far as it is separated from personal interest. These views could 
be in form of debate and discussion during the board meeting as it could lead 
to performance of the firm. 
2. Board organization - For fruitful meetings of the board to hold, the 
composition of the board must be balanced. They must be people of good 
trait and there must not be minor and their profession and experience should 
be considered. Furthermore, the board chairman needs to involve older 




3. The board chairman should also serve as Spokesman of the company. The 
board chairman must have good public relation. The spokesperson role as a 
chairman largely involves passing the mission statement of the corporation to 
the general public, along with sufficiently explaining to the public, the 
strategies of the firm. The board chairman is also responsible for ensuring 
that the board works as it should in counseling, guiding, and monitoring and 
sometime directing the CEO. Since the board chairman is expected to 
perform some crucial  control functions, it is often suggested that a different 
person apart from the CEO should occupy this position (Ehikioya, 2009; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Reynald & Li, 2009) . 
 
The implications of organizations leadership structure for firm performance have 
been richly debated in the literature. The market’s growing volatility, the demand for 
evidence on the effect and risks of CEO Duality sparked growing research in this 
area. The arguments against CEO duality are strongly founded on the agency theory. 
CEO of contemporary businesses always acts in self favour instead of that of the 
owners of business. This was the reason for call for separation of the leadership 
position which results in mitigation of  agency problems when there is divorce of 
ownership from control (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). To backup these self-interest 
conflicts, this argument proposes the running of the firm becomes more effective and 
focus when the two roles is separated. Extending this logic, the recommendation 





1.  The BOD is answerable to overall performance of firm activities. It should 
explain the firm’s long term objectives and guarantee that resources are 
proficiently organized towards achieving firm’s goals. 
2. The BOD is to guarantee that the corporation is correctly handled. It is the 
role of the BODs to manage the resources of the firm to achieve performance 
so as to protect equity holder interest and to meet the firm’s commitments to 
workers and investors. 
3. The board should guarantee that the firm conducts on its affair in accordance 
with the relevant laws and regulations guiding the company.  
4.  The delegation of work shall be done by the BOD to the management. The 
allocation of responsibility to those running the business does not in any way 
lessen the general duty of the BOD as the board is being held liable for the 
activities and firm performance. 
 
The BOD of company is crucial in firm performance because they perform 
monitoring roles which includes the selection of employees for the organization 
(Xiaoyan, 2013) . The BOD can constitute audit committee as one of the board 
committees to prevent corporate failures by overseeing the account preparation 
process and monitoring the management. This could lead  to resolving inside 
problem and reduce  agency cost in a firm  (Al-matari & Al-matari, 2012). 
 
The member of BODs should also be answerable to the equity holders for every 




directors: executive directors and the non-executive directors. The bulk or larger 
percentage of BOD  should take rational decisions to increase the  worth of  the 
equity holders investment and avoid corporate failures (Bijalwan & Madan, 2013; 
Lin, 2013; Xiaoyan, 2013).  
 
The role of outside directors is very vital to improve executive function as they can 
oversee the association and force the executives to take impartial decisions 
(Xiaoyan, 2013). The selection of the board should be done in a manner that it will 
consist both the executive and non-executive directors for the value creation and 
better firm performance (Finegold et al., 2007; Johnson & Greening, 1994). 
 
2.3.2 Officers of the Board in Nigeria 
2.3.2.1 The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
According to the Nigeria corporate governance code released by SEC in 2011, it 
states that the CEO is the number one ranking officer in charge of the day to day 
running of a business, and can play crucial functions in firm performance. 
Executives plays a vital role in improving firm performance because their role could 
lead to reduction in agency cost of firm by improving the level of information to be 
disclosed in the annual financial reports. Information asymmetry is also been 
reduced as a results of CEO effectiveness (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). The minority 
equity holders’ rights are intimidated and the actions of the executives mostly favour 
the majority equity holders in the developing market. However, the executive and 
the equity holders in these markets seldom  use the instrument of aggressive 




help to improve the performance of the organization (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Shan 
& McIver, 2011; Xiaoyan, 2013).  
 
The CEO is the chief of the executive group and is accountable to the BOD. The 
chief should be expert and well-informed in crucial areas of the firm’s operations. 
Credibility and integrity should be his watch word. The BOD should have 
confidence in him and the organization as a whole (Krause, Semadeni, & Cannella, 
2013). The CEO and the  management team should institute a principles of good CG 
and relevant statute and laws which should be followed by workers at all levels of 
the organization (Ikoh et al., 2013; Liedorp et al., 2013;  Rogers, 2008; Xiaoyan, 
2013). 
2.3.2.2 Executive Directors 
According to the corporate governance code of SEC 2011, the executive directors 
are individuals well-informed in important areas of the firm’s undertaking, executive 
director are involved in the daily running of the company’s business operations.  
Specifically, executive director should be in charge of units and should be 
responsible to the BOD through Managing Director (MD). Their pay determination 
is the decision of BOD. The component of executive directors’ remuneration should 
include long-term performance linked and bonuses, all this should be disclosed in the 




2.3.2.3 Non-Executive Directors 
According to the corporate governance code of 2003, the Non-executive directors 
(NED) should be crucial members of the board. They should bring autonomous 
judgment as well as vital scrutiny to the proposals and actions of the management 
and executive directors especially on issues of policy, performance appraisal and key 
appointments.  NED should be individuals of high personality with broad 
knowledge, honesty and reliability and proficiency that can increase the level of 
independence and fairness in corporate decision making (Kamardin & Haron, 2011; 
Ogbechie & Koufopoulos, 2010).   
2.3.6 Meetings of Shareholders 
The general meetings of the company shall be the principal avenue for meeting and 
discussion between the equity holders and all other stakeholders ’in the firm. The 
BODs shall guarantee that all stockholders are treated equitably and all information 
about the corporation (Nigerian code of corporate governance, 2011). 
 
 The BOD should guarantee that equity holder’s statutory and overall rights are 
protected at all times (SEC, 2011). In particular, the Board should ensure that equity 
holders at annual general meeting keep their effective powers to appoint and remove 
directors of the firm where they maintain equity. The BOD should ensure that all 
equity holders are given equal treatment. No equity holder, however large or small, 
institutional or domestic, should be given preferential treatment or superior access to 




equity holders are treated equally at all times and are adequately protected from 
insulting actions of controlling stockholders (SEC, 2011) 
2.3.7 Risk Management 
According to the revised code of corporate governance of Nigeria released in 2011, 
the BOD is responsible for the process of managing the risk of the company (SEC, 
2011).  Risk management is an integral part of BOD function as stated in the code of 
best practice. Executives are responsible to the BOD for executing risk management 
of the firm. The composition should include persons with professional knowledge in 
the area of risk management. The BOD of any company may inaugurate a risk 
committee to help it in its risk profile oversight role, risk management mechanism 
and the risk-reward plan to be determined by the BOD (Ballou et al., 2012; SEC, 
2011, Edogbanya & Kamardin, 2015). The Risk management committee functions 
are as follows: 
1.  Appraisal and endorsement of the firm’s risk management system including risk 
strategy. 
2. Assessing the abundance, efficiency and efficacy of risk controls systems. 
3. Oversees of executive’s method for the knowing the significance of risks across 
the firm operations and the sufficiency of avoidance, discovery and reporting 
systems 
4. Appraisal of the firm’s level of compliance with applicable regulatory framework 




2.3.8 Disclosures in the Financial Report 
Companies should disclose more than is required by the necessary regulatory agency 
like CAMA 1990 and NCCG 2011. The financial statements must be certified by 
auditor that it presents a true and fair view of the undertakings of the firm.  The 
board of a public limited firm should state the governance structure in the annual 
report and all information about the firm strength as per the governance mechanism, 
policies and practices to shareholders (SEC, 2011).  
 
Given the corporate scandals such as Enron, WorldCom in the global scene and  
Oceanic Bank management problem, Intercontinental Bank, Afri bank, bank PHB 
management and margin loan problem and lack of disclosure by these banks in 
Nigeria that led to four banks to be nationalized by Central Bank of Nigeria 
(Adelopo, 2011). Restoring public trust is at the top of the plan of today’s business 
frontrunners which can be done through greater disclosure of material information 
on the enterprise’s capital and control structures and strong corporate governance 
compliance (Beasley, 2014; Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & Lapides, 2000).  
2.2.9 Transparency and Disclosure of Information 
In line with the agency theory, companies are viewed as interconnection of contracts 
which are vulnerable to information asymmetry and self-interest of the managers and 
its shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), transparency and disclosure (T&D) in 
the annual report as instruments to solve problem that may result from agency 




of owners (Che Haat, Rahman, & Mahenthiran, 2008). Such practices are expected 
to lower the agency costs, leading to high   firm performance which is also indicated 
in signaling theory as stated in  Spence (1973). 
 
Transparency is an essential component of corporate governance and transparency 
and disclosure reduces the information asymmetry between a company’s executive 
and shareholder’s in the firm (equity forms of security and creditors and other 
interested parties in business) and mitigating the agency issues in corporate 
governance (Beasley et al., 2000; Sandeep, Balic, & Bwakira, 2002). In Nigeria and 
most part of Africa, lack of T&D is attributed to the closures of some firms (Rogers, 
2008). Transparency in organization is very important as it brings out risk profile in 
an organization and also report good news and bad news when necessary to give its 
investors and potential investors confidence in the executives’ work. This means 
there must be public information on firms rules and regulations which shows    
organizational transparency (Rogers, 2008).  
 
Chen and Cheng (2007) argue that timely incorporation of disclosure of losses in the 
annual report will lead to the efficacy of CG effectiveness. For example, enhanced 
and excellence corporate governance mechanism can lead to a reduction in sharp 
practices by the executives. The measurement of transparency and disclosure 
includes disclosures of financial accounting of major investors, disclosures of 
information in good time, communication of information and information  





Firm have incentives to disclose all material information about their business 
transactions (Yosha, 1993). Corporate information disclosure provides room for firm 
to influence the perception of potential stakeholder’s of the future of the company’s 
performance and firms value. Companies may withhold unfavorable news in a 
voluntary disclosure because they use their discretion on disclosure policies (Dye, 
2014). Deegan (2002) posit that leaving disclosures task to the managers may lead to 
biased information that gives excellent impression of the company. When the going 
concern of company is threatened, managers may only disclose all favourable 
information. The abuse of discretionary disclosure leads to the introduction of 
mandatory disclosure requirements of detailed information (Suijs, 2005). Mandatory 
disclosure reduces the agent ability to only report excellent performance, positive 
results and symbolic information (Mobus, 2005).  
 
The accounting standards will complement existing monitoring mechanisms of 
disclosure as argued by Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (2001). Disclosure and 
corporate governance mechanism are more often appreciated as closely related 
concepts - the higher the level of transparency, the more excellent the value of CG 
practices (Alexandrina, 2007). The lack of financial transparency and disclosure was 
often viewed as one of the major causes of most corporate scandals and governance 
failures around the world, adversely affecting self-reliance of public in the reliability 





Transparency and disclosure studies are vital considering that academics debated 
that enhancements in company’s transparency through quality disclosures in the 
financial statements  can reduce false reporting by the companies executives  
(Adelopo, 2011b). The disclosure of information in the annual financial statement 
and reports should be done in a way that will reflect timeliness, relevance, 
comparability and understandability (Adelopo, 2011a; Che Haat et al., 2008). 
 
Disclosure assists investors to come closer to the corporation’s affairs and hence, 
reduces the gap between management and stakeholders (Akhtaruddin, Hossain, & 
Yao, 2009). The agency theory signifies that firm’s increases disclosure to prevent 
potential pressures from monitoring authorities (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009). Voluntary 
disclosures are information disclosed in excess of the requirement with free choice 
of the part of firms’ management to divulge crucial information to the management 
to show transparency of their transactions (Meek, Roberts, & Gray, 2014). Those 
competing for fund in the world market provides wide range of information 
disclosures beyond the requirements of regulatory authority, however, the 
availability of crucial financial report is the need to gain entrance into the 
international scene (Meek et al., 2014). In order to increase the worth of disclosure in 
financial report and statements, regulatory authorities in Nigeria adopted SEC 
disclosure requirements for companies. 
 
Information transparency and disclosure practices are an important elements and a 




Nigerian firms need transparent and full disclosure of information to sustain the 
growth rate and to solve agency problem from false declaration of information and 
majority shareholders expropriating minority shareholder (Adelopo, 2011b; Aksu & 
Kosedag, 2006; Othman, 2013; Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Zaheer, 2013). Firm with 
greater corporate governance quality makes more excellent  disclosures beyond the 
regulatory requirements (Al-Razeen & Karbhari, 2004).  In Nigeria context, 
companies are advised to disclose beyond statutory requirements as stated in the 
code of corporate governance released by SEC in 2011. 
2.3.10 Mandatory Disclosure Requirement in Nigeria 
Company and Allied Matter Act (CAMA) (1990) section 334(2) states the 
mandatory disclosure requirements in the annual report includes the following; 
            “A statement of accounting policy, the balance sheet 
as at the last day of the year, a profit and loss account 
or, in the case of a company not trading for profit, an 
income and expenditure account for the year, Notes on 
the accounts and the auditor’s reports” 
 
Other statutory disclosures required in the annual reports are as follows: 
Section 335(1) of CAMA requires that accounts should be prepared in accordance 
with the accounting standards recommended by the NASB. In terms of comparisons, 
there are differences between the local accounting standards and the international 
accounting standards that is the IFRS While there are some standards that are not 
currently being used in the preparation of account in the country, there are some 





Section 342 of the CAMA (1990) stipulates that the directors should report the 
activities to the shareholders. The annual report should contain the names of the 
directors. There are no requirements that the directors should be either independent 
or not. It provides for a maximum of 20 directors and minimum of 5 directors on the 
board of directors. It does not provide any guidance on the structure of the board, 
just as there is no statutory guideline on the duration of their meetings; however, 
information on members’ attendance at meetings should be available for inspection 
by shareholders at the venue of the annual. 
 
Section 359(3) to (6) (a) to (f) of CAMA, requires that the limited company to 
constitute an audit committee with membership equally shared between management 
and the shareholders. The law stipulates a maximum membership of 6 and maximum 
of 1 executive director on the board. There are no requirements on the structure and 
characteristics of the committee in terms of its independence, functioning etc. There 
are also no requirements to have a remuneration or nomination committees. The law 
also details the expected functions of the audit committees as follows; “To obtain 
from the general auditor an independent and objective assessment of the adequacy 
and effectiveness of the controls over (1) financial reporting, (2) effectiveness and 
efficiency of operations, and (3) compliance with laws and regulations, at such 
regular meetings and at other times as necessary” By and large, regulatory 
framework in Nigeria is still developing; however, the NSE has set a strong 
regulatory structure. Most of the quoted corporations in Nigeria have conformed to 




2.3.11 The Importance of Transparency 
The principle of disclosure and transparency is viewed by the Nigerian code of 
corporate governance as an excellent measure in ensuring the protection of the 
outside shareholder and minority interest in business. This assertion is in line with 
CAMA which states minimum guideline in preparation and presentation of 
accounting information. Therefore, transparency in this context is defined by Ariffin 
(2005, p. 15) as “public disclosure of reliable and timely information that enables 
users of such information to make an accurate assessment and judgment of an 
organization financial condition and performance, business activities, risk profile and 
risk management practices”. This explanation identifies that disclosure of accounting 
information cannot alone guarantee excellent transparency and disclosure of the 
organization as a whole. To achieve transparency, an institution must provide timely, 
accurate, relevant and qualitative and quantitative information.  this will allows users 
to make enhanced appraisal of the firms events and risks present in those actions that 
can leads to the overall firm performance (Ariffin, 2005; Kosedag & Aksu, 2005).  
 
Strong transparency and disclosure keep corporate stakeholders informed about the 
doing and operations of the corporation and how the firm is governed (Mac & Mae, 
2011). Furthermore, research posit that excellent  disclosure of relevant information 
have been proven to have  good effect on the effective running of capital markets as 
it sends signal to the potential investors (Silva & Lubian-lopez, 2013; Stiglbauer, 
2010). Specifically, Healy and Palepu (2001) posits that reporting detail financial 




executive may lead to the increased pace of innovation, internationalization of trade 
and have increased the value of depending on information in the security markets.  
 
In the imperfect accounting regulations, managers can be stimulated to make 
voluntary disclosure for so many reasons. First of all they can be driven by the 
expectation of cost of capital reduction by reducing the information asymmetry and 
the uncertainty of return on investment perceived by investors (Lang & Lundholm, 
2014) Secondly, managers can voluntarily disclose given the importance of 
disclosure as an improvement in business transparency (Adelopo, 2011a). This is 
done through quality disclosure and can greatly reduce information asymmetries 
(Botosan, 1997).  
 
Similarly, when the shares are in bad situation, the managers may withhold the 
information which may likely have an adverse effect in the performance of the firm 
(Dye, 2014). In this case, managers may likely disclose relevant and material 
information in order to protect themselves from possible legal actions for inadequate 
or untimely disclosure (Skinner, 1994, 1997).  However, brilliant managers may 
have an incentive to make voluntary earnings forecasts in order to enable the market 
to appreciate their role and capabilities (Trueman, 1986).  
 
Furthermore, the literatures suggest that it is in the corporation’s  interest to provide 
more voluntary disclosures, thereby reducing the information asymmetry component 




increasing the company's stock liquidity (Ariffin, 2005; Lambert & Verrecchia, 
2012). Transparency reduces moral hazard and unethical practices by top 
management and adverse selection and enhances efficiency, credibility and integrity 
of the markets and strengthens market discipline (Ariffin, 2005). 
2.4 Standardization of Accounting Practice 
Standards involve formulation of assurance services that are tailored towards 
controlling and regulating trade activities, contracts agreements and rules and 
regulation guiding activities of event at any point in time (Ashbaugh & Pincus, 2001; 
Mary et al., 2013).  Standards are developed or formed by an individual or 
government to serve as a guide or minimum bench mark for their operations, 
business associations or standard setting committees and the regulatory agencies 
(Oliveira, Rodrigues, & Craig, 2011). The sources mentioned above have serious 
role in setting ammonized standards for business organizations (Kasum, 2012; Mary 
et al., 2013; Oliveira et al., 2011). They also stipulate that three types of standards 
are relevant which are the performance standards, compatibility standards and 
measurement standards. The Standards that specify the way of doing things is 
referred as performance standards. The interface between standards and their 
relationship between quality and quantity is called compatibility. Standards set the 
rules to follow at any particular point in time is called measurement standard. Mary 
et al. (2013) identifies that standard are set in order to conform to basic way of doing 




(Adekoya, 2012; Edogbanya & Kamardin, 2014) standards setters and preparers are 
there to enable the users comply to ensure uniformity of operation. 
 
Oghuma and Iyoha (2006) states that the preparation and presentation and disclosure 
of financial statement is the responsibility of accountants. BOD are responsible also 
to see that management comply with all the prescribe rules governing the 
preparation. The knowledge and skills of accountants must be put together   in 
carrying out these preparation and presentation. The procedures for producing 
financial statement were not standardized in the past leading to company producing 
different type of report using the standard set by the individual company and the 
consequences are that the accounts produced may not be in the interest of the owner 
of business. This practice was adopted by managers in many part of the world before 
the introduction of standards by regulating agencies that may be formed by the 
government of respective country to attend to accounting issues and standards. 
Different accountant, therefore, can produce different balance sheets for identical 
firms with similar characters and in the same industry (Oghuma & Iyoha, 2006).  
 
However, the accounting profession needed more transparency, compatibility, 
accountability and enhanced public confidence in terms of proper record keeping of 
financial reporting and good corporate governance structure (Kasum, 2012).  
Standards were developed as guidelines which defines how companies and 
businesses should display transactions and events in their financial report and 




account and practice, enlightenment of users of accounting information and 
provision of a framework for preparation, presentation and interpretation of 
accounting information. This standard should be the best interest of the owners of 
business, creditor, potential investors and the rest users of accounting information 
(Kasum, 2012; Mary et al., 2013; Okpala, 2012).  
 
The issuance standards guiding accounting presentation report is the International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC), The International Accounting Standard Board 
(IASB) previously known as the International Accounting Standard Committee 
(IASC) is charged with the responsibilities of developing the standards and the board 
has been responsible for the issuance of about Standards as IAS and IFRS. In the 
past, countries of the world chooses between adopting the International Standard 
directly or adapting their own standard to reflect what the International standards has 
provided and also consider their own local environment. The measure for the 
regulation of their accounting and reporting is dependent on whatever the individual 
country is adopting (Edogbanya & Kamardin, 2014; Kasum, 2012; Oghuma & 
Iyoha, 2006). 
 
Researches have yield mixed results on whether the adoption of IFRS is favorable to 
a country. capital-market efficiency can be improved as a result of international 
harmonization in accounting can improve a common set of international accounting 
standards can reduce the information processing and auditing costs to market 




that accounting standards “evolve in the context of domestic cultural, legal, and 
other institutional features (including auditing): international harmonization in 
accounting, if it is not accompanied by changes to related capital market institutions, 
can be costly” 
2.5 Underpinning Theories  
Various theories can explain the dynamics of corporate governance, financial 
reporting and performance. These theories include, signaling theory (Spence, 1973)  
agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), resource dependency theory (Payerle & 
Pfeffer, 1978)  and shareholders theory Hetherington, (2014), however, this study 
proposes to adopt agency theory, signaling theory and recourse dependency theory to 
explain the framework proposed for this study. 
2.5.1 Signaling Theory 
This theory is very important in explaining behavior when two characters are 
involved. These parties could be individual or organizations. These parties have 
admittance to different information about the firm. Characteristically, one party the 
sender which is referred to as signaler must choose the appropriate way to 
communicate (signal)(Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2010).  
 
According to Connelly, Certo, Ireland and Reutzel (2010), signaling theory is highly 
characterized with reducing false information between associated parties in business. 




communicate to the capital market that the method employed in the diversification is 
in the best interest of stakeholders in business (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 
2010).  
 
Management researchers have applied signaling theory to support and explain the 
influence of information asymmetry in a broad of research effort. The observable 
quality of financial statements by investors is a result of signal sent by CEO of 
business organization (Spence, 1973). The researcher further states that signaling 
theory explains how firms or business organization uses their board to communicate 
to the shareholders about the extent of achievement, disclosure and compliance with 
relevant CG mechanism and financial reporting.  The CEO also provides signal 
about firms or organization quality to the financial market (Brandes, Hadani, & 
Goranova, 2006; Spence, 1973; Zhang & Wiersema, 2009).  
.  
Furthermore, Karasek and Bryant, (2012) and  Zhang and Wiersema, (2009) 
postulated that signaling is present in every activities. People provide signal by 
speaking, carrying themselves and interacting with others. In another way, 
organization or firm signal through advertisements, recruitment and presentation of 
annual report and financial statement as well as compliance with relevant corporate 
governance code and financial reporting standards to reduce information 
asymmetries (Karasek & Bryant, 2012; Spence, 1973). This study therefore adopt 
signaling theory to explain the relationship between  corporate disclosure, risk 





Spence (1973) who did an empirical study on corporate governance structures based 
his research on signaling theory and information exists between company’s manager 
and those who have interest in the company. The firm therefore removes information 
asymmetry by providing material information to the stockholders. However, there is 
no way for investor to understand the real situation of information asymmetry of the 
transaction of the firm. Previous studies state that information is sent out by 
company to attract investors. In practical terms, company or organization with good 
CG normally disclose information to the public to promote good image of the 
business institutions (Bhattacharya, 2007; Chiang, 2005; Spence, 1973). Figure 2.1 
below shows signaling and information environment of the business. The diagram 
show that the information is sent by the BOD about the performance of the firm and 
received by the stakeholders of the business including potential investors. There 








Figure 2.1: Signaling Circle 
2.5.2 Agency Theory 
Agency theory is an assumption which tends to explain the relationship or 
association between the owner of business (principal) and those appointed by the 
owners (agent) in business. The agency problem addresses the problem that can exist 
in agency association that is between the employee and the employed. The basis of 
agency theory can be traced to (Jesen & Meckling, 1976). The two main agency 
issues is the conflict of interest on the part of executive and monitoring cost on the 
part of principals. This theory is also based on the understanding that the agent have 
more material information than the principal, hence , this information asymmetry 
impact on the principals ability adversely to effectively monitor whether if their 





The business value that is to be created, be it for shareholder or whoever, is a result 
of the effort of the managers. It has been said that the managers have no legal 
responsibility to shareholders, but to the company. It has, however, been asserted by 
the courts that the interests of the company are those of the equity holders, making 
the directors to be thus, responsible to the shareholders (Anderson, et. al; 2007). 
According to (Charreaux & Desbrières, 2001) “value creation depends on the 
corporate governance system”. A review without that of management here, therefore, 
may make the work incomplete. The association between the principal in business 
and agent employed by the owners of a firm is an agency type. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) define the agency association as a contract under which one party (the 
principal) engages another party (the agent) to perform some services as dedicated to 
him. An agency relationship arises whenever one or more individuals, called 
principals, hire one or more other individuals, called agents, to perform some 
services and then delegate decision-making authority to the agents. The primary 
agency relationships in business are those between stockholders and managers and 
between debt holders and stockholders. 
 
Agency theory first arose in the 1970s. The concept of agency, however, dates back 
to the time of first separation of ownership from management. Other scholars 
involved in agency theory's formative period in the 1970s included Armen Alchian, 
Harold Demsetz, Michael Jensen, and William Meckling. Specifically, agency 
theory is directed at a relationship between the principal and agent who performs that 




theory and its relationship with corporate governance (Jesen & Meckling, 1976). 
Agency theory suggests that the firm can be viewed as nexus resource holders, the 
owners and contracts intellectual and managerial resources. 
 
Agency topic is usually in focus because of interest asymmetry. Issue of self and 
divergent interest cannot be overemphasized. Agency hitches arise from conflicts of 
interest between parties in business, these parties includes the agent and principal 
(Lockhart & Crow, 2011; Ross, 1973). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
holds that managers will not act to maximize the returns to equity holders in the 
large corporation, unless good CG structures are implemented to safeguard the 
interests of equity holders. Agency loss is the degree to which earnings to the 
residual claimants, the principal, fall below what they would be if the principals, the 
owners, exercised direct control over the company (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
 
 Agency theory raises a fundamental problem of self-interested behavior, on the one 
hand, in an organization. “A corporation's managers may have personal goals that 
compete with the owner's goal of maximization of shareholder wealth”. Agency 
theory proposes that, in an imperfect labour and capital markets managers will seek 
to maximize their own utility at the expense of principle or stockholder in business. 
Agents have the capacity to operate in their own self-interest rather than interest of 
the owners. Evidence of self-interested managerial behaviour can be seen in the 




avoidance of optimal risk positions, whereby risk-averse managers avoid profitable 
opportunities in which the firm's equity holder would prefer to invest.  
 
Majority of large publicly traded corporations, agency conflicts are potentially quite 
significant, because the firm's managers generally own only a small percentage of 
the common stock. Therefore, shareholder wealth maximization could be 
subordinated to an assortment of other managerial goals. For instance, managers may 
have a fundamental objective of maximizing the size of the firm. By creating a large, 
rapidly growing firm, executives increase their own status, create more opportunities 
for lower and middle-level managers, improve salaries and enhance their job 
security, because an unfriendly takeover is less likely (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
More so, it has been said that obtaining resources from the environment and 
satisfying key shareholders are simply additional aims for the organization. Ideally, 
therefore, when we speak of firm performance, we should consider a set of outcomes 
that reflect the different perspectives (Hillier, Linn, & McColgan, 2005). The 
possibilities of manager's actions on value sharing in particular can be important in a 
firm that creates a high stakeholder value. He may prefer binding the customers with 
a reasonable price, guaranteeing a regular supply with a pricing policy favorable to 
the suppliers or attract his employees with a generous wage policy. Managers 
involves themselves in these rather than allot created value to the shareholders, 
whose role, in the process of value creation, they consider as minor for most of the 
firms, since financial capital does not provide any core competence (Charreaux & 





Checking the perceived excesses of the managers is usually not without its costs. 
Like any other cost, agency problems will be dealt with by the financial market and 
be reflected in a corporation’s share price. These costs can be seen as the value or 
loss to equity holders, arising from divergences of interests between equity holders 
and agent. Researchers have defined agency cost as those costs undertaken by equity 
holders to encourage managers to maximize shareholders’ wealth rather than behave 
in their own self-interests. Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined agency costs as the 
sum of cost of monitoring, cost of bonding and residual loss. According to 
encyclopedia of business, the agency costs includes the cost expenditures to monitor 
managerial activities, such cost of audit; expenditures to structure the organization in 
a way that will limit unwanted managerial behaviour, such as appointing outside 
members to the BOD or restructuring the corporation's business units and 
management hierarchy; and opportunity costs, which business incurs when 
shareholders imposed restrictions. On the need to monitor the managers, scholars are 
of divergent opinion that excellent monitoring could be restricted to certain groups 
or individuals (Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1990). Another study reveals  a contradictory 
view on monitoring, arguing that too much constraint will constrain managerial 
initiative and will act as deterrent to managerial entrepreneurship (Markus & Sor, 
1994). However,  (Denis et al., 1997;  Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1999) recommends 
optimal levels of monitoring of managerial policies that are specific to the individual 





How can owners make or encourage managers to work in firms’ interest? For any 
effective governance mechanism, two conditions must be ensured. Firstly, does the 
device serve to narrow the gap between manager and equity holders’ interests? 
Secondly, does the structure then have a significant impact on firm performance and 
value? (Himmelberg, Hubbard, & Palia, 1999). Stock-based compensations to the 
managers could induce to maximize equity holders’ wealth. Furthermore, families 
that are well to do are said to prefer family ownership of   enterprise. CG thus 
becomes the governing of family relationships. However, all the three theories 
discussed have link with corporate governance mechanism and the interest of 
protecting equity holders’ interest and other interest in an organization. Meanwhile, 
agency theory is adopted for this study. 
2.5.3 Resource Dependency Theory 
The board of directors  administrative functions can best be described  through the 
lenses of agency theory; the environmental linking functions of the board of 
directors  are best examined through the resource dependency theory (Bryant & 
Davis, 2012). Resource dependency theory suggests that organizations act in ways 
associated with their level of dependence upon various resources (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978).  Organizations act upon their environments in attempts to reduce 
dependency on certain resources and to maintain independence over other resources 
 
Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold (2000) posit that most other research concerning the 




The Consideration is on that agency theory perspective is most appropriate for an 
administrative function of the board of director’s examination. Resource dependency 
theory states that when the board committee is bigger, a better performance is 
achieved. Resource dependency theory relate to corporate governance and 
performance and links them with the intensity of board activity, measured through 
the board meeting frequency. The resource postulates that the board meeting helps 
the board to evaluate and pursue a board business from time to time and to solve any 
problem faced by employees. Hence, when the board meeting frequency increases, 
the performance of the firm is expected to be more enhanced 
 
Whilst the stakeholder theory focuses on relationships with many groups for 
individual benefits, the resource dependency theory concentrates on the role of board 
directors in providing access to resources needed by the firm. Hillman, Canella and 
Paetzold (2000) posit that resource dependency theory focuses on the role that 
directors play in providing or securing essential resources for an organization 
through their linkages to the external environment (Babalola & Adebipe, 2014). 
Meanwhile, Wanyonyi & Tobias (2013) agreed that resource dependency theorists 
provide focus on the appointment of representatives of independent organizations as 
a means for gaining access in resources critical to firm success. For example, outside 
directors who are partners to a law firm provide legal advice, either in board 
meetings or in private communication with the firm executives that may otherwise 





 It has been argued that the provision of resources enhances organizational 
functioning, firm’s performance and its survival (Daily et al, 2003) According to 
Hillman, Canella and Paetzold (2000) that directors bring resources to the firm, such 
as information, skills, and access to key constituents such as suppliers, buyers, public 
policy makers, social groups as well as legitimacy. It is therefore appropriate to 
adopt this theory for this study as agency theory and the signaling theory may not be 
adequate to explain the entire variable under this research. 
2.6 Firm Performance 
Gitman & Vandenberg, (2000) Nuryaman (2012, p. 12) defined “performance as a 
description of level of achievement of the implementation of an activities / programs 
/ policies in realizing the goals, purpose, mission and vision of the establishments as 
stated in the formulation and long term schemes (strategic planning) of an institution, 
can generally be said that the performance is the achievement which can be achieved 
by firms in a particular period”. Kald and Nilsson (2000) and  Khanchel (2008) posit 
that the measurement performance can be explained as a process of measuring the 
efficacy measures. This measurement is tailored towards identifying weakness of 
any firm and performance of the companies. The effectiveness and efficiency of any 
organization activities could be viewed as performance measurement of companies 
or firm performance (Nanka-Bruce, 2011).  
 
Several measurements of firm performance are used as indices of performance of the 




corporate investment decision. This measure of performance is either the accounting 
measure or the market measure of firm performance (Dowen, 2001;  Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2006). 
 
The accounting measure of performance is Return on Asset (ROA), Return on equity 
(ROE) and Return on Investments (ROI) which is indicated by market profit margin 
on sale and Earning per Share (EPS). The firm earnings and the profit for the year 
are measured from the amount of capital contributed for the running of the business. 
The higher the result, the more efficient the management of assets is (Gitman & 
Vandenberg, 2000). This method of measurement is based on financial information 
of the company of historical results. This includes operating earnings, revenue and 
profit. The accounting measurements measure what the firm accomplishes in a 
particular year (Millstein & Macavoy, 1999).  
 
The impact of agency cost on firm performance is better investigated through the 
measure based on profitability (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2001) even though the 
measure is having the limitation of manipulation by the activities of the management 
and discretionary reporting choices which affect earning level of firm 
(Wiwattanakantang, 2001).  If the company can meet its debt obligation either short 
run or long run, that organization is said to be performing (Lukviarman, 2004). The 
ability of firm to settle it short term financial obligation is referred to as liquidity and 
the ability to meet both debt either long term or short term is called leverage 




ROA is in this study is used to reflect the utilization of assets employed by the 
company in enhancing the wealth of the shareholders. The following weaknesses are 
identified by Wiwattanakantang, (2001); 
(a) The ROA is widely thought that it might not absolutely accurate in 
measuring firm performance. 
(b) In the case of developing countries, where standards are not well established 
or it is established but the compliance is very poor. 
(c) Earning are easily manipulated.  
(d) There is biaisness associated with accounting standards regarding advertising 
expenses and depreciation. 
(e) Sales are less affected by firm level of earning management.  
 
Also, the market performance is also added as a proxy for firm performance 
alongside ROA. Market measure of performance (Tobin’s Q) is one of the measures 
to evaluate the performance of the company (Abdulazeez et al., 2016). This measure 
is one of the ways to assess the performance of the corporation’s activities (Taufik et 
al., 2017). This is because, the measure take into account, risk and return on 
investment to the equity holder and other investors (Short & Keasey, 1999). This 
type of measures considers prices of stock which are considered “forward looking” 
the economic value of the company’s information is reflected by the stock prices. 
Shareholders wealth creation can be determined by dividends pay out received by 
the shareholders and the institution stock price appreciation. This is referred to as 




Price to Book Value ratio (PBV) are the market performance measurements indices 
include which include stock returns and Tobin's Q. Furthermore, Millstein and 
Macavoy (1999) posit that the use of stock return for the evaluation of corporation 
performance has the possibility to reflect expected future performance rather than 
actual performance.  
 
Researchers have used Tobin's Q as performance measurement mechanism. This can 
be seen in the study by  (Roszaini Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Hermalin & Weisbach, 
2003; Mcconnell & Servaesb, 1995; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2001; Morck et al., 
1988; Nuryaman, 2012). “Tobin Q is the ratio of the market value of the replacement 
cost of its assets. In the absence of market power, a divergence of Q from one 
represents the value of assets not included in the denominator of Q such as the value 
of expected agency cost”  (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991, p. 104). In the country 
where replacement cost for asset are not available or accessible, an equity market to 
book ratio that is  market value of equity divided by the book value of net assets is 
used as an alternative proxy (Craswell, Taylor, & Saywell, 1997).  
 
However, Tobin’s Q cannot be measured without creating measuring bias. For Q to 
provide accurate measure of performance, stock prices have to reflect the true value 
of the firm  (Lindenberg & Ross, 1981).  Similarly,  Khanna and Palepu, (1999) posit 
that the assumption of Tobin’s Q may not meet the case of emerging economies 




clear whether ROA and Tobin’s Q is accurate in the case of Nigeria. On this note, 
the third measurement of performance (VAIC) is adopted for this study.  
 
In addition to the traditional corporate performance measurement discussed above, 
there is need for measurement using long term which includes firm total resources 
(physical and intellectual). Intellectual capital is important in knowledge economy. 
One of the component of intellectual capital is human capital which is heavily relied 
on by companies to perform (Pulic, 2004). Due to increase importance of intellectual 
capital to firms, it will be appropriate to adopt value added intellectual capital 
(VAIC) with other traditional method to measure performance (Abidin et al., 2000; 
Degroote et al., 2000).  
 
Furthermore, the reasons for adoption of VAIC method are attributed to the 
following; reduction of information asymmetries, investors react and accurately 
incorporate any information that has value relevance when making investment 
decisions, managers can evaluate their investment in in intellectual capital asset 
(Pulic, 2004). Similarly, Rahim, Atan and Kamaluddin, (2011) posit that external 
reasons, companies believes that knowledge capital should be measured in order to 
transmit the real value to the market in order to give the stakeholders comprehensive 






 Empirically, VAIC shows a strong positive relationship with some corporate 
governance code as shown in Goh (2005) and Tseng and  Goo (2005). The term 
“Intellectual Capital” collectively refers to all resources that determine the value of 
an organization, and the competitiveness of an enterprise. It is also argued that the of 
intellectual elements inclusion into the measurement of performance provides a 
long-term measurement of corporate performance (Abidin et al., 2000).  
 
Following the argument on intellectual capital value creation, Pulic (2004, 2000, 
1998) develops a useful measuring mechanisms in 1998 called VAIC. This method 
gives a new understanding to measures of value creation and monitors the value 
creation efficiency in firms using basic accounting figures. Contrary to the 
traditional accounting measure that focuses on tangible assets in corporate reporting, 
Pulic picks interest in the driver(s)/component (s) that create value (Chang & Hseih, 
2011). Pulic (2000), provides that there are two key resources that added value. They 
are: capital employed which consists of physical and financial capital and intellectual 
capital that consists of human and structural capital (Chang & Hseih, 2011). 
 
VAIC is a composite sum of three indicators formally termed (Abidin et al., 2000): 
firstly, Capital Employed Efficiency (CEE) is an indicator of value added efficiency 
of capital employed.  This is part of the total asset of company that should not be left 
when evaluating company performance based on each asset invested by company 
because of the influence that they can exert on companies’ performance (Díez, 




indicator of value added efficiency of human capital Human capital as an asset 
expected to create value in upgrading companies’ human resource via employee 
related knowledge, competencies and skill (Kamardin et al., 2013) and thirdly, 
Structural Capital Efficiency (SCE) is an indicator of value added efficiency of 
structural capital. This capital provides the structures and procedures within the 
organization that can be used by the employees to put their knowledge and skill to 
the best use; and provides the best practice in which human resource can be fully 
utilized (Bontis, 1998).  
 
VAIC is represented by Formula; VAIC = CEE + HCE + SCE (Abidin et al., 2000). 
The researcher have adopted to study VAIC alongside other measurement of 
performance because it takes care of  long term performance measurement and other 
items not fully captured on the balance sheet (Abidin et al., 2000; Degroote et al., 
2000; Kamardin et al., 2013; Pulic, 2004). 
2.7 Corporate Governance Mechanism and Firm Performance 
The importance of corporate governance on the value of the firm has long been 
recognized as  founding work of (Brunner & Meckling, 1976; Jesen & Meckling, 
1976) in a link of contracts among various parties in business, this is as result of 
owners managers conflict in an establishment. Subramanian and Swaminathan 
(2008) states that stock holder and parties in business interest are very important. 
Furthermore,  La-Porte,  Shleifer  and Vishny (2014) who research on the 




with uniform laws provide better protection of shareholder (Kasum, 2012). In a 
comprehensive review on different aspects of internal and external governance 
systems. Gillan (2006) suggests that the next wave of governance research will 
broaden the scope of what establishes corporate governance, and address multiple 
corporate governance mechanisms and their interactions ( Lin, 2013; Okpala, 2012). 
 
Corporate governance is a very hot topic as companies around the world are facing 
corporate problems. Corporate failures in the US and other part of the globe, many 
of which were caused  by corporate governance weaknesses (Bradley, 2004). 
Various management scholars have defined the concept of corporate governance in 
various ways. For example, Fourier (2006) states that excellent corporate governance 
is the tendency of company directors to conduct business within acceptable ethical 
standards. Corporate governance encourages fair, well-organized and transparent 
executive of organizations fortune to meet the objectives of the firm through 
effective practices and well-defined corporate governance structure (Maury, 2006; 
Rambo, 2013). 
 
Corporate governance is ensuring that the action of management is the best interests 
of shareholders and the remaining stakeholders in the firm. The protection of 
shareholder is one of the key and underlining principles of good corporate 
governance and implementation (Ishak & Napier, 2006; Lin, 2013). The minority 




interest in business is protected as a result of implementation of best practices by 
corporation (Gürbüz, 2010; Nuryaman, 2012). 
 
In another opinion, corporate governance is a chain of mechanisms that can protect 
all parties in business from controlling managers and executives of the firm if the 
self-interest of manager comes to play. The insider abuse by the controlling or 
majority shareholder against the minority shareholder could be controlled as result of 
presence of corporate governance mechanisms (Shleiver and Vishny, 1997). 
corporate governance is further defined as a “pattern of relationships, systems, and 
processes used by the organs of the company (Board of Directors, Board of 
Commissioners) to provide added value to equity holders and owners of company on 
an ongoing basis in the long term, with due regard to the interests of other 
stakeholders, based on laws and norms that applies” (Nur et al., 2013, p. 92) 
Corporate governance mechanism is basically a system for addressing agency 
problems of information asymmetry, problem between management and equity 
holder and monitoring the risk-taking of the firm  and financial performance (Tarraf, 
2012). The importance of effective and excellent corporate governance in the 
business environment could be seen from responses to the financial crisis around the 
globe and ways of instituting corporate governance practices. This includes many 
initiatives and statements by executives of firms and central banks that emphasize 
excellent corporate governance (Nur et al., 2013; Peni & Vähämaa, 2011). Hence, it 
is crucial to evaluate the potential consequences of enhanced corporate governance 




because despite the many studies cited above that inadequate firm governance 
contributed to the financial crisis, there is little empirical evidence to support these 
claims (Tarraf, 2012) 
 
Many scholars (Beck & Levine, 2008; Caprio, Laeven, & Levine, 2009; Laeven & 
Levine, 2007; Mishra & Nielsen, 2000; Sierra, Talmor, & Wallace, 2006) who 
investigated the role of corporate governance in organizations concludes that 
effective governance has positive effects on firm financial performance. Moreover, 
Brown and Caylor (2008); Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006); Cremers and Nair 
(2006); Gompers, And, Metrick (2003);  Haniffa and Hudaib (2006); Kesten (2011) 
suggested that good governance is highly associated with strong financial 
performance, and that good  governance practices may constrain managerial 
opportunism and reduce incentives for excessive risk-taking. 
2.7.1 Board Size and Firm Performance 
According to NCCG 2011, a company should have at least two set of boards of 
directors which includes executive and non-executive directors. The NCCG did not 
specify the maximum number of the appropriate board. The interest of the owners 
should be reflected by the size of the board. However, the Nigerian code of corporate 
governance recommends and emphasizes the essence of having effective board. 
The board of directors (BOD) size is an important element in achieving firm goals  
(Abdulazeez et al., 2016). The size should be adequate to represent the size of the 




should comprise both executive and non-executive directors (NONED) to guarantee 
different expertise on the board. This will allow compatibility, integrity, 
independence, and readiness of executives to attend BODs meetings (Roszaini 
Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). The BOD members should possess personal 
characteristics of credibility and integrity and spirit of entrepreneurship (Dowen, 
2001). There records should show high level of responsibility and persons who are 
committed for company advancement and excellent corporate governance and also 
transparent in the operation of the company (Dowen, 2001).  
 
However, there may not be adequate discussion on the company matters if the 
numbers of the directors on the board are too few. This will lead decision-making 
precision on the issues involved to move the company forward (Bijalwan & Madan, 
2013; Boyd, 1996; Hughes, 1995; Rossouw, 2005; Xiaoyan, 2013). 
 
Researches reveal mixed opinions on board size and firm performance. resource 
dependency theory postulates that BOD is beneficial lead the collection of expertise 
and firm resources so that organization goal can be attained  (Daily & Dalton, 1994; 
Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999; Johnson, Ellstrand, Dalton, & Dalton, 
2005). Larger board’s diversity helps companies to secure critical resources and 
reduce environmental uncertainties. They may also be constructive in their 





Hermalin and Weisbach (2012)  suggest that the BOD number is appropriate 
between eight (8) and nine (9). This suggestion is in support of large board which 
states that the long run goal will overweigh the agency cost of BOD. That is, the gain 
by additional membership will outshine the costs associated with slow decision 
making, the effort problem and easier control by the CEO. Cohen, Holder-Webb, 
Nath, and Wood (2011) and Grove et al. (2011) found that companies have larger 
boards as a result committees. The large board will enable the board to set up some 
company’s committees and some statutory committees as recommended by 
corporate governance code. These committees are as lending credit committee, audit 
committee and risk management committees, management committee, remuneration 
committee and research and development committee as stated by NCCG, 2011. 
 
Furthermore, Hermalin and Weisbach (2012); Jhunjhunwala and Mishra (2009) 
argues firm performance could be impaired if the  BOD  is large  Jensen, (1993) in 
another argument, the board ability decreases if  the board size increases. This is 
because the decision-making period of BOD will increase as result of low decision 
making. In another study,  Setia-atmaja, (2008) posits that the composition of larger 
board may include specialists from various fields; nonetheless, the productivity of 
the board and its effectiveness and corporate governance mechanisms could be 
dragged to the mud. As a result of peculiarity of working environment of large firm, 





Furthermore, the association of the board becomes negative as a result excessive 
board size which might impair firm performance (Grove et al., 2011). The agency 
conflicts will be increased due to a lack of efficient control by the board. The size of 
the board does matter whether small or large. What matter here is operational 
effectiveness by the company executive (Monks & Minow, 1989).  
 
On the other hand, researchers argues that small board size are more effective and 
are good in solving agency problem (Monks & Minow, 1989) , but when the board 
becomes too large, they began to consider their interest instead of the interest of 
owners (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2012).  
 
Lipton and Lorsch (1993), Pearce and Zahra (1992) Garg, (2007) and Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006), Amran and Ahmad (2009) and Nanka-Bruce (2011) found a 
significant negative association between board size and firm performance. 
Performance of firm could be enhanced if the board size is small. The monitoring 
role of each member is easier. As a result of small number of the board members,  
decisions can be quickly made (Akpan & Amran, 2014). On the other hand, the 
diversity required for firm to perform could be seen in a larger board size (Schiehll 
& Bellavance, 2009).  
 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) further found out that the board size is significantly 
related with both accounting measure of performance and market measure of 




it seem to have decreased performance compared to smaller board size in monitoring 
and controlling of company for better performance. When considering accounting 
measure, larger board seems to be better in terms of diversity of in contracts, 
expertise and experience needed to enhance performance of the organization in 
general.  
 
Similarly, (Erhardt et al., 2003) suggest that company board of directors is in charge 
for controlling and evaluating senior management and the major thing about board 
effectiveness is the board structure. In another study, board size is relevant in 
determining the level of compliance with corporate governance code and financial 
performance of business organization (Grove et al., 2011) he further stated that 
corporate governance to be prerequisite for organizational performance and greater 
independence.  Rambo (2013) found that that all the code of corporate governance is 
significantly associated with firm performance.  
 
The following also posit positive significance Kang and Kim (2011), Khanchel 
(2011) Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) and Premuroso and Bhattacharya (2007). 
Furthermore, Pearce and Zahra (1992) concluded that the board of directors are the 
most important instruments of corporate governance variables. Directors can only 
protect the interest of equity holders by taking decisive decision and good decision 
that will lead to the benefit of stakeholder in the business (Rebeiz & Salameh, 2006). 
Expanding the board is believed to provide an increased pool of  professional and 




The board may likely to face longer reaching timely decision for the organization as 
the large group may form faction in reaching timely decision as a result of different 
expertise.  
 
In Nigeria,  studies Akpan and Amran (2014) shows a positive significance, this is in 
line with study by Adams and Mehran (2012) who also found positive association 
between board size and performance. the following studies also found mixed results 
(Erah, Samuel, & Izedonmi, 2012; Mande, Ishak, Idris, & Ammani, 2013; Sanda, 
Mikailu, & Garba, 2005; Augustine Ujunwa, Nwakoby, & Ugbam, 2012). 
 
This section shows that the literature on the board size is broadly established, 
however, some empirical evidence is mixed and inconsistent notwithstanding in a 
similar setting. However, it is interesting to examine VAIC as another proxy of firm 
performance alongside traditional methods such as ROA and Tobin’s Q method of 
firm performance measurement in Nigeria, especially during the period after the 
adoption of NCCG 2011 and IFRS adoption.    
2.7.2 Non-Executive Directors and Firm Performance 
The BOD is viewed as a crucial internal corporate governance mechanism. In the 
corporate form of business institutions, the NONED handle special position in the 
board as they are expected to serve as check and balances to the operations of the 
executive directors  (Duppati, Sune, & Samanta, 2017). The NONED are also given 




corporate governance of 2011. The Cadbury Report (1992) sees corporate board at 
the midpoint of governance mechanism as inclusion of NONED may enhance 
performance of the board (Boyd, 1996; Popoola, 2010). Furthermore, the governing 
and managing of the companies is the responsibility of the executive that are elected 
by the shareholders who owned the firm. The equity holders and the executive 
management can therefore be viewed as juxtaposed by the presence of non-executive 
directors (Leng, 2004). 
 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) posit the situation where ownership and management are 
widely separated, it will be difficult for the owners to have full control of the board 
or executives, therefore it will be important to employ independent non-executive 
directors to oversee the activities of the executive directors. More so, Yasser, 
Entebang and Mansor (2015) posit that NONED are effective monitors of firm's 
strategic related issues. They are able to offer independent professional judgment 
when dealing with the executive directors in areas such as pay awards, executive 
director appointments and dismissals. 
 
Furthermore, Non-executive directors (NONED) play crucial role in the efficacy of 
board operation of monitoring, management and improving the overall activities of 
the firm. Their opinion to the board should be characterized as independent and add 
to the diversity of skills and expertise of the BOD (Aina, 2013; Kamardin, Latif, 




NONED should also a business ‘watchdogs’, as to the function of ensuring that there 
is alignment of top executive interest thereby leading to firm value (SEC,2011) 
 
The NONED is crucial that SEC makes it compulsory for reasonable percentage of 
the BOD must be NONED. Empirically, evidence shows that the relationship 
between independent directors and firm performance are found to be significant and 
improve firm value and performance, as measured by accounting and market values 
measurement (Lorsch, 2011). Furthermore, Garg (2007), Rohald (2009) Schiehll and 
Bellavance (2009) and Sirmans (2013) argue that non-executive directors ensure 
monitoring task on the executive director. This indicates that their role can lead to 
greater firm performance.  
 
On the other hand, the following studies on corporate governance such as  Hermalin 
(2005); Saito and Dutra (2006) Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat and 
Black (2000) and found that there is no significant relationship between the 
proportion of outside directors and firm performance. In another study, Adams et al., 
(2010) reveals that non-executive  directors either add or destroy worth corporate 
performance, this is an indication that  there is no consistent evidence using either 
accounting and market measure of performance. 
 
Lawrence, Banking, & Barney (1999) found that the non-executive directors 
proportion tends to increase when a company ill performing. Rebeiz and Salameh 




that small boards could be more effective as a result of quick decision making (Lin, 
2013). A similar view was advocated by Adams et al. (2010) and Hermalin (2005) 
who  states that the behaviour of the board directors is dysfunctional, this means that 
board members rarely criticize the policies of the top management.  
 
However, several researchers found that NONED do not affect firm value. Garg, 
(2007) argues that non-executive directors do not positively affect firm performance 
as they have failed to perform their monitoring role with utmost care and to improve 
the performance of the firm. The phenomenon or criteria for eligibility for 
appointment as NONEDs should be stated in the guidelines on corporate governance 
code of best practice. 
 
It is argued that lack of NONED and ignorance of the procedures, tasks, and 
responsibilities expected of them could be reasons for the NONEDs nonperformance 
as expected on the board. Ming and Gee (2008) examines the relationship between 
independent directors and pay-performance relationship in government-linked 
companies (GLCs) in Malaysia where the study is based on 21 selected GLCs. The 
study states that the NONEDs on a board do not positively affect firm performance.  
 
Evidence from the few researches conducted in Nigeria demonstrated mixed results 
on the relationship between NONED and company performance. research  by Akpan 
and Amran (2014) on board structure and performance in Nigeria was found to have 




industries in Nigeria found out that the NONED is found to have positive with 
performance. 
 
This section shows that the literature on the non-executive directors is broadly 
established, however, some empirical evidences are mixed and inconsistent using 
ROA and Tobin’s Q as proxies for performance.  However, it is interesting to 
examine VAIC as another proxy of performance alongside other traditional method 
of performance measurement in Nigeria, especially during the period after the 
NCCG, 2011 and IFRS adoption.   
2.7.3 CEO Duality and Firm Performance 
Krause, Semadeni and Cannella (2013) referred CEO dual role as “double-edged 
sword” because of the unity of command associated with duality role of board 
leadership and the independent oversight associated with a separate board of director 
chair. The research literature on CEO duality has taken two different analytical 
dimensions: creating the theoretical underpinnings of CEO duality role and 
evaluating the empirical effects of CEO duality on firm financial performance 
variables. The growing prevalence of CEO duality in CG in America underscores the 
importance of understanding this leadership structure and its impact on organization 
performance (Krause et al., 2013).  
 
Larcker, (2016) postulated that the separation of leadership role of management 




confusion in achieving firm goal of wealth maximization in time of crisis. Larcker, 
(2016) concluded that pressure to separate the chairman and CEO roles seems to 
center almost wholly on big corporations. More so,  (Yasser & Mamun, 2015) stated 
that  strategic decisions of the business can be implemented more efficiently when 
leaders have better discretion. This greater discretion can be attained by a unitary 
management structure because it provides a wider control base and locus of control.  
 
In another vein, regulators and equity holder activists across various jurisdictions 
have strongly discouraged CEO duality function. First, they are concerned that CEO 
duality function changes the balance of power between the CEO and board of 
director’s members, potentially compromising the board’s oversight of management 
activities (Ghabayen, 2012). Second, CEO duality engenders information asymmetry 
between the CEO and the board of director’s members, thereby weakening the 
effectiveness and the operation of the audit committee in monitoring reporting and 
management quality (Dahya, Garcia, & van Bommel, 2009). Simultaneously, the 
government of several countries has sought more influence over corporations by 
increasing its role in establishing and enforcing new corporate laws, rules and 
regulations. 
Various stakeholder groups have seriously advocated for different persons to handle 
the position of the CEO and chairman the board of directors. They believe that this 
separation of power will improve good decision making and help prevent accounting 




and others and also can lead to better financial and general performance of the 
company (Adetunji & Olaniran, 2009). Specifically, investor activists believe the 
separating the positions is fundamentally essential for ensuring a more deep 
oversight of the company’s strategic decision-making (Kamardin & Haron, 2011).  
 
Further, the shareholder activists believe separating the roles will help neutralize 
questionable practices and sharp practices such as stock option backdating and 
excessive risk-taking (Coffee, 1999;  Gordon & Pound, 1993). The growing 
concerns about the potential for abuse of power by combined CEO/Board leadership 
were propelled in the first decade of this century by the economic climate, abuses of 
power, and lack of Board control and supervision that led to organization failures 
and high drops in value (Peng et al., 2009). These concerns continue to drive the 
quest for separation of roles. These concerns and efforts to eliminate CEO duality 
role, however, have not been propelled by empirical evidence. 
Corporate governance issues in Nigeria have called for separation of the two top 
positions where the chairman of the board is also the CEO. Coffee, (1999), Gordon 
and Pound (1993) supports CEO role should not be separated from chairman of the 
company. Duality helps to improve and quick. This will allow sharper concentration 
on the firm’s objectives and implementation of operational decisions. Similarly, 
Dahya, Garcia, and van Bommel (2009) and Dahya (2000) believes that if the two 
top position are not divided, allows for long term vision to come out and achieve the 




improved as a result of this combined role of the top man (Rechner & Dalton, 1990; 
Rechner & Dan,1989).  However,  Duppati et al., (2017) argues that if the two roles 
are combined, managers may work for self-interest instead of the interest of the 
owners. There will be essential checks and balances over management’s role if the 
two roles are separated. This could lead to firm performance (Forman & Argenti, 
2005; Richard, 2001)  
 
Empirical evidence on  CEO role duality on firm performance from researches have 
showed mixed result; Brickley et al., (1997), Griffith, Fogelberg, and Weeks (2002)   
found evidence of better positive performance for companies who have separated the 
role of chairman from that of CEO. However, (Dawna, Paula, & Sundaramurthy, 
2001)  found firms with a separation of duties of chairman and  roles perform better 
than company with combined role. Study by Vefeas and Theodorou (1998)  and 
Charlie, David and Phillip, (2002) concluded in the same manner which is in 
consonant with  Biao, Davidson and Dadalt  (2003)  Biao et al., (2003) and Brickley 
et al. (1997) reveal positive relationship between CEO duality and firm performance.   
 
Duality role of CEO, wherein the CEO is also the chairman of the BOD has been 
contentious issue that has attracted significant and serious attention among 
researchers, shareholders, creditors, and policymakers around the world. Despite the 
lack of consistent empirical evidence indicating the benefits and relationship of 
separating the CEO and Board Chairman positions, the pressure to do so continues 




and is considered objectionable by many agency theorists, equity holder activists, 
government officials and policy makers, and corporate watchdogs such as 
Institutional Shareholder, Shareholders Rights in the operation of the business (Peng 
et al., 2009).  
 
However, despite powerful objections to the practice of duality, leadership structure 
literature offers varying conclusions on duality role and its effect firm’s 
performance. Some studies have found an association between firm performance and 
board leadership. Interestingly, even where studies agree that a relationship exists, 
they often reach conflicting conclusions. Some have found a positive effect of 
duality on a company’s performance, while others have found a negative effect 
(Ellstrand et al., 2002; Payne et al., 2009; Rechner & Dalton, 1990) Nevertheless, 
despite inconclusive empirical evidence there is an increasing convergence of the 
opinion  of institutional investors, labor unions, and equity holder activists who do 
not support CEO duality role. Furthermore, studies that shows mixed results and 
negative correlation or relationship are as follows  (Dawna, Paula, & 
Sundaramurthy, 2001; Ellstrand et al., 2002; Payne et al., 2009; Rechner & Dalton, 
1990). 
 
In Nigeria, the combine role of the chairman and CEO is not common by companies. 
It is a recommendation of SEC in Nigeria for companies to have the role of chairman 
separated from CEO to allow proper monitoring, checks and balances on the 




lead to abuse of office by the top man who may be working for self-interest instead 
of the interest of the shareholders. Nonetheless, despite the empirical coverage of 
CEO duality role, it is still inconclusive as a result of different results from the past 
studies. However, it is interesting to examine VAIC as another proxy of performance 
alongside other traditional method of performance measurement in Nigeria, 
especially during the period after the NCCG, 2011 and IFRS adoption. The result of 
this study will show whether there is difference from previous studies.   
2.7.4 Board meeting and Firm Performance 
Board meeting is referred the frequencies of meetings that the board holds in a year 
or during the year (Al-Matar, Al-Swidi, & Fadzil, 2014; Mustapha & Ahmad, 2011; 
Sahu & Manna, 2013; Stewart & Munro, 2007). With the increased clamour for the 
effectiveness of corporate governance for protecting stakeholders' interests, board 
meeting has become important elements of corporate governance. It is argued that 
the firm  performance is affected by number of board meeting (Collins Ntim, 2013).  
 
Resource dependence theory suggests that a board with larger composition brings 
greater opportunities, more links to external environment and thus enhanced access 
to resources. The board meeting is essential because the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the board is reviewed and most board decisions on how to move the company 
forward are taken (Cameron, 2014). Furthermore,  another effective way to evaluate  
performance of any board is through the board meeting and to review the minutes of 




board meetings is not frequently held, it  make them ineffective for sharing 
important information necessary for governance purpose (Craft & Benson, 2006). 
Frequently held meetings of the board will bring out their expertize towards 
achieving the goal of the company (Kamardin et al., 2012) and sign of good signal 
for decisive decision making (Jensen, 1994; Spence, 1973).  
 
The board efficiency is hinged on the frequency of its meetings as this can improve 
the performance of the company. Hence the following studies found board meeting 
to have positive relationship with performance; Hsu and Petchsakulwong, (2010), 
Al-Matar et al., (2014); Kang and Kim, (2011);  Khanchel, (2008) and Ntim and 
Osei, (2013). These researchers demonstrated in their findings that excellent and 
high quality meeting will lead to firm performance. Additionally, Khanchel, (2008) 
posit that the board meetings frequency is a significant activity because as the board 
meetings increase in frequency, the more the operating performance firm will 
improve  
 
On the contrary, Jensen (1993) argued that board meetings are characterized by daily 
tasks and hence this limits the external directors’ chances to conduct a meaningful 
oversight over management. Series of researches demonstrated negative significance 
between board meeting and firm performance. Such studies are as follows; (García-
Sánchez, 2009; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Vafeas, 1999a). However (Kyereboah-






However, the code of corporate governance in Nigeria, NCCG, 2011 recommends 
not less than one meeting a quarter which means a minimum of four meeting of the 
BOD is recommended a year (Adewuyi & Olowookere, 2013). In line with the 
discussions above, they seem to be disagreement by researchers on the numbers of 
meeting to be held by the board of directors. Therefore, it will be appropriate to 
consider another measure of performance which is VAIC because previous 
researchers have consistently proxy performance to be ROA or Tobin’s Q with 
inconsistent result.   
2.7.5 Board Gender Composition and Firm Performance 
Researches on women on the board of the firm have received great deal of research 
in the recent years and have contributed to legislation in some countries that made 
reservation for women in the board of listed companies (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; 
Akpan & Amran, 2014; Erhardt et al., 2003; Lückerath-Rovers, 2011). For example, 
some country like Norway and Sweden imposed gender quota on board of directors 
of listed companies which allow women to take some certain percentage of the board 
position in the company (Akpan & Amran, 2014).  
 
Diversity in the appointment of board members should be encouraged  as a result of 
their strict and trustworthiness of women on board of directors, this trustworthiness 
of female on the board  can lead to increase in effectiveness of board control than 




board based on the resource to which they can provide and argue that women are 
more likely to handled and be placed in leadership position in time of economic 
downturn as a result of their strict compliance to company’s policies and regulatory 
framework (Ujunwa, 2012).  
 
In the contemporary firm, the BOD has two important role: monitoring role and 
provision of access to organizational resources (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). It is 
postulated that the   presence of women on the board enhances the fulfillment of 
monitoring functions, then it is possible that employment of women to the board 
increases firm performance (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). In this case, improvement in 
BOD monitoring is expected because: “(a) the unique human capital of women 
brings diversity of skills and experiences to the board (b) women improve decision- 
making and leadership style (c) women increase board independence and (d) women 
promote better boardroom behavior” therefore, the following study found positive 
significance between women director and firm performance; Carter, Simkins, and 
Simpson (2003), Lückerath-Rovers, (2011), Smith, Smith and Verner (2013) and 
Chen, Leung, and Goergen, (2017) 
 
On the contrary, some researches posit negative significance Adams and Ferreira 
(2009), Bøhren (2007), Gregory-Smith et al. (2012) and (Campbell & Mínguez-
Vera, 2007). These studies posit that irrespective who is on the board can lead to to 
company achieving her goal as their finding states that the presence of women on the 





Culture is an extremely indefinable hypothesis (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002) culture is 
defined by (Harris, 1987, p. 6) as “learned, socially acquired traditions and life styles 
of the members of a society, including their patterned, repetitious way of thinking, 
feeling and acting.”  Women in Nigerian are treated as minor by many culture even 
though the Nigerian constitution gives women equal rights as men. This value 
system is reinforced by religious philosophies that are based on patriarchal thought 
systems in which the ‘God-given’ roles of women are that of mother and wife, caring 
roles and obligations that often extend outside the immediate family (Zakaria, 2001). 
The asymmetry and ascendancy of males over females in the labour market are 
clearly seen in patriarchal communities, where as in Nigeria there is a large power 
distance and high masculinity (Hofstede, 1980) and where customs place the 
obligation on the male child to be the economic provider, emotional protector and 
leader (Hofstede, 1980). However, Woldie and Adersua (2004) note, a gradual but 
significant shift away from these trends and a lessening of gender inequalities are 
apparent as countries such as Nigeria become more democratic, women still have 
difficulty challenging the subjugated role society had given them. However, there is 
no gender composition issues in Nigeria public limited companies.  
 
In Nigeria, there is no agreeable number of women to be on the board of companies 
yet, because it is not stipulated by SEC NCCG 2011 or any other regulatory body. 
Consequently, on the general note, there is a campaign for 35% affirmation and 




of Nigeria promised to include a Bill seeking to provide 35% affirmative action for 
women in the Gender and Equal opportunity bill (Vanguard August, 2017). 
However, this study adopts board gender composition with the inclusion of ROA, 
Tobin’s Q and VAIC to see the different level of performance by companies as 
previous studies only uses the traditional method with inconclusive results without 
consideration of intellectual capital measurement of performance.   
2.8 Ownership Structure and Firm Performance 
The system of monitoring firm is also through the structure of ownership of the firm 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). There is divorce of ownership from control which is an 
absence of the owners from management and control of the firm recourses (Scholten, 
2014). The only way the moral hazard that can arise from the absence of the owners 
from being part of the company is lack of monitoring mechanisms (Kesten, 2011). 
Shareholders interest is for their interest to be aligned with the management. This is 
the reasons shareholders are calling for strong monitoring framework and control 
mechanism which could enhance performance (Boyd, 1996; Daily & Dalton, 1994; 
Rechner & Dalton, 1990). Furthermore, it’s very important to study ownership 
structure of companies because effective ownership structure will enhance 
companies value and maximization of owners wealth (Abbasi, Asadipour, & 
Pourkiyani, 2017). 
 
However, minority equity holder could be affected as the majority shareholders 




is actually a cost to the minority shareholders. Furthermore, monitoring strength of 
the minority in business is very weak due to free-rider problems (Blundell-wignall et 
al., 2009; Cheffins, 2011; Gill et al., 2012; Grove et al., 2011; Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2006; Hermalin, 2005;  Rebeiz & Salameh, 2006).  The firm risk could be on the 
increase as a result of the activities of the dominated managerial ownership. This  
may have serious negative results on the firm performance (Carolina, 1998; Haniffa 
& Hudaib, 2006; Long, 2000). 
 
Empirical investigation on the association between ownership structure and 
corporate performance are mixed from the previous research.  Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006) reveal a positive association between shareholdings characteristics and firm 
performance. The above result is consistent  with the result of  Holderness, Kroszner 
and Sheehan (1999) which also reveal similar result with Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) 
which posit positive relationship. Under the shareholding structure, managerial 
ownership is included in the research model to check the possible convergence of 
interest hypotheses and blockholder ownership to serve as monitoring role, which is 
proxy for moderator on the activities of the BOD and other corporate governance 
variables.  
2.8.1 Managerial Ownership 
Managerial shareholding is one of the shareholding structure which is considered 
important in determining the performance of company (Abbasi et al., 2017).  




firm with regard to corporate governance.  It is of interest for investors to know the 
stock of the management or executive in the business. This will enable the 
companies handle conflicts conflict of interests between the owners and management  
(Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006) 
 
 Managerial ownership is also referred as the incentives for those running the affair 
of the business on behalf of the shareholders to act in line with their interest 
(Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991).  Moreover, the ownerships of shares of the company 
by executive and supervisory board members shall be conveyed (Boyd, 1996; 
Chiang, 2005; Gürbüz, 2010; Verriest et al., 2012). If the entire amount held by any 
members should be more than one percent of the total called up capital of the 
business. If it so happened, the report of this shall be separate in the annual report 
and statement.  
 
However, McConnell and Servaes (1995) consider and reveal non-linearity between 
managerial ownership and firm performance. Morck et al., (1988) report managerial 
ownership and Tobin’s Q to have a positive association. This positive association is 
for ownership structure levels between 0% and 5% and for levels beyond 25%, and a 
negative association over the 5–25% managerial ownership structure range. They 
argue that between 5–25% are refer to as smaller and larger ownership structure 
ranges. The negative relationship between corporate governance mechanism and 





Harold and Kenneth, (1985),  Jensen and Fama, (1983) in their research mentioned 
out offsetting cost of management ownership significance. This study recognized 
that when agent own only small stake, market discipline and managerial labour 
market may force him towards wealth and profit maximization. On the opposite, 
managers with substantial shareholding may have enough voting powers to enable 
him maintain his office as executive of the company for the long time.  
 
Adams et al. (2010), Hermalin (2005), Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (2001) all reveals 
that the value of a company rises from a base of low involvement of managerial 
ownership. Empirical research states that managerial opportunism persists in the 
absence of equity holder large enough to enforce their own interests of profit and 
wealth maximization. For instance, large owners in a firm restrict extremely high 
managerial pay to compensate themselves (Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, & Hinkin, 1987). 
Similarly, (Cho, 1998) in his study found a significant association between insider 
ownership and corporate value. This is a research he carried out in 1991 using a 
cross section of Fortune 500 manufacturing firms. His findings are also consistent 
with Morck et al.  (1988). He found out that managerial ownership affects firm value 
and can lead to maximization of shareholders’ wealth if the interest of the directors 
are aligned with the owners.  Furthermore, managerial shareholdings help to aligning 
the interests of agent and principal, and firm performance increases as a result in the 





The measurement of managerial ownership is diverse as different scholars have 
previously used different measures for managerial shareholding.  Bhagat and Black 
(1999) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) use the percentage of share held by the 
CEO to determine MOWN. Similarly, Craswell et al. (1997) and Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006) make use of insider shareholding which includes directors and officers and 
executive directors shareholdings are commonly used. In Nigeria, executives and 
directors shareholding are disclosed as it will be appropriate to proxy directors 
shareholding for this current study. 
 
According to the recommendations of Nigerian code corporate of governance, 
declaration about the amount held by directors or current changes in this amount and 
the amount that is available for sale should be declared. This declarations of 
management interest is also reported in  Boyd (1996), Chiang (2005),  Gürbüz 
(2010) and Verriest et al. (2012). 
 
Consequently, this study adopts managerial shareholding because of likely problem 
of agency type I problem which states which may arise as a result of separation of 
shareholders from control (Charitou, 2013) and type II which states the conflict of 
interest between the insider ownership and outside ownership (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Previous studies only consider the traditional performance measurement but 
this present study is considering the intellectual capital measurement of performance 




2.8.2 Blockholder Ownership 
Several studies establish that blockholders ownership with significant equity 
positions are a common characteristics of public limited liability companies around 
the world, with reported rates of blockholder ownership presence above 90% 
(Hadlock & Schwartz-ziv, 2017). One frequently hypothesized advantage of 
blockholder ownership is the potential for considerable direct monitoring benefits 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). In addition, for some types of outside blockholders 
ownership, particularly corporate blockholders, there can be potential product-
market relationship synergies that are enhanced by their presence. Similarly, Morck, 
et al. (1988) posit that large inside blockholder ownership have the potential to 
motivate the BOD to maximize firm wealth rather than pursuing personal interest.  
Additionally, Chemmanur (2016) posit that  the presence of blockholder may have a 
favorable effect on  executive incentives by affecting how speedily information is 
put into stock prices and decisive  decision making on companies activities.  
 
The controlling mechanisms of moral hazard in business is the problems arising 
from separation of ownership and control is via block ownership by outside equity 
holders (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). One of the ways to control this hazard in business 
is through blockholder ownership. These type of ownership structure have greater 
incentives to align management interest with that of shareholders, this can result in 
better corporate firm performance and also benefiting minority shareholders  





Furthermore, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) reveal a u shaped relationship 
between ownership consideration and firm performance. This relationship between 
concentrated ownership and firm performance is in respect of the research conducted 
on 371 Fortune 500 firms. Kroll, Walters, and Wright (2008) studies of Chinese 
firms showed a positive relationship between concentrated ownership and 
performance of firm. They suggest that the control and monitoring of the 
management performance lies in the hand of large equity holders and play a 
substantial role in corporate governance of any organization. Additionally, other 
studies that shows positive results are as follows; (Joh, 2003; Leech & Leahy, 1991; 
McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Xu & Wang, 1999) With regard to the association 
between ownership concentration and firm performance, the following  empirical 
evidence by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Harold Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), 
Murali and Welch (1989) found no significant association between ownership 
concentration and firm performance. 
 
Another study in Malaysia report high concentration of share ownership among 
public listed companies (Abidin et al., 2000;  Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). They found 
out that shares are highly owned or concentrated in the hand of few with the mean of 
30% and 60% for the largest shareholder and the concentrated respectively. Large 
shareholders may have a disciplinary effect on the management and thereby can 
monitor their investment from outside the firm without necessarily be involved in the 






On the other hand, minority shareholders might be expropriated by blockholder 
ownership or controlling owners of the company’s assets as they could use their 
position to their own interest alone, expropriating the minority interest instead of the 
general interest of the firm (Ishak & Napier, 2006). Similarly, motivations to 
perform direct monitoring are weaker for dispersed ownership due to free-rider 
problems as a result of concentrated ownership structure (Grossman & Hart, 1982). 
Dominance by large equity holders may also damage performance due to large 
exposure to risk by the firm (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). Blockholder ownership is 
associated with firm performance as revealed in the study of Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006),  Latif et al. (2013) as it is shown that ownership structure of top shareholders 
are significant with accounting performance and negatively correlated with market 
performance. 
 
This section of literature review shows that the empirical evidence of the 
blockholder ownership is well established, it also showed the strong relationship 
with firm performance and their importance in monitoring the activities of the BOD 
from the outside the company as a result of their voting right and powers (Kumar & 
Zattoni, 2017). However, it is interesting to examine the moderating role of 
blockholder ownership on the relationship between corporate governance 





2.9 Risk Management Committee and Firm Performance 
Risk management have undergone serious and series of debate in the time past as 
scholars postulates that good enterprise risk management (ERM) can enhance firm 
value and greater financial performance (Aldamen, Duncan, & Kelly, 2012).  
Financial Performances depend largely on risk management mechanism and 
corporate governance structures of any organizations (McShane, Nair, & 
Rustambekov, 2011). Risk reporting is the act of signaling to the shareholders of 
business by the management. The firm uses their board to communicate to the 
owners the extent of disclosure and compliance with relevant financial reporting and 
corporate governance code (Al-Matari et al., 2014; Heenetigala, Armstrong, & 
Clarke, 2014; Khanchel, 2011; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007; Al-Matari, Kaid Al 
Swidi, & Fadzil, 2014; Premuroso & Bhattacharya, 2007; Reddy, Stuart, & Frank, 
2010). 
Risk reporting is the act of signaling to the shareholders of business by the 
management. The firm uses their board to communicate to the owners the extent of 
disclosure and compliance with relevant financial reporting and corporate 
governance code (Al-Matar et al., 2014; Heenetigala et al., 2014; Khanchel, 2011; 
Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007; Al-Matari et al., 2014; Premuroso & Bhattacharya, 
2007; Reddy et al., 2010). 
Akindele (2012) posit that firm performance depends largely on risk management 
mechanism and corporate governance structures of any organizations, better 




management has significant effect on general performance and firm’s profitability. 
Similarly, Davies (2013) stated in his study that the global financial crisis revealed 
several number of governance weaknesses and loopholes that resulted in firms’ 
failure to understand the risks they were undertaking. Akindele (2012) and Davies 
(2013) reiterates that risk governance committee is very important in the 
performance of any organization. 
 In another research conducted by  McShane, Nair and  Rustambekov (2011) posit 
that corporate governance failures is as a result in chronic failures of risk 
management of business establishments. The researcher states that, the appointment 
of senior management to oversee the risk management department of any business 
organization indicates positive relationships and strong benefit to the business 
organizations.  
Consequently,  McShane et al. (2011) which stipulates that corporate governance 
failures is as a result in chronic failures of risk management of business 
establishments. The researchers states that, the appointment of senior management to 
oversee the risk management department of any business organization indicates 
positive relationships and strong benefit to the business organizations (Gordon, 
Loeb, & Tseng, 2009).  Therefore, the following studies on the relationship between 
risk management committee and firm value or firm performance that indicates 
positive relationship are as follows (Bartram, Brown., and Conrad, 2009; Beasley, 
Clune, & Hermanson, 2005;. Gordon, Loeb, & Tseng, 2009; Graham & Rogers, 




shows a negative association between risk management and performance (Guay & 
Kothari, 2003; McShane et al., 2011.  
 
Furthermore, similar study on risk management, it states that firm should not make 
effort to manage unavoidable risk called idiosyncratic risk (Guay & Kothari, 2003; 
McShane et al., 2011). The capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM) states that the 
shareholders are only rewarded for bearing non-diversifiable risk but not bearing 
unsystematic risk  (Markowitz, 1952). However, the firm rate of return is dependent 
on non-diversifiable risk. Furthermore, the CAPM states that company can overcome 
firm unsystematic risk through diversification (Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966). More 
so, several researches that centers on CAPM states that unsystematic risk does not 
matter. They states that investors may hold undiversified portfolios (McShane et al., 
2011). 
The inclusion of this variable in this research is the importance of risk management 
committee in taken risk decision by the firm. The revised Nigerian Code of 
Corporate Governance in 2011 suggest companies to report their risk framework in 
the annual report. Therefore, this study adopts board’s risk management committee 
to test the different proxies of performance.  
2.10 Disclosure and Firm Performance 
Empirical evidence suggests that enhanced disclosure has a substantial effect on the 
cost of capital. Greater disclosure and timely reporting of accounting information is 




pays forecasts, or higher demand for a firm’s securities (Che Haat et al., 2008). The 
importance of overall disclosure studies cannot be over emphasized  considering that 
academics have argued that improvements of firm transparency through quality 
disclosure  in the annual report can reduce information asymmetries (Adelopo, 
2011b; Botosan & Harris, 2000).  
 
More so, disclosure plays a crucial role in corporate governance. It permits the 
owners of business and other stakeholders in business to make better and precise 
decisions (Zaheer, 2013). Previous research posit that firms that discloses in advance 
tend to experience cheaper cost of capital (Botosan, 1997; Karamanou & Vafeas, 
2005; Leuz  & Verrecchia, 2001). Information in the annual reports and statements 
should be disclosed to reflect timeliness, relevance, comparability and 
understandability (Courtis, 1998; Adelopo, 2011b). 
 
Disclosure of material information in relation to corporate governance mechanism 
has received great deal and several studies are carried out in both developed 
countries  (Babío Arcay & Muiño Vázquez, 2005; Garcia-Sanchez & Prado-
Lorenzo, 2010; Goodstein, Gautam, & Warren, 1994; Marston & Polei, 2004; 
Vander Bauwhede & Willekens, 2008) and developing countries (Barako, Hancock, 
& Izan, 2006; Gugler, Mueller, & Burcin Yurtoglu, 2003; Hausin, 2012; Mohd 
Ghazali & Weetman, 2006). However very few attention is done in Africa (Adelopo, 




level internationalization in the developing countries like Nigeria has called for 
special attention on corporate governance issues and disclosure of material fact in 
the annual report. Meanwhile, the adoption of NCCG 2011 by the listed companies 
in Nigeria and other developing countries can also attract foreign direct investments 
as reported  in (Ahunwan, 2002). 
 
Corporate financial reporting and annual reports are essential avenues for 
communicating firms financial and non-financial information  (Barako, 2007). 
Disclosure of corporate financial information is seen as any financial information, 
quantitative or qualitative, that is deliberately released by firm the firm through 
formal or informal channel (Al-Razeen & Karbhari, 2004). Corporate voluntary 
disclosure has been the focus of an increasing amount of attention in recent years. 
Such disclosures can be defined as ‘‘disclosures in excess of requirements, 
representing free choices on the part of company managements to provide 
accounting and other information deemed relevant to the decision needs of users of 
their annual reports’’ (Meek, Robert, & Sidney, 1995, p. 555). 
 
Theoretically, firm’s good news to share with their shareholder and other interest 
parties in the company will disclose more than firm with losses will do, and thus, a 
positive association may be expected between better performing companies and 
disclosure of information by company. Clatworthy and John (2006) provides 






Previous studies have failed to document any significant association between 
disclosure and company performance. Ahmed (1999) and  (Akhtaruddin, 2005) in 
their research found no significant relationship. However, Wallace and Naser (1995) 
in their study found negative associations between disclosure and firm performance. 
In another study, Chou and Gray (2002) found that there is a positive association 
between disclosure and firm performance. Corporate financial transparency is highly 
associated with corporate financial performance and company with better corporate 
governance is said to have very high standard of disclosure and transparency in the 
company dealings. In a research conducted in Malaysia, Che Haat et al (2008) posit 
that corporate performance is not linked with the level of disclosure and timely 
accounting reporting. The researcher results states that disclosure and timeliness are 
insignificantly contributing factors in the association between CG and Tobin’s Q. 
 
Consequently, this study adopts disclosure alongside other corporate governance 
variables because empirical evidences showed that companies who disclose in detail 
signal to potential investors which could lead to investment into the company’s 
stock.  Che Haat et al. (2008) posit that poor CG, poor investor relations, a low level 
of transparency in disclosing material fact by corporation and the ineffectiveness of 
monitoring agencies in enforcing legislation in getting offenders punished and 




2.11 Transparency, Corporate Governance Mechanism and Firm Performance 
Chronic poor firm performance could be as a result of absence of transparency in 
financial dealings; this factor could lead to poor firm performance (Bijalwan & 
Madan, 2013). The research conducted by Akhtaruddin (2005) identifies that 
companies that disclose all relevant and material information in their annual 
financial reports are said to be transparent. He concludes that adherence to the 
relevant legislation and accounting standards is a sign of transparency in financial 
reporting. The studies find out that financial transparency have a strongest link with 
financial performance.  
 
Furthermore, good CG can be referred as a mechanism and system for controlling 
and curtailing sharp practices of business institutions as stipulated by (Ikoh et al., 
2013). The study states that excellent CG enhances corporate financial reporting and 
can lead to corporate financial performance. The study finds out that financial 
reporting transparency is as a result of strong internal control compliance and 
compliance with relevant reporting standards and corporate governance code. In a 
similar research (Ikoh et al., 2013) provide both empirical and theoretical evidence 
that market transparency is found to have enhanced productivity of many 
organizations (Ikoh et al., 2013), these researchers further states that IFRS adoption 
enhances between performance, transparency and disclosure of material fact about 





According to Ikoh et al. (2013) reported that performance is higher for early adopters 
of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).this study  in line  with 
(Kosedag & Aksu, 2005) who states in his study in the context of Taiwan that that 
transparency of ownership structure, financial disclosure and financial transparency 
and board and management disclosure have serious positive implication on firm 
performance. He concluded that proper reporting, compliance with the relevant 
reporting laws and compliance with the corporate governance code will send good 
signal to investors which on the other hand can lead to financial performance.  
 
Additionally, Ho and Wong (2001) who study the Hong Kong listed company posit 
that  his study is in response to Asian economic crisis and the legislation that is 
attempted to improve the disclosure and transparency in annual report and also to 
protect shareholders right especially the minority shareholders. Some of the CG 
variables considered were proportion of independent directors, audit committee 
formation. It was found out that there is positive association between AC and 
voluntary disclosure. The level of disclosure improves as a result of the presence of 
audit committee. On the other hand, the presence of independent directors did not 
significantly affect voluntary disclosure. The researcher also documents evidence of 
a negative relationship between voluntary corporate disclosure in annual report and 
the proportion of family members on the board. 
 
There is a likelihood of agency conflicts in modern corporation due to the separation 




1976). Thus, managers act in the best interests of the owners if provided with 
discretionary disclosure (Barako, 2007; Craswell et al., 1997). To reduce agency 
conflicts with the owners, Managers may therefore, voluntarily disclose material 
information to reduce information asymmetries.  
 
 
Stiglbauer (2010) posit that T&D on CG may enable firms to signal quality in 
management and control. These may have a potential to lower agency costs through 
monitoring to reduce conflicts of interest and information asymmetries among the 
party in business. The study sums up that most failed company do not always 
disclose full information. He concluded that transparency & disclosure on corporate 
governance has an impact on firm performance, Companies should invest in 
transparency & disclosure on corporate governance to increase value and   cost of 
capital for future growth. 
 
Nigeria is chosen for this study because of its size in Africa, with over 186 million 
people. It plays influential roles amongst the sub- Saharan African countries in both 
political and economy scenes of the area. Importantly, an understanding of the 
disclosure practices amongst listed companies in Nigeria is important in 
understanding reporting and disclosure practices in the West African region. 
Improvements in disclosure practices in Nigeria could influence practices in other 




2.12 Summary of Chapter 
Literature on corporate governance has been reviewed, and the Nigerian Code of 
Corporate Governance (NCCG) has been identified as strength to the corporate 
governance practices and mechanism in Nigeria. The adoption of corporate 
governance code as released by security and exchange commission and the 
Introduction of IFRS as a measure of proper financial statement disclosure will 
enhance corporate performance. This chapter discusses board characteristics, board 
committees, shareholding structure and their relationship with financial performance. 
It also highlights the need to introduce VAIC as a long term measurement alongside 
with traditional measurements of performance. The theory supporting this study is 
also discussed in this chapter. The next chapter describes the study framework, 
hypothesis developments, research design, population and sampling technique, 







RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has discussed related and relevant literatures on corporate 
governance, IFRS, corporate reporting transparency and disclosure and firm 
performance. This chapter discusses research methodology employed for this study 
and procedures undertaken by this study. Specifically, theoretical framework, 
conceptual definitions, and hypotheses development of the research under study, 
underpinning theory, operational definition and measurement of variables, 
population of the study, sample size and sampling technique, data collection and 
method and techniques of data analysis.   
3.2 Research Framework 
This research adopts agency theory to explain the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanism and firm performance and also signaling theory and resource 
dependency theory as supporting theories. The agency theory describes and explains 
the relationship between principal and agents. The agency theory suggests that in 
order to protect the shareholders interest from opportunistic behavior, there is need 
for effective and well-functioning board of directors to enhance the firm 
performance (Abidin et al., 2000; Ahmad, Ishak, Aziah, & Manaf, 2003; Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2006, Jesen & Meckling, 1976). The owner manager drawback is found in 




suffering as a result of self interest in business. Various mechanisms and systems 
may be employed to align the interest of equity holders and that of executives who 
do business on their behalf. Al-Matari, Al-Swidi, and  Fadzil (2014), states that 
directors must have expertise and be knowledgeable in the field of finance, 
accounting, information technology, auditing, marketing and others.  
 
Basically, this research attempts to determine the association between Nigeria public 
listed company’s performance and corporate governance code or mechanism which 
includes; board size, CEO duality role, board gender, block ownership, board 
meetings, by shareholders, managerial shareholding, and corporate reporting 
transparency and block ownership as a moderator. Prior studies have looked at the 
above listed variables except for corporate reporting transparency which is proxied 
by transparency and disclosure scores as used by Meek et al., (1995),  Tsamenyi et 
al., (2007) and other disclosure scores which is yet to be studied in Nigeria to the 
best of my knowledge.  
 
Previous studies on the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance have shown inconclusive results. This study has decided to use block 
shareholding structure as a moderator to see whether it will enhance firm 
performance because it has been indicated from past studies that block ownership 
can lead to effective monitoring of the activities of BODs (Schiehll & Bellavance, 




information asymmetry between managers and shareholders and provide information 
relevant to managers to take decisive decisions (Adelopo, 2011; Tsamenyi et al., 
2007). This study therefore extends previous studies by including corporate reporting 
transparency as independent variable. This study also adopts three measures for 
performance namely; accounting measures (ROA), market measures (Tobin’s Q) and 
the Intellectual capital measures (VAIC). 
 
The measure drawn from accounting method which is used by companies to track 
their internal affair is called accounting measures such as ROA. However, the 
accounting measure does not put into account outstanding liabilities and may 
indicate higher profitability than actual dividend.  Similarly, share prices and 
dividend stream observed in the activities and an operation of the capital market is 
referred to as market measures. Also, the market measure is in relation to the total 
firm’s asset and account for outstanding liabilities of the firm.  However, only ROA 
and Tobin’s Q are included in this research as dependent variables to measure firm 
performance as they have been used in prior studies to test the relationship between 
CG structure and performance of the company (Chen et al., 2006; Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2006; Kamardin & Haron, 2011; Latif et al., 2013). In addition to the traditional 
corporate performance measurement techniques, there is a need to measure firm 
performance using long term measurement which includes firm total resources 





Intellectual capital is important in knowledge economy (Degroote et al., 2000; 
Kamardin et al., 2013; Pulic, 2004). Furthermore, knowledge economy is about 
creating value (Pena, 2002). Value is highly related to performance transformation of 
knowledge to value. Abidin et al. (2000, p. 151) defined “intellectual capital as 
intellectual material that has been formalized and leverage to produce higher value 
assets”. Therefore, knowledge economy can be viewed as contributions of intangible 
assets such as knowledge capital to achieving organizational goal. In addition, firm 
size and leverage is included in the model to control for the sample. Based on the 
review of relevant literature, prior and empirical studies and theoretical 
underpinnings, the research framework suitable for the current study is developed in 
































Fig 3.2 Research Framework 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Research Framework of the Study 


































3.3 Development of Hypotheses 
With the help of the literature reviewed for this study and theoretical justifications, 
hypotheses for this research were developed for empirical testing. This study has the 
following variables which includes board of director’s size, CEO duality role, Non-
executive directors, block ownership structures, management ownership, board 
gender and board meeting. These mechanisms are expected to help organization to 
achieve its performance role to the shareholders. Corporate reporting transparency is 
seen as disclosure of relevant information which can lead to greater firm 
performance and return on accounting and Tobin’s Q for measure of financial 
performance as dependent variables as well as two control variables which includes 
firm size and leverage. Based on the related evidence from previous findings, the 
hypotheses of the study are developed for empirical testing. 
3.3.1 Hypothesis on Board Size 
The principal role of the board as stated by agency theory is to monitor the action of 
agents that is the executives and to ensure the efficacy and to protect the interest of 
owners (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shaker, 1989). The board size is the number of 
BOD serving on the company’s board. Board size is important as either small or 
large board size affect the extent of monitoring, controlling and company decision 
making (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006).  Previous studies indicate that big firm possess 
treat to performance of firm. This is because when board is too big, it become more 
symbolic rather than been part of management decision process (Hermalin & 




diversity and skill are put into use (Goodstein et al., 1994; Payerle & Pfeffer, 1978; 
Pearce & Zahra, 1992).  
 
Contrary to negative association between board size and firm performance, it was 
also argued from another perspective that that larger board size or larger board of 
director’s composition is beneficial and will increase the collection of expertise and 
recourses and accessibility to firm (Al-Matari et al., 2014), this argument is 
following resource dependency theory.  This study shows positive significance 
which is in relation to Daily and Dalton (1994), Grove et al. (2011) postulates in 
support of large board of directors as they bring positive association between board 
size and firm performance. They will also bring expertise to play and diverse 
knowledge will come to play in times of decision making. Therefore, large board of 
director led to pay more whether in cost or effect to do the firms. Brickley et al., 
(1997) argues that the boards are less effective and could result in meaningless 
discussion that could deter growth and development of the company.  
 
The small board size helps in making the firm more effective by taking quick and 
decisive decision (Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1993). This empirical evidence is 
supported by Goodwin et al. (2009), Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), Lee, Rosenstein, 
and Wyatt (1999), Vafeas and Theodorou (1998), Yoshikawa and Phan (2013) all 
these studies demonstrated a negative significant relationship between board size and 
firm performance. Based on this theoretical and empirical justification regarding 




H1: There is a relationship between board size and firm performance in Nigeria.  
3.3.2 Hypotheses on CEO Duality Role 
From the agency point of view, independent leadership of the board is important to 
prevent managerial entrenchment. The board leadership role is from the perspective 
of agency theory will provide control, monitoring, checks and balances on the 
performance of the company. The theory assumes that if one person hold the two top 
positions, is most likely to pursue self-interest instead of protecting the instead of 
protecting the interest of owners (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Shaker, 1989).Chief 
Executive Officers (CEO) are often called Managing Directors (MD) in Nigeria. 
They play a crucial role in company’s financial performance. The CEO are involved 
in managing the day everyday affairs of the business enterprises. 
 
 The duality role is the situation where the CEO is the chairman of the BOD of the 
corporation. Evidence regarding the CEO duality role provides the foremost 
indication of possible association between duality and firm performance. The 
following scholars posit that companies are more cherished when the function of 
CEO and the duties of the top man is separated and also that organizations with CEO 
handling the chairman position seem to be less effective (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; 
Shaker, 1989). In another study, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) recommend that  if the 
two role are combined by one person, the financial benefit involved may make the 




The empirical evidence in support of CEO role duality which shows positive 
significant relationship can be found in  Dawna et al., (2001), Peng et al. (2009), 
Steward (1991).  The researcher states in their research that CEO duality role 
enhances operational decisions.  On the contrary, other studies that shows significant 
negative relationship are conducted by Blundell-Wignall et al., (2009); Cheffins 
(2011); Gill et al. (2012), Grove et al., (2011), Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), Hermalin, 
(2005), Rebeiz and Salameh (2006). Based on this theoretical justification regarding 
CEO duality, the following hypothesis is developed: 
H2: CEO duality role has a negative relationship with firm performance in Nigeria. 
3.3.3 Hypotheses on Non-Executive Directors 
The board dominated by non-executive directors may help in solving agency 
problems by controlling and monitoring the leadership of the firm on behalf of the 
shareholders (Dawna et al., 2001; Peng et al., 2009; Steward, 1991). Board 
effectiveness in protecting the shareholders interest is the function of non-executive 
director on the board (Lee, Rosenstein, & Wyatt, 1999; Weisbach, 1991).  
 
Also, the resource dependency theory states that the NONED are crucial to the 
management to provide the needed expertise and the needed resources (Salancik & 
Pfeffer, 1978). Furthermore, the proportion of outside director was positively related 
to company performance (Daily & Dalton, 1994). Such board are charged with 
responsibilities of removing CEO that are not performing and other board member 




are viewed as a crucial internal corporate governance mechanism that is rated 
importance in the administration of company because they serve as monitors on the 
activities of the executive directors.  
 
Adetunji and Olaniran (2009) and  Jesen and Meckling (1976) found that the level of 
non-executive directors does not forecast a better future of accounting performance, 
the proportion of NONED  tend to increase when the company is poorly performing 
(Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Bhagat & Bernard, 2002). These researchers state that 
having too many independent directors may be harmful to the company as they may 
lack knowledge and understanding of the company operations. On the contrary some 
researchers found the relationship to be positive between independent director and 
firm performance (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Bhagat & Bernard, 2002). These 
researchers’ states that NONED enhance and boast corporate governance and 
therefore improve firm performance as measured by accounting measures and 
economic value added. Based on the above theoretical underpinning, the following 
hypothesis is developed; 
H3: There is a significant positive relationship between non-executive directors and 
firm performance in Nigeria. 
3.3.4 Hypothesis on Board Meeting 
Following resource dependency theory, the BOD need to be active to meet their CG 
commitments, particularly in ensuring high-quality disclosure and transparent 




“Board meeting is the numbers of meetings that the board holds in a year” (Al-
Matar, Al-Swidi, & Bt Fadzil, 2014). With the increased clamour for the 
effectiveness of corporate governance for protecting stakeholders' interests, board 
meeting has become important elements of corporate governance.  
 
The board attendance at the board will make them bring out their expertize towards 
achieving the goal of the company (Kamardin et al., 2012) and frequent meeting is a 
good signal for companies to take decisive decision (Jensen, 1994). Similarly, the 
code of best practice in Nigeria recommends not less than one meeting a quarter 
which means a minimum of four meeting of the BOD is recommended a year 
(Adewuyi & Olowookere, 2013). 
 
Similarly, Jensen (1993) argued that board meetings are characterized by daily tasks 
and hence this limits the external directors’ chances to conduct a meaningful 
oversight over management. The relationship between board meetings and 
performance of the company was reported to be positive in such context (Al-Matari 
et al., 2014; Hsu & Petchsakulwong, 2010; Kang & Kim, 2011; Khanchel, 2008). On 
the contrary, series of researches demonstrated negative significance between board 
meeting and firm performance. Such studies are as follows; (García-Sánchez, 2009). 
Based on this theoretical justification regarding board meeting, the following 
hypothesis is developed: 
H4: There is a significant positive relationship between board meeting and firm 




3.3.5 Hypothesis on Board Gender Composition  
The presence of women on the company board helps the company to execute its 
long-term plan. This is because their experience is highly aligned with the company 
needs (Erhardt et al., 2003). However, because of the importance of strategic 
decision making, it will be logical for company with higher level of board diversity 
to perform excellently.  
 
Board with women numbers have received great deal of research in the recent years 
and have contributed to legislation in some countries that made reservation for 
women in the board of listed companies (Akpan & Amran, 2014). Most companies 
select women into board based on the resource to which they can provide access and 
argue that women are more likely to be handled and be placed in leadership position 
in time of economic downturn (Ujunwa, 2012).  
 
The following study found positive significance between women director and firm 
performance Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003), Lückerath-Rovers, (2011), 
Smith, et al. (2013). On the contrary, some researches posit negative significance 
Adams and Ferreira (2009), Bøhren (2007), Gregory-Smith et al. (2012) and 
(Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2007). In Nigeria, there is no agreeable number of 
women to be on the board of companies yet, because it is not stipulated by SEC or 
other regulatory bodies. However, on the general note, there is a campaign for 35% 
affirmation and representation in the dealings of activities in Nigeria. Based on the 




H5: There is a positive significant relationship between women on the board and 
firm performance in Nigeria 
3.3.6 Hypotheses on Managerial Ownership  
The way to make the managers interest to be aligned with shareholder’s interest is 
for the board of directors to own shares in the company (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . 
The more shares owned by the top directors, the more decisive decisions consistent 
with the shareholders interest, wealth and profit maximization of the shareholders 
(Short & Keasey, 1999). In a similar view, Jesen and Meckling (1976) states that 
when executives of a firm control small level of company shares, their strategy will 
be in line  with preference of other shareholders. 
 
Adams et al. (2010) Hermalin (2005) Morck, Shleifer & Vishny (2001) posit that the 
low participation of the director’s shareholdings will lead to increase in firm value. 
The less the ownership of shares by the management the better for the firm’s 
maximization of its value.  
On the contrary, it is also established that the interest of shareholder will be 
protected if there are shareholders large enough to enforce the business to attain 
certain goal. Mcconnell and Servaes (1995) demonstrated in their study that the 
association between directors shareholding and firm performance is having a 
significant and positive association with firm performance. In contrast, Griffith et al., 




either alignment of managerial ownership and shareholders interest. (Singh and 
Davidson (2003) also states that the alignment of shareholders interest could lead to  
positive utilization of asset which reflects lower agency cost. However (Morck et al., 
1988) report is mixed for both alignment benefit of over the 5%–25% managerial 
ownership range reveal a positive relationship and entrenchment benefit between 0% 
and 5% shows a negative relationship with performance. Furthermore, block 
shareholdings is found to have significant positive with firm performance 
(McConnell & Servaes, 1990)   
 
However, the empirical evidence explained above showed that the size of the insider 
ownership does not mean and the effect could either be positive or negative on the 
relationship between managerial shareholding and firm performance. Based on the 
above theoretical and empirical explanation, the following is hypothesized; 
H6: There is a significant positive relationship between managerial ownership and 
firm performance in Nigeria. 
3.3.7. Hypothesis on Risk Management Committee 
Risk reporting is the act of signaling to the shareholders of business by the 
management. The firm uses their board to communicate to the owners the extent of 
disclosure and compliance with relevant financial reporting and corporate 




Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007; Mohammed Al Matari et al., 2014; Premuroso & 
Bhattacharya, 2007; Reddy et al., 2010). 
Firm performances depend largely on risk management mechanism and corporate 
governance structures of any organizations, better corporate governance can lead to 
strong risk management (Akindele, 2012).  The researcher concludes that risk 
management has significant effect on general performance and firm’s profitability. 
The study reveals that there is a significant positive relationship between risk 
management and firm performance.  
 
Davies (2013) found that the global financial crisis revealed several number of 
governance weaknesses and loopholes that resulted in firms’ failure to understand 
the risks they were undertaking. The researcher reiterated that risk governance 
committee is very important in the performance of any organization. In another 
research conducted by McShane et al. (2011) which posit that corporate governance 
failures are as a result in chronic failures of risk management of business 
establishments. The researcher stated that, the appointment of senior management to 
oversee the risk management department of any business organization indicates 
positive relationships and strong benefit to the business organizations. The following 
studies on the relationship between risk management committee and firm value or 
firm performance that indicates positive relationship are as follows (Bartram, Brown 
& Conrad, 2009; Beasley, Clune, & Hermanson, 2005; Gordon, Loeb, & Tseng, 




the following studies shows a negative association between risk management and 
performance (Guay & Kothari, 2003; McShane et al., 2011). Based on the above 
theoretical and empirical explanation, the following is hypothesized; 
H7: There is a significant positive relationship between risk management committee 
and financial performance in Nigeria. 
3.3.8. Hypotheses on Disclosure and Firm Performance 
Financial transparency is an act of signaling and proper disclosure (Spence, 1973). 
Management researchers have applied signaling theory to help explaining 
information asymmetries in the broad of research effort (Karasek & Bryant, 2012). 
In a similar vein, agency problem is solved when the CEO of business organization 
reports in a transparent way because information asymmetries adversely impact on 
the principal ability to effectively monitor whether his interest has been properly 
taken care of (Abubakar, 2012). This is also in line with resource dependency theory. 
 
Poor financial or firm performance could be as a result of lack of sharp practices and 
corruption, false financial reporting which could lead to poor firm performance. The 
research conducted by Rogers (2008) identifies that companies that disclose all 
relevant and material information in their annual financial and reports are said to be 
transparent.  The study that find out that financial transparency have a strongest link 




In a similar research (Kosedag & Aksu, 2005) provide both empirical and theoretical 
evidence that market transparency is found to have enhanced productivity of many 
organizations (Goodwin, Ahmed, & Heaney, 2009), these researcher’s further states 
that IFRS adoption enhances between performance, transparent and disclosure score. 
The performance is higher for early adopters of International Financial Reporting 
Standards in these studies are in consonant with Chiang (2005) who states in his 
study in the context of Taiwan that transparency of ownership structure, financial 
disclosure and financial transparency and board and management disclosure have 
serious positive implication on firm performance. He concluded that proper 
reporting, compliance with the relevant reporting laws and compliance with the 
corporate governance code will send good signal to investors which on the other 
hand can lead to positive financial performance.  
 
In contrast, Major and Marques (2009) in his research, “the relationship between 
IFRS and financial performance” states that there is need to give more priority to 
sound and good corporate governance practices as the research reveals that IFRS 
convergence and adoption is not linked with higher corporate performance. The level 
of relationship of IFRS with performance cannot be compared to that of good and 
strong corporate governance. Based on the above theoretical and empirical 
explanation, the following is hypothesized: 
H8: There is a significant positive relationship between corporate disclosure and 




3.3.9 Moderating effect of Blockholder Ownership on the Relationship between 
Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
Baron and Kenny (1986, p. 1173) posit that the “moderator function of a third 
variables which partition a focal independent variable into subgroups that established 
it domain of maximal effectiveness in regards to any given dependent variables”. To 
consider block ownership structure as a moderating variable, it must be related to 
both dependent variable and independent variable. According to the agency theory, 
block ownership structure will influence firm and board performance. It is suggested 
that better CG practices will lead to high performance. 
 
Furthermore, under the agency theory, block ownership or concentration of shares by 
some shareholders may lead to private interest rather than putting interest of all 
contracting parties into considerations, that is expropriating the minority interest 
(Garg, 2007; Millstein & Macavoy, 1999; Pearce & Zahra, 1992). Larger 
shareholder expropriating small shareholder becomes eminent as a result of majority 
controlling minority shareholders (Garg, 2007; Kamardin & Haron, 2011; Millstein 
& Macavoy, 1999; Pearce & Zahra, 1992). In another study,  Fan and Wong (2002) 
Ho and Shun Wong (2001) reveal a curvi-linear relationship of Tobin’s Q with 
executive member ownership.  Morck et al. (2001), Mcconnell and Servaes (1995), 
sLeech and Leahy (1991)  and Joh, (2003) found a positive relationship and link 
between block ownership and company performance. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) 
shows that ownership structure of top shareholders are significant with accounting 




2006). However, the following study found no significant association between 
ownership concentration and firm performance (Harold & Kenneth, 1985). Based on 
the above explanation, theoretical justification and empirical review, the following 
hypotheses is developed. 
H9: Blockholder ownership structure moderates the relationship between board 
characteristics and firm performance in Nigeria. 
H10: Blockholder ownership moderates the relationship between managerial 
shareholding and firm performance  in Nigeria. 
H11: Blockholder ownership moderates the relationship between risk management 
committee and firm performance in Nigeria. 
3.3.10 Control Variable 
The following variables are said to be related with firm performance. These variables 
are; firm size and gearing which are included in this study as control variables. Firm 
size is used as control variables because firm performance may be affected by factors 
related to the nature of firm directly or indirectly. The firm size is measured by book 
value of the total assets  of company (Ikoh et al., 2013). Controlling for firm size will 
be necessary as the percentage of MOWN may be larger in small firm size. Ikoh et 
al. (2013) state that directors of large firms have wealth of skills because of the 
complexity of operation of the firm they oversee. It will be appropriate for size to 
control for board characteristics and shareholding structure. Executive’s 
discretionary control is one of the crucial role debt financing plays in an 




to engage in non-optimal activities  (Stulz, 1990). Debt also forces executives to be 
productive and become more proficient to avoid insolvency and liquidation, the loss 
of control as well as loss of name (Stulz, 1990). Enhanced or higher executive 
performance and reduced cost of outside capital is as a result of debt contracting 
(Grossman & Hart, 1982).  
 
In short, conflict of interest could arise over risk to be taken by managers and 
shareholders. This shows the shareholder always want the objectives of the firm of 
profit maximization are attained. John and Senbet (1998) suggest that when a 
company is faced with huge debts, shareholders whose share are limited to the 
amount contributed will inspire the firm to undertake risky projects which may lead 
to increase in yield on their investment, but this would be detrimental to the other 
parties with interest in business like creditors. Gearing is used to control for the risk 
associated with the firm performance. 
3.3.10.1 Gearing  
Stiglitz and Weiss (2014) reveal that the association between gearing and corporate 
performance negatively significant. However, Stiglitz and Weiss (2014) found 
gearing is having positive relationship with  profitability. The mean for gearing is 
marginally above 40% in Malaysian case, indicating that debt financing is not as 
high (Roszaini Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Prior researches also reveal that gearing 




3.3.10.2 Firm Size 
The risk management horizons of bigger firms are broadened and therefore are 
regarded as best performers in the market place (Ghosh, 1998). In addition, large 
firms have more people who are interested in their performance especially the 
competitors and business analysts. This will put them under more pressure to 
perform well. On the other hand, smaller firms are said to be more  innovative and 
are ready for change in order to improve corporate value (Hurdle, 1974). 
3.4 Research Design 
Research design is a principal plan stipulating the processes for collecting and 
scrutinizing and analyzing the needed information (Zikmund, 2000). There are three 
types of business research including exploratory, descriptive and explanatory 
(Zikmund, 2000; Sekaran, 2003, Ezedonmi, 2008, Adefila 2008). The decision about 
the type of research used depends on an individual’s clarity of the problem research 
under consideration. Exploratory design is conducted to gather information on a 
particular problem at hand, and thus does not provide conclusive results. Exploratory 
research is, therefore, to enable understanding of a new phenomenon, which further 
studies are conducted to gain verifiable and conclusive evidence (Zikmund, Babin, 
Carr, & Griffin, 2010). Descriptive design is conducted in particular situations where 
there is just a little knowledge of the nature of a problem. It is conducted, therefore, 






Hypotheses testing/explanatory design is conducted to further offer precise 
knowledge and description of the nature of relationships among the variables being 
investigated (Zikmund, 2000; Sekaran, 2003). This study is considered explanatory 
in nature because it seeks to explain the relationships between corporate governance 
structures, financial transparency and financial performance. Thus, hypotheses are 
formulated to provide explanation of their relationships by demonstrating the 
relationships as statistically significant. Other aspects of research design to highlight 
for this study include population of the study, sampling and sampling technique, data 
collection method and analysis of data. These are discussed in the following 
sections. 
3.5 Population of the Study 
Sekaran and Bougie (2010) state that “population of the study is the group of 
persons, events or things of interest for which an investigator wants to make 
inferences based on an available sample”. This study is focuses on all the 136 non-
financial listed public companies currently listed on the floor of NSE as at June, 
2014. Below is the population under study. The study covers for pre-adoption for the 
period of 2010-2011 and post-adoption for the period of 2012-2013 of IFRS 
adoption and adoption of revised corporate governance code of SEC (NCCG, 2011) 






Sekaran and Bougie (2010) define a sample as a subset of a population. It consists of 
some members or units selected from population. There are many types of sampling 
techniques in the field of academic research which are normally classified into 
probability and non-probability sampling technique. The most commonly used is the 
probability method which includes “stratified random sampling, simple random 
sampling, cluster sampling and systematic sampling”. Following Sekaran (2003) the 
technique of probability sampling is employed in this study for sample selection. 
This method offers every company in the category equal chance of being selected as 
the sample item. This method prevents bias selection as every object in the category 
is given equal chances of being selected which is also one advantage of using this 
type of method (Salkind, 2003, Cavana, Dalahaye, & Sekaran, 2001). The sample of 
the firms used for this research is from the population of all the 136 non-financial 
firms listed on the floor of the NSE as at 2014. It is therefore fair for the researcher 
to test the effect of the association between variables. 
 
This study draws its samples from all the non-financial organizations listed on the 
NSE, hence, the need for stratified random sampling to give equal representation of 
all sample in different categories chances of been elected. The random selection is 
attained manually using random number table, or by computer, or through online 
number originator (Hurdle, 1974). However, it is appropriate to use the sampling 
frame of 62 companies for four years with 248 firm observations after considering 




and suspended companies and newly incorporated companies. See Table 3.1 for the 
numbers of delisted companies and companies with incomplete information.  
Table 3.1  
 Sample Selection Method 
Non-financial companies identified from Nigerian stock market 




Delisted  companies  35 
Data not available in any year 39 
Final sample 62 
 
Furthermore, stratified random sampling is therefore employed to select from all the 
sectors. When the subjects are drawn from each section according to a specific 
percentage which is called proportionate sampling, the subjects are drawn from each 
stratum without regard to any specific fraction, but number of the elements contained 
in each stratum is called disproportionate. This study adopts the disproportionate 
sampling method because they may be missing data in other strata. Table 3.2 
provides information about the population and sample used in this study. The 
explanation of sample profile of the study in percentage is provided in section 4.2 






















3.6.1 Sample Selection Method 
 
The data in this study consists of publicly available information mainly obtained 
from the annual reports of the companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The 
use of corporate annual report is categorized as a secondary source of data, which is 
the interpretation from the primary data. The total initial sample consists of 136 
companies in 2014, excluding banking and financial institutions. These types of 
industry are excluded from the sample since they are governed by other regulatory 
agencies namely, Bank and other Financial Institutions Act 1991 (Edogbanya, Ekpa, 
& Kamardin, 2015). However, after dropping 35 delisted companies and 39 companies 
with incomplete information, the number of companies that remained for analysis became 
62. Considering the number of year for the study (2010-2013) with 248 firm observation, it 
was appropriate to consider the data for panel data analysis (Gujarati, 2010). 
 
COMPANY TYPE POPULATION  SAMPLE SIZE 
Consumer goods  27 15 
Industrial goods  23 10 
Oil and Gas  14 5 
Financial services  - - 
Health care  10 3 
Agriculture  5 1 
Services  19 11 
Construction/real estate  12 3 
Conglomerates  13 9 
ICT 9 3 
Natural Resources 5 2 




3.7 Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis is very important in determination of sample, instruments and of 
data collection. Aggregation of the data collected during the succeeding data analysis 
period is called unit of analysis (Sekaran, 2000). Furthermore, Sekaran (2000) stated 
that the unit of analysis can be individuals, groups, division, industries, organization 
or countries. This study uses only non-financial companies (organization) in Nigeria 
as unit of analysis. The justification for this proposal is as a result of secondary data 
analysis of non-financial companies listed on NSE is governed by another regulatory 
body.  
3.8 Data Collection Procedures 
The method of data collection adopted for this study is the quantitative technique 
which has the purpose of providing objective and numerical fact about particular 
phenomenon. Many researchers on corporate governance adopt this method for their 
data collection (Adams et al., 2010; Ballou et al., 2012; Bhagat & Bernard, 2002; 
Davies, 2013; Gürbüz, 2010; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Kamardin & Haron, 2011; 
Latif et al., 2013). Using a cross sectional and panel data study design, this study 
employs a secondary data for its analysis. Cross-sectional study contains gathering 
of data for a particular study only once or at one point in time to meet the research 
intentions (Cavana et al., 2001). The gathering of data for a particular study done 
once to meet a research intention is referred to as Cross-sectional. Panel data method 






Data gathered from the secondary data of all the public listed on the floor of the NSE 
of randomly selected companies under study using (Adams et al., 2010; Ballou et al., 
2012; Bhagat & Bernard, 2002; Davies, 2013; Gürbüz, 2010; Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2006; Kamardin & Haron, 2011; Latif et al., 2013). Balance sheet and income 
statement were used to calculate the ROA, Tobin’s Q and VAIC for accounting 
measure, market measure of performance and intellectual capital measurements.   
3.9 Operationalization of Variables 
The variables for this study are divided into three (3), the independent variables, the 
moderating variable and dependent variables. All these variables are included in the 
framework designed by the researcher. 
3.9.1 Dependent Variables 
Firm performance is used in this research as dependent variable. ROA and Tobin Q 
statistics are proxies for both accounting and market measure of performance for 
both accounting and market measure of performance respectively, to see whether 
there are different impacts of corporate governance mechanism on firm performance. 
ROA refers to Earnings before Interest and Tax (EBIT) divided by Total Assets (TA) 
of the company (Adams et al., 2010; Ballou et al., 2012; Bhagat & Bernard, 2002; 
Davies, 2013; Gürbüz, 2010; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Kamardin & Haron, 2011; 
Latif et al., 2013). EBIT is used to avoid capital structure discretion choices effect on 




expenses and depreciation costs (Freeman & Hannan, 2014). Tobin’s Q refers to the 
ratio of the market value of equity shares (MVES) plus debt divided by book value 
of total Assets of the firm (Atinc & Ocal, 2014; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). This 
measurement of Tobin’s Q is the approximate method as developed by 
Wiwattanakantang (2001). The adoption of Wiwattanakantang (2001) is due to 
original Tobin’s Q requires replacement cost of assets and preference shares which 
are not actively traded in Nigeria. This study proposes to use book value of liabilities 
as used in the study by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and Sirmans (2013).  
 
 In addition to the two earlier measures of performance, VAIC is also adopted for 
this research due to increase in the number of knowledge organizations and 
increasing importance of intellectual capital to firms, it will be appropriate to adopt 
VAIC with other traditional method to measure performance (Goh, 2005; Tseng & 
James Goo, 2005). VAIC shows a strong positive relationship with some corporate 
governance code as shown in Abidin et al., (2000), Firer & Williams, (2003), Pulic, 
(2004), and  Chung and Pruitt, (1994) 
3.9.2 Independent Variables 
The following independent variables are considered for the purpose of this study:  
Board Size: the total number of board members serving on the board as board of 
directors 
Non-executive Director: the ratio of the number of non-executive directors in the 




CEO Duality Role: the situation where the chairman is the CEO or the MD and 
oversees the day to day affair of the organization 
Board Meeting: the number of the meetings held by the BODs during the financial 
year. 
Board Gender: the percentage of the women on the board. 
Managerial Shareholding: the percentage of shareholding by the directors 
Blockholder Ownership: the percentage of share ownership by top shareholders of 
corporation or five percent of concentrated shareholding by shareholders. 
Risk Management Committee: A situation where the company maintains the risk 
management committee in accordance with NCCG, 2011. It is represented by a 
dummy variable where it is maintained 1 or 0 otherwise 
 
Corporate Reporting Disclosure: this is the system where the company is said to 
have adopted and complied with financial reporting transparency and disclosure 
attributes. This study adapts the methodology of Tsamenyi et al. (2007) information 
disclosure measurements criteria to measure the information transparency of 
sampled non-financial public listed firms in Nigeria.  
 
This study supplement information obtained from annual report of all the sampled 
public listed companies in Nigeria. In a study conducted by Meek et al. (1995) which 
is also in consonant with the study by Aksu and Kosedag (2006), Tsamenyi et al. 
(2007) and Zaheer, (2013) measures information disclosure in the following ways 




information disclosure and board and management structure and process disclosure”.  
This is also the method adopted by S&P for their research in rating companies of the 
level of disclosure and transparency achieved by them (Bijalwan & Madan, 2013). 
3.9.3 The Disclosure Scoring Index 
Data on corporate disclosure are collected on public listed companies in the Nigerian 
stock exchange (NSE). The sample is limited to only the non-financial companies. 
The choice to limit the study to non-financial companies is as a result of regulatory 
difference. This study focuses on the disclosure of ownership structure, financial 
transparency and information disclosure, board’s management process disclosure as 
proxy for corporate disclosure (Tsamenyi et al., 2007).  
The introduction of mandatory disclosure requirements can improve significantly the 
extent of voluntary disclosure because, disclosure by firm voluntarily seems to 
provoke other companies to make related disclosure in financial report (Dye & 
Sridhar, 2014;  Dye, 2014). For example Chiang (2005) study on CG structure and 
firm performance and the level of  financial transparency by Taiwan listed firms with 
mandatory disclosure requirements and extent of voluntary disclosure in these 
companies. Their studies found out positive association between the level of 
mandatory disclosure and firm performance.  
 
Transparency and disclosure (T&D) scores and attributes are examined using the 




(1995) to search for the best practice of information disclosure items in the 2010-
2013 annual reports of the sample firms. The researcher uses 42 items to measure 
corporate governance and disclosure in Nigeria. Out of 42 item, 36 items were 
adopted from Tsamenyi et al. (2007) and the remaining 6 items were adopted from 
Meek et al. (1995).  
 
The information attributes and disclosure were developed in line with Nigerian SEC 
transparency and disclosure guideline on corporate best practices as reflected in the 
revised NCCG, 2011. The disclosure is in line with OECD guideline on transparency 
and disclosure as reported in Tsamenyi et al. (2007). This transparency and 
disclosure is designed to help potential investors to understand the reporting 
differences in the annual report across market sector and capitalization.  
 
The data sources for this research is the annual reports of non-financial companies in 
Nigeria. This research adopts the information transparency measurement criteria of 
Tsamenyi et al. (2007) and  Meek et al. (1995) to measure the information 
transparency of selected firm. The transparency and disclosure attributes is divided 
into three sub-set: these are “transparency of ownership structure and investments 
with 11 attributes, financial transparency and information disclosure with 17 
attributes and board and management structure and process with 14 attributes”  
which brings the number of attributes to 42 that is included in this study (Meek et al., 
1995). One score point is awarded for each criterion for a firm that meets it and zero 




a binary basis as “yes”, “no” and “N/A” to ensure objectivity. Each “yes” answer is 
equal to one point and the overall T&D score for each firm is calculated. The scoring 
methodology is consistent with Tsamenyi et al. (2007), Zaheer, (2013) and Meek et 
al. (1995), Adelapo (2011) posits that unweighted scores are used for number of 
reasons because of its subjectivity that would be involved in allocating weights when 
user preferences are unidentified and when users in different nations are likely to 
assign different weights to similar attributes. Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) states 
that unweighted score and measurements permit an  analysis  independent of the 
observations of a particular user group which control for subjectivity in interpreting 
the financial statement and annual reports. 
 
The study uses 42 scoring index in all to measure CG and disclosure in Nigeria. The 
scoring index were adapted from both  Meek et al (1995) and Tsamenyi et al. (2007). 
The information attributes were developed in line with the information of 
transparency and disclosure (T&D) rules contained in the OECD principles. The 
study adopts this scoring guideline because it is in line with Nigeria SEC of 
corporate governance guidelines on best practices. The OECD principles recommend 
corporate governance framework that will ensure timely and precise disclosure is 
made on companies’ financial position, performance, ownership and governance 






Table 3.3  
Operationalization of Variables 
Variables Acronyms Operationalization Sources  
DV    
Tobin’s Q QRATIO This is the ratio of the 
market value of common 
shares plus the total debt 
divided by the book 
value of the total asset of 
the company 
Haniffa and  Hudaib 
(2006) 
 
Abdul Latif et al. 
(2013) 
 
Return on Assets 
(ROA) % 
ROA Earning before tax 
(EBT) divided by the 
total assets 





VAIC VAIC represents a 
measure for business. 
 
VAIC = HCE + SCE + 
CEE; 
VAIC = ICE + CEE 
ICE = HCE + SCE 
VA = P+C+D+A 




Abidin et al. (2000) 
IV    
Board Size BOSIZE Total number of the 
board of directors 
serving in the 
organization 
Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006) 
CEO Duality Role CEODUA The situation where the 
chairman is the CEO. It 
is dichotomous with a 
dummy variable 1 if the 
CEO is the chairman or 
otherwise 0 











Table 3.3 (continued) 
Variables   Acronyms Operationalization Sources 
Non-Executive Director 
 NONED 
This is the proportion or 
number of non-executive 
directors serving in the 
firm as board of directors 
Abdul Latif et al. 
(2013) 
 
Board Meeting BOMEET 
This is the number 
percentage of BODS 
meeting during a 
financial year 
Christensen et al. 
(2010), Lin (2013) 
Board Gender 
Composition  BOGEND 
This is the proportion of 
women director on the 
BOD 
Adams  and Ferreira 
(2009), Lückerath-
Rovers (2011) 
Blockholder Ownership BLOOWN 
 Proportion of 
shareholding by top 
shareholders or 
concentrated 
shareholding structure by 
few shareholders 
Xu and  Wang 
(1999) 
Managerial Shareholding MOWN 
Proportion of 
shareholding held by the 
directors of the company 
Xu and Wang (1999) 




This is a situation where 
there is presence of risk 
management committee, 
which is proxies as 1 for 
presence and 0 otherwise 
Goodwin et al. 
(2009) 
Hoyt and Liebenberg 
(2011) 
Disclosure: 
1. ownership and 
investments, 
2.  financial and 
information 
disclosure  











Total score of the 
transparency in the entire 
category listed and the 
compliance and adoption 
of relevant reporting 
standards by 
organizations. It is 
dichotomous for 1 for 
disclosure  and 0 if 
otherwise 
Tsamenyi et al., 
(2007) Zaheer, 
(2013), Adelopo, 
(2011b),  Meek et al. 
(1995) 
CV    
Gearing (%) 
 GEAR 
The percentage of total 




Firm Size FIMSIZ 
This is proxy for the 
total assets of the 
company. 
Haniffa and Hudaib 




3.9.4 Test for Validity and Reliability of Disclosure Variables  
Poor reliability of score measures leads to inflated standard errors and/or biased 
estimates, particularly in multivariate analysis. Reliability estimation is usually an 
integral step to assess data quality in the analysis of score data. Cronbach’s α is a 
widely used indicator of reliability due to its rather strong assumptions (Cronbach, 
1951; Biemer; Christ.; Wiesen, 2009). Therefore, it may be worthy to provide 
analysis of the measurement of scoring index vis-à-vis the type of research variables 
used in the present study. This is because, the measurements methodology of the 
disclosure index was adapted from previous studies of 36 items was adopted from 
Tsamenyi eta al. (2007) and 6 scoring index was adapted from Meek et al. (1995).  
 
The internal consistency reliability test was conducted and the extent to which items 
of a particular variables converge together and are independently capable of 
measuring the same variable. Test of internal consistency reliability of Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficient was employed (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010). As shown in Table 3.4, 
the results demonstrate that all measures attain high reliability coefficient. The 
researchers consider a reliability coefficient of 0.60 as average reliability, and a 
coefficient of 0.70 and above as high reliability (Hair et al., 2006; Nunnally, 1967; 







Table 3.4   
Summary of Reliability Test Results 
Variables  Standard  Deviation Cronbach’s alpha 
OWNT 1.66 .704 
BODT 1.88 .709 
FINT 2.33 .719 
3.10 Model Specification 
Independent variables consist of corporate governance variables, namely board size 
(BOSIZE), non-executive directors (NONED), CEO role duality (CEODUA), 
blockholder ownership (BLOOWN), managerial shareholdings (MOWN), board 
meeting (BOMEET), board gender (BOGEND), risk management committee 
(RISMGT) and two control variables, gearing (GEAR), firm size (FIMSIZ).  On the 
moderating variable, blockholder ownership, Baron and Kenny (1986) posit that the 
“linear hypothesis is tested by adding the product of the moderator and the 
dichotomous independent variable to the regression equation, So if the independent 
variable is denoted as X, the moderator as Z, and the dependent variable as Y, Y is 
regressed on X, Z, and XZ. Moderator effects are indicated by the significant effect 
of XZ while X and Z are controlled”. Thus the model or the regression function for 
this research is found in 3.11. 
3.11 Regression Functions 
 Panel corrected standard errors multiple regressions were used in equation (a), 




corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. In equation (b), the study 
used hierarchical regression function to test the moderating effect of block ownership 
between the relationship between the corporate governance variables and firm 
performance proxies (Aiken & West, 1991a; Andersson & Nielsen, 2014; Baron & 
Kenny, 1986; Shieh, 2009). The following are the proposed models to analyze the 
relationship between the various corporate governance variables and corporate firm 
performance. 
The regression functions for the study are as follows: 
(a) Corporate governance and firm performance 
FPit = α0 + β1BOSIZEit + β2NONEDit + β3BOMEETit + β4BOGENDit + β5MOWNit 
+ Β6MOWN2it + β7 RSKMGTit + β8BODTit + β9OWNTit + β10FINTit + 
β11GEARit+ β12FIMSIZit + є 
 
(b) Corporate governance and moderating variable 
 
FPit = α0 + β1BOSIZEit + β2NONEDit +β3BOMEETit + β4BOGENDit +β5MOWNit + 
Β6MANOWN2it +β7RSKMGTit + β8BLOOWNit + β9BODTit + β10OWNTit + 
β11FINTit + β12BOSIZEit * BLOOWNit + β13NONEDit * BLOOWNit+ 
β14BOMEETit * BLOOWNit + β15BOGENDit * BLOOWNit +β16MOWNit * 





FP  Firm Performance measured by Tobin Q, ROA and 
VAIC. 




NONED Non-executive directors 
BOMEET The numbers of BOD meeting annually 
BOGEND The proportion of women on the Board. 
BLOOWN The proportion of share ownership by the top 
shareholders 
MOWN Shareholdings held by directors 
RSKMGT Risk management committee 
OWNT Ownership disclosure 
BODT Board process  disclosure 
FINT Financial  disclosure 
GEAR Gearing 
FIMSIZ Firm Size 
Є Error term 
 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) in their research used a set of data from US suggest that 
there is a potential problem in the model and regression functions stated above. This 
problem is a potential problem of endogeneity between managerial ownership and 
Tobin’s Q. This will imply that the standard regression functions may not be 
appropriate to test the association between endogenous variable. Cho (1998) and 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) also posit the existence of endogeneity between 
managerial ownership and performance. The problem of  endogeneity is checked  by 
using two-stage least square instrumental variable approach (Bascle, 2008). This 




technique which is subject to the diagnostic test pertinent to this method. In the 
instrumental variables estimation, the common validity test is the Wu-Hausman or 
Durbin Wu-Hausman test. This (Durbin-Wu-) Hausman endogeneity test compares 
the estimates (coefficient vectors) of OLS and the instrumental variables for cross 
sectional data and Davidson-MacKinnon test for panel data. 
3.12 Techniques of Data Analysis 
Upon completion of data collection, combinations of both descriptive and inferential 
statistics were employed as methods of data analysis. The regression analysis was 
conducted using the STATA statistics analysis tool. The reasons for employing stata 
statistical tool is because panel data are used in this research. It enhances the quality 
of the data, data becomes more variability, more degree of freedom and it reduces 
and eliminates bias in the data (Baltagi, 2005).  Since multivariate regression is used 
to test the hypotheses, assumptions of multi co-linearity, normality, 
homoscedasticity and linearity were also tested (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006).  
 
The Pearson correlation matrix is used to test the multi collinearity assumption while 
the test for linearity, normality and homoscedasticity  are also conducted (Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2006). Multivariate regressions for each model were conducted for each 
year (2010-2013) as well as for the pooled data for all four years. These years (2010-
2013) are considered in this research to take into account both pre and post adoption 




two stage least square regression to solve the endogeneity that may occur in the 
course of the study (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006).  
 
To undertake the empirical analysis and to achieve the main objective of the thesis, 
secondary data and STATA statistical package are used. Baltagi (2008) stated that 
panel data will be useful to utilize both time series and cross sectional information 
and it gives large number of observations, increasing the degree of freedom and 
reducing the co-linearity among explanatory variables. Gujarati, (2004), and Green, 
(2003) also stated that panel data improves empirical analysis and it gives more 
flexibility for modeling the behavior of cross sectional units than convectional time 
series analysis. 
 
In addition, more efficient, minimal collinearity, more information, high degree of 
freedom is associated with panel data. Even adjustments which are dynamic in 
nature are better captured by panel data. Also, panel data can discover and measure 
the effect while time series or cross section cannot capture the effects.  In the same 
vein, panel data are macro in nature and have a longer time series whereas time 
series faces problem of non-standard distributions which are peculiar in unit root 
test. 
3.13 Summary of the Chapter 
Corporate governance is an important and key factor in solving agency problem 




discusses the conceptual framework, population of the study, sampling size 
technique and disclosure scoring methodology and operationalization of variables. 





 DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter Four focuses on the result for regression analyses which includes; 
multicollinearity, homoscedasticity, descriptive analysis, Pearson correlation matrix 
and multiple regressions. Furthermore, the basic assumptions in the panel data 
analysis is also considered. This assumption is between pooled effect and random 
effect and between random effect and fixed effect. The final part provides summary 
of hypotheses testing and summary of the chapter. 
4.2 Sample Profile 
Table 4.1 presents the sample composition of sectors used in this study. The sample 
cut across the industry groups making up the Nigerian economy except the financial 
companies. Thus, they are representative of the population of this study. The 
majority of the samples come from consumer goods sector in which 60 companies 
representing 24.19%, and 44 companies from services representing 17.74%, 36 
companies from conglomerates representing 14.52% and 20 companies from oil and 
gas representing 8.06%. The remaining sampled companies were from health sector, 
ICT, and construction representing the frequency of 12 and 4.84% respectively. The 
remaining is from Agriculture and natural resources representing 4 and 8 companies 
and 1.61% and 3.23% respectively. The total of ten (10) sectors are selected for this 





Sample Profile of Companies 
Sector Frequency Percentage 
Consumer 60 24.19 
Services  44 17.74 
Industrial goods  40 16.13 
Conglomerates 36 14.52 
Oil and gas 20 8.06 
Health care                        12 4.84 
ICT 12 4.84 
Construction 12 4.84 
Natural resources  8 3.23 
Agriculture 4 1.61 
Total  248 100 
Note: The frequency represents the number of firms’ observations under the period  
of study 2010-2013.                                                         
 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables 
Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics of continuous variables. The variables are 
the corporate governance mechanism, corporate reporting transparency and firm 











Table 4.2  
Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables 
Variables MEAN MIN MAX SD 
BOSIZE 8.49   5.00 15.00 2.09 
NONED 0.69 0.25 0.82 .139 
BOGEND 0.08 0.00 0.57 .109 
BOMEET 4.60 2.00 9.00 1.23 
MOWN       14.0 0.00          88.0 20.5 
BLOOWN 59.0 10.00 98.33 22.7 
BODT 64.0 14.0 86.0 .134 
FINT 68.0 29.0 94.0 .137 
OWNT 65.0 18.0 91.0 .150 
GEAR 0.59 0.10 1.00 .216 
FIMSIZ 16.08 11.49 20.55 1.88 
ROA 0.07 -0.69 0.47 0.11 
QRATIO 1.04 0.09 3.36 .240 
VAIC 3.56 -6.63 27.90 1.74 
Note: N= 248. BOSIZE is the number of board members; NONED is the proportion of non- executive 
director; BOGEND is the proportion of female directors on the board; MOWN is the percentage of 
directors shareholding; OWNT is the total index of ownership transparency; FINT is the total index of 
financial transparency; BODT is the total index of board transparency; GEAR is the debt ratio; 
FIMSIZ is the log of total asset; Q ratio is the Tobin Q; ROA is the return on Asset; VAIC is the 
Value Added Intellectual Capital. 
 
The mean of the board size (BOSIZE) is 8.49 with minimum of five directors and 
maximum of fifteen directors. The numbers of the members of the board is in line 
with the recommendations of the revised code corporate governance of 2011 by 




sizeable enough to consisting of both executive and non-executive directors. The 
code further states that the ideal board should not be less than five. The mean of the 
composition of the non-executive director (NONED) is 0.69 with the minimum as 
0.25 and maximum as 0.82. However, the code of best practice in Nigeria do not 
state the number of NONED to be on the board but 69% mean of the composition of 
non-executive directors is already in line with the requirements of the Nigerian code 
of corporate governance which stipulates that the non-executive director should be 
more in numbers in the board composition.   
 
The meeting of the board of directors (BOMEET) from this study posit that the 
companies was having average of 4.6 meeting annually which comply with the code 
of corporate governance states that companies must meet at least once in every three 
months, that means four times in a year. The number of women on the board 
(BOGEND) on the average percentage is 8% with minimum percentage of 0% and 
maximum of 57%. This means the participation of women in company management 
in Nigeria is very low. The low level participation of the women in the board room is 
as a result of no specific requirement of the women to be included on the board list 
by the code of corporate governance in Nigeria. The managerial shareholding 
(MOWN) is having average of 14%; minimum of 0% and maximum is 0.88%, this 
explains that there is low level of managerial shareholding in Nigeria.  The block 
shareholding is having the average of 59%, minimum of 10% and maximum of 98%. 
This is an indication that shareholding by Nigerian companies are characterised by 




The corporate reporting transparency has three dimensions namely board process 
transparency (BODT), the financial transparency (FINT) and the ownership 
transparency (OWNT). On the board transparency (BODT), the mean score is 64%, 
the minimum is 14% while the maximum is 86%. Also, on the board transparency 
(FINT), the mean score is 68, the minimum is 29% while the maximum is 94%.  
Lastly on corporate transparency, the ownership transparency (OWNT) is having   
mean score of 65%, the minimum score 18% and the maximum score of 91%.  
 
On the firm performance dimensions, the ROA shows the mean of 0.07, the minimum 
of -.06 and maximum of 0.47. Similarly, the Tobin’s Q shows the average mean 1.04, 
the minimum of 0.09 and maximum of 3.38 while the Value Added Intellectual capital 
shows 3.50, the minimum of 6.63 and maximum of 27.9.  In terms of firm size 
(FIMSIZE) which is the proxy of the log of total asset, the mean is 16.08, the 
minimum is 11.49 and the maximum is 20.55. The gearing is 0.59 average, minimum 
at 0.10 and the maximum is 1.00. 
4.3.2 Categorical Variable 
Table 4.3 presents the statistics of categorical variables; CEO duality and risk 
management committee (RSKMGT). The Nigerian companies have 100% complied 
with the corporate governance code of best practices in Nigeria as all the companies 





 However, the risk management committee is one of the board committees set as a 
control mechanism to monitor the affairs and the activities of the firm, however, not 
all the companies that have established this committee. The dummy variable 1 is used 
if there is presence of risk management committee and 0 if otherwise. The compliance 
of companies on risk management committee shows that 46.8% have complied with 
the corporate governance code that risk management committee is set up alongside 
other board committees, however, 53.2% of the companies are yet to comply. The 
compliance of SEC code of 2011 is hampered as a result of weak legal framework in 
the compliance of code of best practices in Nigeria. Good legal framework can greatly 
enhance corporate governance practices in Nigeria (Edogbanya et al., 2015). 
Table 4.3 
Descriptive statistics of Categorical Variable 
Variables Dichotomy Frequency Percentage 
CEO Duality 1 0 0 
 0 248 100 
RSKMGT 1 116 46.8 
 0 132 53.2 
Note: there is 100% compliance by the Nigerian companies. The duties of the managing director in 
Nigeria are fully separated from the functions of the chairman of public listed companies in Nigeria. 
This means, there is 100% compliance to the SEC code of cooperate governance 2011. 
 
4.4 Diagnostic Tests of Panel Data Analysis 
Before the commencement of regression analysis, the basic assumptions in multiple 
linear regressions using panel data are checked. These assumptions include 




Assumptions such as normality, linearity, and outlier and validity test for panel data 
analysis.  
4.4.1 Homoscedasticity 
Test for homoscedasticity must be carried out going by the assumptions of 
multivariate analysis. This test is conducted with the assumption that the level of 
variance in the firm performance explained is equally distributed among the corporate 
governance variables. If otherwise, the research data would be said to be 
heteroscedastic (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2010). In other words, 
homoscedasticity is “when an Individual Y values are spread around their mean value 
with mean variance” Gujarati (1995. P. 154). If the variation of the error term of 
individual cross sectional unit is not constant, the assumption is violated and there is 
heteroscedasticity. This test is statistically conducted in this study through independent 
sample t-test.  Scholars such as Hair, et al (2010) and Pallant (2003) argue that the 
Levene statistics result should be statistically insignificant (0.05) for the data to be 
outside the range of heteroscedasticity. This often occurs in a cross sectional data 
where there are large differences in value and size between the observation. Graphical 
method and non -graphical method can be used to detect the presence of 
heteroscedasticity.  
 
The remedy of heteroscedasticity is through transformation of data (Hair et al, 2006). 
Heteroscedasticity is checked using a non-graphical method. Modified Wald test is 




homogeneous were tested. In a situation where the p-value is more than 0.05, then this 
study fails to reject the null hypotheses and the residual is deemed to be homogeneous. 
Regression with robust analysis was conducted so that the standard error could be 
corrected. Robust analysis leads to the  t-statistics will be more accurate because this 
test will provide better estimation for the standard error to be accommodated (Gujariti, 
2009; Pallant, 2003).  
 
Table 4.4 below shows the existence of heteroscedasticity using modified Wald test 
for heteroscedasticity in panel data analysis. Based on the modified Wald test statistic 
results, all the models produce a significant chi-square value at 1% significant level for 
ROA, Tobin’s Q and VAIC. Thus, the finding indicates existence of 
heteroscedasticity. To remedy for this problem, the panel corrected standard error 
method of regression is employed.  
Table 4.4 
Modified Wald test for Heteroscedasticity 
 ROA               Tobin’s Q                       VAIC 
chi2  2.0e+05             2.8e+05                 1.3e+07 
Probability                        0.000  0.000 0.000 
4.4.2 Multicollinearity 
This form of normality test of data distribution inspection focuses on the degree of the 
relationship that exists between independent variables (corporate governance, 




the independent variables exists when the correlation is above 0.80 (Hair et al 2010).  
Coakes and Ong (2011); Hair et al. (2010) and Pallant (2003) posit that the existence 
of multicollinearity between variables distorts the predictive power of independent 
variables on dependent variables as the estimate power of the regression coefficient 
becomes unrealistic. This study conducted the multicollinearity test between the 
independent variables in order to check for the multicollinearity among the variables 
and to get the data prepared for further analyses.  If the correlation is more than 0.80, 
the next step is to test for Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). There is serious 
multicollinearity problem if the VIF is greater than 4 (Hair et al 2010). The way to 
solve this problem if it occurs is by dropping one variable (Bickel, 2007). Checking 
the data, it shows that there is no multicollinearity problem for the data under study 
given that there is no correlation that is greater than 0.8 and the VIF in this this study 
are all less than 2. The analysis for VIF is in the Table 4.5. Correlation matrix between 
























Variable Inflation Factor (VIF) 
Model Variable VIF 1/VIF   
ROA BOSIZE 1.72     0.580 
 NONED 1.18     0.850 
 BOMEET 1.29     0.772 
 BOGEND 1.12     0.891 
 MOWN 1.30     0.767 
 RSKMGT 1.26     0.796 
 BLOOWN 1.13     0.888 
 BODT 1.39     0.722 
 FINT 1.60     0.624 
 OWNT 1.59     0.631 








Tobin’s Q BOSIZE 1.11     0.897 















0.887            
 BODT 1.11     0.897 
 FINT 1.58     0.631 
 OWNT 1.60     0.625 
 GEAR 1.07     0.936 
 FIMSIZ 1.60     0.623 
 Mean VIF 1.31 
 
 
VAIC BOSIZE 1.58     0.633 
 NONED 1.11     0.903 
 BOMEET 1.26    0.790 
 BOGEND 1.09     0.914 
 MOWN 1.28     0.778 
 RSKMGT 1.25     0.801 
 BLOOWN 1.13     0.883 
 BODT 1.11     0.902 
 FINT 1.60     0.624 
 OWNT 1.60     0.623 
 GEAR 1.07     0.931 
 FIMSIZ 
Mean VIF 
1.61   
1.32  
0.622 





4.4.3 Autocorrelation  
When the diagnostic tests reveal the existence of correlation among panel error 
components and also autocorrelation across cross section and time series, the 
assumptions of no heteroscedasticity and no autocorrelation is the random parameters 
model cannot be utilized (Gujariti, 2009). Instead, the fixed effects model provides the 
remedy to the problem as the model allows for the error terms to correlate with the 
individual effects.  
 
The presence of autocorrelation is verified by using the Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation in the panel data. The test checks for the first-order autocorrelation 
with a null hypothesis indicating no first order autocorrelation. For the ROA model, 
the Wooldridge test of autocorrelation resulted in F (1, 60) = 16.150, for Tobin’s Q 
model, F (1, 61) =  9.665 and VAIC model at F (1, 61) = 26.032 and all are significant 
at 0.001. The null hypothesis of no correlation between error terms is rejected and 
indicates the occurrence of first order autocorrelation in the entire three models ROA, 
Tobin’s Q and VAIC respectively. As a result of this problem, the panel corrected 
standard error is employed to take care of possible problem of autocorrelation and 
possible heteroscedasticity. Table 4.6 below shows the result of Wooldridge test for 








Wooldridge test for autocorrelation 
 ROA               Tobin’s Q                       VAIC 
F 16.150                    9.665                         26.032 
Prob 0.000                    0.003                        0.000 
4.4.4 Normality 
It is important to test for normality of variables across two or more variables (Coakes 
& Ong, 2011; Pallant, 2003). In order to uphold the assumption of normality in respect 
of data distribution, normality is one of the pre-requisite for multivariate analysis. If 
this is neglected it can lead to misleading relationship between the variables under 
investigation and hence distort the findings of the research (Gujarati, 1995). One of the 
method in which normality of data can be measured is an assessment of data 
distribution through value of kurtosis and skewness (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). 
Previous scholars assigned different acceptable values to kurtosis and skewness. 
According to Tabanichnick and Fidell (2007) the value for kurtosis and skewness 
should not be greater than + 2, Kline (2005) suggests + 8 value for kurtosis and + 2 for 
skewness. Hair eta al (2006) suggests kurtosis and skewness is within 1.96 (at 0.05 
significance level) and 2.58 (at 0.01 significance level). However, normal P-P plot can 
also be used in this study to test for normality as suggested by some previous scholars.  
For example, Hair et al., (2010) delineate normal p-p plot and histogram as graphical 
representation of data distribution that enhance visual inspection at a glance. This 




4.4.5  Assumption of Linearity 
Before multivariate analysis can be run, there is need to test for linearity between 
dependent and independent variables (Coakes & Ong, 2011; Pallant, 2003). To comply 
with this assumption, this study examines the linearity of independent variables and 
the dependent variables by normal probability plots from regression standardized 
residual results as suggested by Coakes and Ong (2011). Coakes and Ong (2011) argue 
that the linearity relationship between independent variables and dependent variables 
can be assessed by using a graphic inspection of normal probability plots of regression 
standardized residual and histogram. The normal probability confirms the positive 
linear correlation between the study variables. Furthermore, non-linearity is not a 
problem if the standard deviation of the dependent variable is more than the standard 
deviation of residuals. Non-linearity of managerial shareholding was addressed by 
using the quadratic terms in the function. In this study, analyses of curve estimations 
for quadratic term of ROA, Tobin’s Q and VAIC were conducted for managerial 
ownership structure (Morck et al, 1988). 
4.4.6 Outliers 
Outliers are unusual observations present in a set of data with extreme values that 
differ from the rest of the data (Karioti, 2007). It can also be referred to as observation 
with extreme values which are different from other observation in the same category. 
An outlier could be different from other points with respect to the value of variable or 
multivariate data, and could be unusual in respect of the combination of values of 




estimated slope of the regression line but could adversely affect the model fit and 
estimated error (Latin, Douglas, & Green 2003) and leads to wrong conclusion and 
inaccurate prediction. When outliers are identified, the next consideration is either to 
delete or to retain the outlier. The generalization will be limited to improving the 
result. Thus, before deleting the outliers, differences in estimated coefficients are 
tested using multiple regressions on the variables. If the difference is not significant, 
the outlier is deleted.  However, for the current study, the robust regressions were used 
because this method gives less weight to outliers and also check the robustness of the 
model” (Hair et al., 2010). 
4.5 Panel Data Analysis 
According to Baltagi (2005), panel data refers to the pooling of observations on a 
cross section over several times. In short, it is a hybrid of time series and cross 
sectional data structures, thus enabling the researcher to study the dynamics of change 
over the short time series. In this study, panel data structure rather than cross sectional 
or time series was utilized due to the potential benefits provided by this approach, in 
particular it can enhance the quantity and quality of data that could not be provided 
with either a cross sectional or a time series alone (Greene, 2003). 
 
Moreover, panel data could control for variables that are not included in the model 
(Gujariti, 2009). As Henderson and Kaplan (2000) noted that panel data analysis both 
accounts for omitted variables and captures dynamics relationship between 




sectional model. The researchers further suggest that research on corporate 
governance could be conducted by utilizing panel data analysis since it offers various 
benefits other than data structure, such as cross sectional and time series where panel 
data are capable, to some extent, of controlling for model specification (Henderson & 
Kaplan, 2000). Furthermore,  Baltagi (2005) lists several advantages of the panel data 
analysis: (i) individual heterogeneity could be controlled, (ii) data becomes more 
informative, more variability, less correlation among the variables, more degrees of 
freedom and more efficiency, (iii) accounts for multitude of change, (iv) identifies and 
measures the effects, which are simply undetectable in pure cross section or pure time 
series data, (v) constructs and tests more complicated behavioural model compared to 
pure cross section or pure time series data, and (vi) reduces or eliminates bias due to 
aggregation over firms and individuals.  
 
Therefore, pooling cross section and time series allows for changes in time-dependent 
explanatory variables to influence the dependent variable, thus, it provides a more 
dynamic analysis. However, the use of the panel data is not without limitations. The 
restrictions include the survey design and data collection matters, measurement errors, 
selectivity problems (i.e.: self-selection problems, non-response bias, attrition) and 
short time series dimension and cross section dependence (Baltagi, 2005). It is 
important to note that the first three limitations are frequent problems that occur in the 
survey approach but rarely in the archival data. Therefore, the validity test for panel 




4.5.1 Constant Variance Model Vs. Random Effects Model 
The first stage of the panel data analysis involves determining the best panel approach 
to be used. The decision to use the constant variance model or random effects model is 
by conducting the Breusch Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test for random effects 
(Wooldrige). The Lagrangian Multiplier test examines the presence of unobserved 
effects in the random effects model. If the calculated value of the test exceeds the 
critical value (in other words significant of chi-square), null hypothesis is rejected and 
the random effects model of panel data is chosen or vice versa.  
 
Table 4.6 below shows that the calculated value Breusch Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier 
test is more than the critical value for all the models (p=0.000), thus, the null 
hypothesis is rejected. The significance of chi-square of the Lagrangian Multiplier test 
signifies that the variance of the random effects model is not zero (0). Hence, the 
random effects model is more suitable than the constant variance model. 
 
Table 4.6 
Breusch Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test 
 ROA Tobin’s Q VAIC 
Chi2 (12/13)            156.62                      25.44                            86.58 





4.5.2  Fixed Effects Model Vs. Random Effects Model  
Baltagi (2005) proposed the fixed effects model or random effects model to estimate 
the panel data. The fixed effects model is a regression with constant slopes, however, 
the intercepts differ according to the cross sectional unit while the random effects 
model would have a random constant term (Wooldridge, 2010). The choice of the fixed 
effects model or random effects model can be tested based on the Hausman 
specification test proposed by Hausman (1978). This test is based on the difference 
between the fixed effects and random effects estimators. The fixed effect is preferable 
over random effect when the Hausman test result is significant in the model (Al-Ajmi, 
2008). Furthermore, Al-Ajmi (2008) notes that the fixed effects model capture the 
possibility of an individual firm effect on reporting period or control for omitted 
variables that differ among firms but are constant over time. The choice of the fixed 
effects model or random effects model is based on the assumption of whether as the 
unobserved company level effect is independent of the explanatory variables or not. If 
we can assume there is no correlation, then the random effects model would normally 
provide more powerful and efficient estimation than the fixed effects model. In 
contrast, the fixed effects model is generally superior when there is a correlation 
between the unobserved firm-specific random effects and the explanatory variable, in 
which the fixed effects model normally provides consistent results.  
 
Subsequently, the Hausman test is conducted in choosing the best model that suits the 
data. The results for the Hausman test (fixed effects. random effects), as stated in Table 




model 3(VAIC) and the p-value of X2= 0.000 for all the models. Since the chi-square 
values are highly significant, the null hypothesis should be rejected, which indicates 
that there is a significant difference between the coefficients of the random effects and 
fixed effects models. Hence, it is risky to assume that there is no correlation between 
the error terms in all the models and its independent variables. Thus, the stricter 
assumption of the random effects model cannot be used; instead the fixed effects model 
supports the assumption for correlation to exist. 
 
Table 4.7 
Hausman specification test 
 ROA Tobin’s Q            VAIC 
Chi2 (12/13)          156.62                                      165 135 
Prob > chi2            0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
4.5.3  Endogeneity Issue 
As discussed earlier, studies have proven the existence of an endogenous relationship 
between the managerial ownership and Tobin’s Q (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Morck et 
al., 1988). According to Gujarati (1999:439), “endogeneity arises when the dependent 
variable that appears as an explanatory variable in another equation may be correlated 
with the stochastic error term the classical regression of that equation”. As such it 
violates one of the critical assumptions of OLS in that the explanatory variable is 
assumed to be either fixed or non-random, or if random, it may be uncorrelated with 




explanatory variables in the Tobin’s Q, managerial ownership is expected to correlate 
with the error term of Tobin’s Q. For that reason, it is important to eliminate the 
possible correlation and this can be done by employing the Two Stage Least Square 
(2SLS) analysis (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). The 2SLS was developed by Robert 
Basmann to counter the endogeneity problem (Basmann, 1957).  The 2SLS involves 
two (2) successive stages of analysis; the first stage is to regress the endogenous 
variable against all its independent variables, namely, the Tobin’s Q. The first stage 
regression derives the predicted value of Tobin’s Q. Then, in the second stage, the 
predicted value of managerial ownership is used in the regression of the Tobin’s Q 
model. Nevertheless, the validity of the 2SLS technique is subject to the diagnostic 
test pertinent to this method. In the instrumental variables estimation, the common 
validity test is the Wu-Hausman or Durbin Wu-Hausman test. This (Durbin-Wu-) 
Hausman endogeneity test compares the estimates (coefficient vectors) of OLS and 
the instrumental variables and the Davidson-MacKinnon test of exogeneity provides 
equal power to the Hausman. The F-test of the regression results signifies that the 
coefficients of residuals are zero (0). The null hypothesis for both tests states that the 
OLS regression coefficient vectors. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that 
the IV regression is needed since the endogeneity among the independent variables 
would have a harmful effect on the OLS estimates. However, when the p-value of the 
test is not significant (if the variables are exogenous), it is meaningless to apply the 
two-stage regression since it provides a less efficient estimation due to the large 




4.5.4 Endogeneity of Managerial Ownership 
Table 4.8 presents the significant value of the F test for the Davidson-MacKinnon test 
of exogeneity. The null hypothesis indicates that regression estimator would yield a 
consistent estimate using instrumental variables in the fixed effect model. The results 
show that the p-value is larger than a = 0.10 for all the models. Thus, the null 
hypotheses cannot be rejected. The insignificant of this diagnostic test indicate that the 
endogeneity relationship between the managerial ownership and Tobin’s Q do not 
have a destructive impact on the regression estimators. Hence, the instrumental 
variables estimator is meaningless due to the large standard errors are and not required 
to fit in the regression model. However, endogeneity relationship of managerial 
shareholding and financial performance were also checked. Table 4.8 below shows the 
result of Davidson-MacKinnon test of exogeneity test for panel data. The result shows 
insignificant relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. This 
is an indication that it does not have a destructive impact on regression estimator. 
Table 4.8 
Davidson-MacKinnon test of Exogeneity 
 ROA Tobin’s Q VAIC 
F stat      ( 1,174) (1,174) ( 1,174) 
P-value  .667                        .445  .9076 
 
4.5.5 Panel Corrected Standard Errors  
A common feature of time series cross sectional data (TSCS) is that they display both 




Katz, 1995). Specifically, time series data exhibit contemporaneous correlations while 
cross section data display heteroscedasticity. Therefore, any inferences drawn base on 
the standard errors generated by the OLS will be misleading. Although the 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) method (Parks, 1967) is theoretically superior to the 
OLS, it is only applicable to TSCS if one has knowledge of the error process (the auto-
correlation and heteroscedasticity parameters), which in reality is not feasible (Beck & 
Katz, 1995). A practical and better alternative is the Feasible GLS (FGLS). However, 
FGLS tends to underestimate the precise variability of the estimator if the time period 
(t) is not quite higher than the cross sectional units (N), especially in small samples 
(Beck & Katz, 1995; Johnsson, 2005).  
 
To avoid these problems, the Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) method which 
yields robust covariances has been suggested in the analysis of TSCS (Beck & Katz, 
1995). Interestingly, the PCSE does not require t to be considerably higher than N and 
it has been found to perform better than the FGLS (Johnsson, 2005). It also accounts 
for the deviations from the spherical errors, leading to drawing meaningful inferences 
on the estimates from TSCS. The PCSE has been employed in several studies (see 
Bjørnstad & Nymoen, 2008; Hanke & Hauser, 2008; Juttner, Chung, & Leung, 2006; 
Pineda, Cashin & Sun, 2010; Silaghi & Ghatak, 2011). The current study adopts PCSE 




4.6 Correlation Matrix of Variables 
  The Pearson correlation matrix in this research is presented in the Table 4.9. Generally, 
all correlations between independent variables are less than 0.80, thus it is said that 
there is no issue of multicollinearity. Details of explanation are provided in the 
following paragraphs.  
 
Board size (BOSIZE) is found to have positive correlation with proportion of non-
executive director (NONED), blockholder ownership (BLOOWN), board 
transparency (BODT), financial transparency (FINT) and ownership transparency 
(OWNT). This shows that board with large number tends to have larger percentage of 
NONED. The Board meeting (BOMEET) is however not significant but positively 
correlated which means that company with larger board size tend to have more 
numbers of board meeting. This is because the meeting of the board is considered as 
board diligence because decisive decision can be taken during the meeting of BOD. 
There is negative correlation between board size and managerial ownership (MOWN). 
This means that the smaller the board the better.  
 
The proportion of non-executive directors is found to have positive correlation with 
board gender (BOGEND) which signifies that the higher the number of the non-
executive director (NONED) the more the women on the board. Furthermore, board 
meeting (BOMEET) shows have positive correlation with non-executive director. This 
means that the higher the number of NONED, the higher the number of meeting held. 




disclosure and transparency (BODT); this means that transparent board is the one with 
high number of non-executive director. The non-executive director is also found to 
have a negative correlation with managerial ownership (MOWN), blockholder 
ownership (BLOOWN) and ownership transparency (OWNT). Furthermore, board 
meeting (BOMEET) is found to have positive correlation with the following board 
size (BOSIZE) but not significant but is found to have positive significant correlation 
with non-executive director (NONED), managerial ownership (MOWN) and board 
process transparency (BODT). This indicates that the higher the numbers of non-
executive director the higher the board becomes transparent and the higher the number 
of the board the higher the meeting of the board of directors held. Additionally, the 
board gender (BOGEND) is positively correlated with board process transparency 
(BODT) but negatively correlated with managerial shareholding (MOWN) and 
financial transparency (FINT). This means that the more women on the board the 
more the higher the board performance. Similarly, BOGEND is also found to have no 
significant correlation with BLOOWN but somewhat positive.   
 
Risk management committee (RSKMGT) is found to have positive correlation with 
financial transparency (FINT) meaning that the establishment of risk management 
committee will strengthen the financial transparency of the company. Furthermore, the 
following is found to be positive but not significant with the risk management 
committee; board size (BOSIZE), board meeting (BOMEET), board gender 




women on the committee, the more effective the risk management committee will 
become.  
 
On the company transparency, the ownership process transparency (OWNT) is 
positively correlated with board size (BOSIZE) but negatively correlated with 
managerial shareholding (MOWN), blockholder ownership (BLOOWN) and non- 
executive director (NONED). This signifies that the more the number of board 
members the more efficient and performance of the board members as a result of 
different expertise and skills that will be employed by the board members. 
Furthermore, board process transparency (BODT) is positively correlated with board 
size (BOSIZE), non-executive director (NONED) board meeting (BOMEET), and 
block shareholding (BLOOWN). This means that the higher the board of directors the 
more transparent the board will become. More so, the financial disclosure and 
transparency (FINT) is found to have positively correlation with risk management 
committee (RSKMGT). This means that the company with high numbers of board of 
directors tend to have effective risk management committee. However, board gender 
(BOGEND) has negative correlation with managerial shareholding (MOWN). This 
means that the more women on the board of director the less the managerial 
shareholding.  
 
Furthermore, the correlations for firm performance (ROA, Tobin’s Q and VAIC) are 
explained below. ROA is positively correlated with non-executive director (NONED), 




negatively correlated with managerial shareholding. ROA, Tobin’s Q and Value added 
intellectual capital (VAIC) are found to show positive correlation with ownership 
transparency (OWNT). This means that knowledge capital is very crucial in 
company’s performance.  Tobin’s Q has negative correlation with board size 
(BOSIZE), non-executive director (NONED), board meeting (BOMEET), board 
gender (BOGEND) and risk management committee (RSKMGT).  Furthermore, 
VAIC is found to have positive correlation with financial transparency (FINT), 
ownership transparency (OWNT) and board transparency (BODT) but negatively 
correlated with block shareholding (BLOOWN), managerial shareholding (MOWN) 
and non-executive director (NONED). This means that the knowledge capital can be 
translated to the various level of firm transparency. Therefore, Table 4.9 below 
presents the Pearson correlation matrix between corporate governance, corporate 
reporting transparency and firm performance. 
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 Table 4.9 
   Pearson Correlation Matrix Between Corporate Governance Corporate Disclosure and Firm Performance 
VARIABLES ROA QRATIO VAIC BOSIZE NONED BOMEET BOGEND RSKMGT 
ROA 1.000        
QRATIO -0.050** 1.000       
VAIC 0.170 -0.035** 1.000      
BOSIZE 0.188 -0.049** 0.135 1.000     
NONED 0.032** -0.044** -.052*** 0.069* 1.000    
BOMEET 0.082* -0.082* 0.069* 0.300 0.062* 1.000   
BOGEND 0.058* -0.025** 0.081* 0.113 0.024** 0.043* 1.000  
RSKMGT 0.109 -0.043* 0.044** 0.299 -0.114 0.249 0.144 1.000 
MOWN -0.131 -.010*** -0.073** -0.093* -0.093 0.044* -0.041* -0.094* 
BLOOWN 0.076* -0.072* -0.022** 0.011*** -.0360** -0.067* -0.025** -0.035** 
BODT 0.004*** 0.130 0.069* 0.068* .0734* 0.015** 0.022** -0.084* 
FINT 0.133 0.114 0.056* 0.041** 0.121 0.128 -0.015** 0.038** 
OWNT 0.012** 0.053* 0.057* 0.075* -0.060* 0.110 0.163 0.238 
GEAR -0.352 0.027** 0.134 -0.121 -0.076* 0.060* -0.016** -0.049* 























                 Note *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.1 
 
 
VARIABLES MOWN BLOOWN BODT FINT OWNT GEAR FIMSIZ 
MOWN 1.000       
BLOOWN 0.116 1.000      
BODT -0.084* 0.00*** 1.000     
FINT -0.223 -0.081* 0.195 1.000    
OWNT -0.107* -0.078* 0.166 0.547 1.000   
GEAR 0.062* 0.092* 0.061* 0.120 0.113 1.000  
FIMSIZ -0.112 0.214 -.0100*** 0.220 0.08** -.048* 1.000 
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4.7  Hypotheses Testing 
4.7.1 Relationship between Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
4.7.1.1 Relationship between Corporate Governance and ROA 
Table 4.10 presents the results of multiple regressions analysis between the corporate 
governance mechanism variables and ROA with the corresponding coefficient, t-value 
and the probability value (P-value). The model was produced to capture the relationship 
between the corporate governance and ROA and to test the impact of the level of 
managerial shareholding on performance. The curve estimation was employed in order 
to know whether to use the square term of managerial shareholding or not as a past 
studies have shown the presence of non-linearity relationship between managerial 
ownership and performance following Morck et al. (1988) and Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) study. The analysis shows that quadratic term is not significant between 
managerial ownership (MOWN) and ROA by the F-test from ANOVA analysis. 
Therefore, the quadratic term of the managerial shareholding is therefore not used in 
this model but the linear term of managerial shareholding was used in the relationship 












Multiple Regression Results Between Corporate Governance and ROA 
ROA Coefficient t-value P-value 
BOSIZE -.006   -2.26 0.024 ** 
NONED  .000 0.37 0.708 
BOMEET .051 3.55 0.000*** 
BOGEND .001 0.78 0.433 
RSKMGT .018 2.00 0.045** 
MOWN            -.004 -2.31 0.021** 
BODT            -.135 -3.98 0.000*** 
FINT .144 3.13 0.002*** 
OWNT -.019 -0.81 0.420 
GEAR             -.061 -1.70 0.089* 
FIMSIZ .003 6.18 0.000*** 
CONSTANT -.124 -2.82 0.005 
R-squared                                0.371 
Probability                               0.000 
Wald chi2                         10784 
N                                              248 
Note *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
 
Table 4.10 represents the result of multiple regression analysis between corporate 
governance variables and return on asset (ROA) which is the proxy for accounting 
measurement of performance with the corresponding coefficient value and t-value. 
The detailed diagnostic test is as follows, R2 = 37% and probability = 0.000. The 
result in the model shows that board size is negatively significant with ROA at 5%, 
this suggests that the number of board of directors on the board do not really affect the 
performance of the company positively. This is an indication that smaller board is 
better compared to larger board. This result supports agency theory (Jesen & 
Meckling, 1976) and also in line with previous empirical research on board size that 
posits negative significance such as Bijalwan and Madan (2013). This findings is 
consistent with Jensen (1993) who posit that when the board becomes too large, it 




ineffective in monitoring management activities and operations. The non-executive 
director (NONED) is found not to be significant with return on asset (ROA). This 
result is consistent with Dalton et al (1998). The finding indicates that the engagement 
of the non-executive director is just for the fulfilment of the law provision or 
satisfaction of the code of corporate governance in Nigeria. 
 
Furthermore, board meeting (BOMEET) is found to have positive significance at 1% 
significant level with return on asset (ROA). This suggests that the numbers of 
meetings held by the members of the board of directors is important in firm’s 
development. The finding is consistent with Jackling and Johl (2009) and Al-Matar et 
al. (2014). The board meeting is an important activity by companies because as firm 
increases the number of times they meet, it will increase their performance (Khanchel, 
2011). This finding is also in line with the recommendations of the code of corporate 
governance in Nigeria which stipulate at least four meetings of board of directors in a 
year given the importance of meeting of the directors as board diligence. Furthermore, 
board gender (BOGEND) is found not to be statistically significant but posit positive 
relationship with ROA. This finding is in line with Campbell and Mínguez-Vera 
(2007) which states that women involvement in the management of firm could lead to 
performance.   
 
Additionally, managerial ownership (MOWN) is negatively significant at 5% with 
ROA. This finding is consistent with Short and Keasey (1999) which posit that at the 




higher level of ownership and their powers can hinder the success of the company 
performance. This shows from the finding that the higher shares held by the directors 
can lead to negative performance of the firm. The risk management committee 
(RSKMGT) is found to be positively significant with ROA at 5%. This finding is in 
support with signalling theory (Connelly et al., 2010; Karasek & Bryant, 2012), this 
finding indicates that risk management committee is one of the effective means of 
achieving the profitability of the firm. The RSKMGT help in firm performance 
because the investors’ confidence will be built by their presence and that is why the 
revised code of corporate governance of 2011 of Nigeria, included risk management 
committee in its corporate governance framework to be adopted by the companies 
covered by the code.  
 
Similarly, financial transparency (FINT) is positively significant at 1%. This finding 
indicates that information asymmetries could be reduced through improvements in 
disclosure of financial dealings of the company. This finding is consistent with 
signalling theory and Botosan and Harris (2000) who posit that disclosure frequency 
of financial transactions can enhance both the content and the timeliness of the 
information which could lead to firm performance. This study found increase in 
disclosure of financial process as a result of inclusion of transparency in the revised 
code of corporate governance of 2011 in Nigeria. On the board process transparency 
(BODT), the study found negative significant relationship at 1%. This finding 
supports the study of Wallace and Naser (1995) indicating that management may 




information away from investors. Furthermore, the ownership transparency (OWNT) 
is found to have no significant relationship with firm performance but somewhat 
positive. This finding supports Karasek and Bryant (2012) and Chiang (2005) who 
state that the disclosure of ownership by the management is primarily done because of 
NCCG, 2011 requirement. The significant increase in the disclosure by the companies 
in Nigeria is as the result of the inclusion of transparency in the revised code of 
corporate governance and adoption of international reporting standard in Nigeria in 
2010 (Edogbanya & Kamardin, 2014; Madawaki, 2014). Furthermore, gearing 
(GEAR) and firm size (FIMSIZE) are included in the model as control variables. 
Gearing is found in this study to have negative significance at 10%. This study 
supports Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Wanyonyi and Tobias (2013) who argue that 
debt owed to large creditors could be useful tool in reducing agency and enhancing 
performance. This  study also supports  Short and Keasey (1999) who posit negative 
significance.  On the other hand, firm size (FIMSIZE) shows a positive significance at 
1%. This findings support  Ghosh (1998) and  Haniffa and Hudaib (2006)  who posit 
that the performance of larger firm is better as a result of easy diversification of their 
risk. 
4.7.1.2  Relationship between Corporate Governance and Tobin’s Q 
     Table 4.11 presents the result of multiple regression analysis between corporate 
governance variables and Tobin’s Q which is the proxy for market measurement of 
firm performance with the corresponding coefficient value and t-value. The result of 




Tobin’s Q is thus as follows: R2= 12.2% and probability = 0.000. This model was 
developed to capture the relationship between the corporate governance and Tobin’s 
Q. The corrected panel standard error regression (PCSEs) was used to take care of 
heteroscedasticity and auto correlation that may be present in the model as suggested 
by Cook and Weisberg test.  
Table 4.11 
 
Multiple Regression Results Between Corporate Governance and Tobin’s Q 
R-squared                       0.122 
Probability                          0.000 
Wald chi2                         2831 
N                                             248 
Note *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.0 
 
Board size (BOSIZE) is found to be negatively significant at 5% level, this posit that 
the fewer the board members the better for the firm. The finding is consistent with 
agency theory which is in support of small board size and it can lead to reduction in 
proprietary cost (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This finding is consistent with (Jensen, 
1993) who posit that when the board becomes too large, it could cause free-riding 
issues among the directors which may lead to directors ineffective in monitoring 
management activities and operations. The non-executive director (NONED) is found 
Tobin’s Q  Coefficient      t-value P-value 
BOSIZE  -.008                -1.98 0.047**  
NONED   -.002                -1.77    0.077* 
BOMEET  -.140                -1.90 0.057*  
BOGEND  .001                 0.56 0.575 
RSKMGT  .011                 0.48 0.633 
MOWN  1.27                 2.77 0.205 
BODT               .288                 2.42   0.016** 
FINT  .154                 1.56 0.118     
OWNT              .019                 0.20    0.907     
GEAR  -.005                -0.12 0.907 
FIMSIZ  -005        0.53 0.594     




to have negative significance at 10%. This finding support also Bhagat and Black 
(2001) who state that some non-executive directors have personal relationships with 
the managing director that affects their independence and would lead to negative 
performance (Yermack, 1997). Board meeting (BOMEET) is found to have 5% 
negative significant level. The finding supports Lin (2013) and Vafeas (1999) who 
posit that the annual number of board meetings is negatively associated to firm value.   
 
Furthermore, board gender (BOGEND) is found not to have any significant 
relationship with performance. The finding is in line with  Ding and Charoenwong 
(2014) and Terjesen et al., (2009) who posit no relationship between the percentage of 
women on the board.  Lee and James (2007) investigated the effect of appointment of 
female directors in the United States on shareholder value and found a negative 
reaction to a female CEO compared to a male counterpart. The Risk management 
committee (RSKMGT) is also found not to be significant with Tobin’s Q but 
somewhat positive. This is an indication that the inclusion of the risk management 
committee in the code of corporate governance in Nigeria is important.  
 
The quadratic term is therefore not used in this model as suggested by  Morck et al. 
(1988) and Demsetz and Lenn (1985) because the managerial shareholding is found to 
have linear relationship with Tobin’s Q. The managerial ownership (MOWN) is 
therefore found to be positively significant but the quadratic term is found to be 
negatively significant. This shows that the managerial ownership is having impact 




study is consistent with Denis et al. (1997) that managers with more shareholding may 
likely diversify due to serious need for personal risk reduction (Demsetz & 
Villalonga, 2001).  
 
Furthermore, board process disclosure and transparency (BODT) is positively 
associated at 5% with performance and financial transparency is found to be 
significant at 10% level. This finding is consistent with signalling theory because the 
transparency of the board is having positive reaction with the market. Ownership 
transparency and disclosure (OWNT) and financial transparency and disclosure are 
found not to be significant with Tobin’s Q but somewhat shows positive relationship. 
This finding supports Barth and Schipper (2007) who state that that financial 
transparency is a desirable characteristics of financial report.  This finding is also in 
line with signaling theory because the firm with good corporate governance 
mechanisms disclose more information to those outside the company to develop 
positive image about them (Chiang, 2005; Spence, 1973). The control variables in this 
model namely, gearing (GEAR) and firm size (FIMSIZ) are both found not to be 
significant with the market measure of performance. This finding is in line with 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) who suggest that when faced with too much debt, 
shareholders with limited liability may encourage the company to undertake highly 
risky projects to increase return on investment, but this would be detrimental to 




4.7.1.3 Relationship between Corporate Governance and VAIC   
Table 4.12 presents the results of multiple regressions results between the corporate 
governance variables and value added intellectual capital (VAIC). The model were 
developed to capture the relationship between the corporate governance, corporate 
reporting transparency and VAIC and to test the impact of the level of managerial 
shareholding. Following Morck et al. (1988) the square term of managerial ownership 
is considered as a result of non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and 
firm performance. In this model, the detailed diagnostic test is shown below:  R2 = 17.3, 
probability of 0.000. The board size (BOSIZE) is found to be positively related with 
VAIC at the significant level of 1%. This indicates that the larger the board size the 
more efficient the board will become because the experience and expertise of the board 
members will outweigh the agency cost in the long run. This also suggests that the 
experience and skills of the board can lead to company achieving its goal, following 
resource dependency theory.  
 
The non-executive director (NONED) is negatively significant at 1%. This finding is 
consistent with  Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and  Bhagat and Bernard (2002) who 
posit negative significance of the outside director and firm value. This result suggests 
that the presence of non-executive director is for decorative reasons as the appointment 
of NONED into the board is for mere satisfaction of code of corporate governance. 
Board meeting (BOMEET) is found to have no significant relation but have positive 
coefficient relationship. This means that despite the non-significance of the board 




of corporate government in Nigeria, NCCG prescribes at least one meeting every three 
months that minimum of four meetings in a year.  
 
Furthermore, the board gender (BOGEND) is found to be positively significant with 
VAIC at 1%, this is an indication that the presence of women on the board can serve as 
a monitoring mechanism on the activities of board of directors. This finding is in 
support with Jianakoplos  Bernasek (1998) which posit that women are more sensitive 
in financial risk aversion  than their male colleagues.  Risk management committee 
(RSKMGT) is found to be positively correlated with VAIC at 5% level of significance. 
This finding is in support of resource dependency theory which states that the more the 
board members the better for the company. The member of the board can be included 
















Multiple Regression Results Between Corporate Governance and VAIC 
R-squared                      0.173 
Probability                         0.000 
Wald chi2                        234.45 
N                                            248 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Note *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
 
The squared managerial ownership is used to measure the effect of managerial 
ownership on value added intellectual capital (VAIC). The curve estimation was 
employed in order to know whether to use the square term of managerial shareholding 
following  Morck et al., (1988).  In this model managerial shareholding is positively 
significant at 5% as against 1% negative significance when the square term is used. 
This finding posit entrenchment effect  of board of directors at the high level of 
managerial ownership (Fan & Wong, 2002).  The entrenchment effect of the ownership 
structure have a very serious effect on company’s overall performance (Fan & Wong, 
2002).  
VAIC Coefficient t-value P-value 
BOSIZE .290 5.95 0.000***  
NONED  -.056 -4.78 0.000***  
BOMEET .244 0.57 0.570  
BOGEND .056 3.79 0.000***  
RSKMGT .491 2.06 0.039**  
MOWN 1.987 2.50 0.013** 
MOWN2 -.495 -3.02 0.003***  
BODT -2.503 -2.23 0.026**  
FINT 3.002 4.83 0.000***  
OWNT .635 0.90 0.367 
GEAR .818              1.55 0.122  
FIMSIZ -.181 -1.82 0.069**  




Board transparency and disclosure (BODT) is found to be negatively associated with 
value added intellectual capital (VAIC) at 5%. This means that the less board structure 
the more efficient the board will be and that most companies disclose information that 
is required by related government and related authorities (Chiang, 2005). Financial 
transparency and disclosure (FINT) is found to be positively significant at 1% with 
VAIC, this indicates that the level of financial transparency indicates the presence of 
knowledge capital in use by the company. The ownership transparency and disclosure 
(OWNT) failed to be significant in this model but somewhat positive. This result is 
consistent with agency hypothesis which states that the transparency of the ownership 
can greatly enhance the total performance of the firm. The trend of transparency is such 
that it was low before the revised code of corporate governance. After the adoption of 
the revised code by the companies, they were increase in reporting and disclosures in 
their financial report. 
 
4.8 Additional Analysis  
4.8.1 Dummy 2012 and 2013 
In the main analysis, the effect of corporate governance mechanism on firm 
performance was tested on pre-corporate governance code adoption and post adoption 
period, where the post adoption period started from 31 December 2012 onwards. The 
results reveal that the post-adoption of corporate governance code of 2011 by security 
and exchange commission significantly increased firm performance. In order to 




dummy variables were included in the model. The pre and post adoption was coded as 1 
and otherwise 0. 
 
In model 1, the impact of the differences in year of adoption from the regression result 
between corporate governance and ROA from the regression shows that the post 
adoption of the revised code of best practices for year show non-significant result in 
year 3 and show a positive significance at 1% in year 4.   This is an indication that the 
disclosure in the post adoption is better than year 1 and 2. This indicates that the market 
reaction to the adoption of the code of corporate governance is high, that is why year 4 
is found to have positive significant results at 1% level of significance. Consequently, 
the revised code of corporate governance is thereby recommended by this study.   
 
In model 2, the impact of the differences in year of adoption from the regression result 
between corporate governance and Tobin’s Q shows that the year dummy included in 
the regression model is found to have the following results; From the results of the 
multiple regression, it shows that the pre adoption of the code of best practices for year 
1 and 2 shows a non-significant result. However, in the year 3 and 4, that is the post 
adoption era, the results state as follows; (p =0.571) and (p=0.019) respectively. This 
indicates that the market reaction to the adoption of the code of corporate governance is 
high, that is why year 4 shows significant results at 5% level of significance. 
Consequently, the revised code of corporate governance is thereby recommended by 




Furthermore, further analysis was conducted to consider the variation in year 
performance using the corporate governance and value added intellectual capital 
(VAIC) model. It was discovered that in the pre adoption of the revised code of 
corporate governance, shows the following results (p=0.000) and (p= 0.413) 
respectively for 2010 and 2011. However, 2012 and 2013 shows the following results 
1% respectively.  This is an indication that in the post adoption of the code of 
corporate governance in Nigeria has positive impact on performance and also the 
presence of intellectual capital has enhanced the performance of the firm in Nigeria. It 
is therefore on this note the study concludes that the adoption of the revised code of 
best practice amongst the Nigerians firms have impact on firm performance.  
4.8.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
The main analysis of this study converts the value of non-executive directors 
(NONED) into proportion which is the commonly used as proxy for measuring 
NONED (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006;  Al Matari, Al Swidi, &  Fadzil, 2014).  Even 
though the proportion is the most popular technique, the number of the non-executive 
directors can also be used to test the robustness of the research model (Kyereboah-
Coleman, 2007). Thus, the sensitivity test by using the number of NONED on the 
board of directors is conducted to know the presence of any differences in the results 
of the hypotheses. The findings reveal that the results of the hypotheses remained 





Additionally, further sensitivity analysis was conducted to check the differences that 
may exist between variables. The main analysis of this study converts the value of 
board gender into proportion which is  commonly used as proxy for measuring women 
members in the board (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2007).  
Even though the proportion is the most popular method,  the number of female 
directors can also be used to test the robustness of the research model (Campbell & 
Mínguez-Vera, 2007). Thus, the sensitivity test by using the number of female on the 
board of directors is conducted to know the presence of any differences in the results of 
the hypotheses. The findings reveal any of the method used, the research hypothesis 
result remain the same hence the research model is robust. 
4.8.5 Trends in Corporate Reporting Disclosure 
The figure 4.1 presents the trend in corporate reporting disclosure (CRD) for this study 
as follows; the ownership process transparency and disclosure (OWNT) increased 
significantly from the average of 55% and 56% in the pre-adoption period of adoption 
of code of corporate governance to 74% and 77% for the year 2012 and 2013 
respectively, that is the post-adoption period. Similarly, board process transparency 
and disclosure (BODT) also witness increase in information with the total average of 
54% and 56% for 2010 and 2011 respectively and average of the total year disclosure 
of 71% and 73% for 2012 and 2013 respectively. Furthermore, financial transparency 
and disclosure (FINT) also increased reasonably in disclosure from 60% and 61% in 
the year 2010 and 2012 respectively and 75% and 78% in the year 2012 and 2013 




result of adoption of revised code of corporate governance of 2011 and adoption of 
international financial reporting standards (IFRS) by public companies in Nigeria. This 
study therefore recommends strongly to the policy makers to put strong legal and 
regulatory framework to achieve full compliance with the relevant codes. Figure 4.1 

























Figure 4.1 Trends in Corporate Reporting Transparency 
4.9  Summary of Hypotheses Testing: Corporate Governance and Firm       
Performance 
The analyses show the relationship and the effect of corporate governance variables on 
return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q and value added intellectual capital (VAIC) are 
somewhat different. For instance, some board characteristics variables found to have 




found to be negatively associated with ROA and Tobin’s Q but positively significant in 
VAIC model. The non-executive director (NONED) is found not to have positive 
significance with ROA but negatively associated with Tobin’s Q and VAIC. Board 
meeting (BOMEET) is found to have positive impact on ROA, negative impact on 
Tobin’s Q and no significance relationship on VAIC. The important of board gender 
(BOGEND) is supported in model 3 by demonstrating positive significance but found to 
have negative significance in model 2 and no significance relationship in model 1. 
Furthermore, managerial shareholding (MOWN) is found to have positive significance 
with all the models. The risk management committee (RSKMGT) is found to be 
positively significant with ROA and VAIC but found not to have impact with Tobin’s 
Q. In a similar vein, the corporate reporting transparency and disclosure is said to have 
different directions as financial transparency and disclosure (FINT) is found to have 
positive impact with ROA and VAIC, board transparency and disclosure (BODT) is 
found to have negative impact with performance (ROA) and VAIC and ownership 
transparency and disclosure (OWNT) is found to have no significance relationship with 











 Table 4.13 
Summary of Hypotheses Testing: Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
Hypotheses ROA Tobin’s Q VAIC 
H1: There is a 
significant 
relationship between 
board size and firm 
performance in 
Nigeria 




H1 is supported 
Board size is 
significant 
negatively 
H1 is supported 




H1 is supported 
H2: CEO duality 





This variable is 
dropped as a 
result of 100% 





This variable is 
dropped as a result 
of 100% 
compliance by the 
companies on 
separation of CEO 
and chairman 
This variable is 
dropped as a result 
of 100% 
compliance by the 
companies on 
separation of CEO 
and chairman 








directors is not 
significantly 
related 












H3 is not 
supported 
H4: There is a 
significant positive 
relationship between 
board meeting and 
firm performance in 
Nigeria 
 




H4 is  supported 




H4 not supported 
Board meeting is 
not significantly 
related 
H4 not supported 
H5: There is a 
significant positive 
relationship between 
women on the board 
(Board Gender) and 
firm performance in 
Nigeria 
Board gender is 
not significantly 
related  
H5 is not 
supported 
Board gender is not 
significantly 
predictive  
H5 is not 
supported 
Board gender is  
significant positive 
relationship 







Table 4.13 (Continued)  
Hypotheses  ROA Tobin’s Q VAIC 











H6 is not 
supported 
Managerial 
ownership is not 
significantly related  




positively related at 
low level  
H6 is supported 













  H8 is supported 
Risk management 
committee is not  
significantly related 






relationship   
H8 is supported 










significant with  
positive 
relationship  
H8 is supported 
Financial 
transparency 
committee is not 
significantly related  








H8  is supported 




















H9 is supported 
Board process 
transparency 




H9 is not 
supported 









committee is not 
significantly 
related  
H10  is not 
supported 
Board process 
transparency  is not 
significantly related  
H10  is not 
supported 
Board process 
transparency  is not 
significantly related  






4.10 The Moderating Effect of block shareholding on the Relationship between 
Corporate Governance and firm performance 
According to Baron and Kenny (1986), to test for moderating variable, three 
regression need to be conducted, these are  (1) regress the moderator on the dependent 
variables, (2) regress the dependent variables on the independent variables and (3) 
regress the dependent variables on both independent variables and moderator when 
controlling the independent variables. “The moderator function as a third variables 
which partition a focal independent variables into subgroup that establish it domain of 
maximal effectiveness in regards to a given dependent variables (Baron & Kenny, 
1986:1173)”. The moderator effect are indicated by significant effect of moderating 
variables while the independent and moderator are controlled (Andersson & Nielsen, 
2014; Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
4.10.1 Steps in Testing Moderation 
In order to confirm a third variable making a moderation effect on the relationship 
between the two independent variables (IVs) and dependent variables (DV), we must 
show that the nature of this relationship changes as the values of the moderating 
variable (MV) change. This is in turn done by including an interaction effect in the 
model and checking to see if indeed such an interaction is significant and helps 
explain the variation in the response variable better than before (Baron & Kenny, 
1986). In more explicit terms the following steps should be followed as suggested by 





Fit a regression model (block shareholding) predicting the outcome variable firm 
performance (FP) from both the predictor IVs and the moderator variable (MV) and 
control variables (CV). Both effects as well as the model in general (R2) should be 
significant. Furthermore, add the interaction effect to the previous model and check 
for a significant R2 change as well as a significant effect by the new interaction term. 
If both are significant, then moderation is occurring. However, if the predictor and 
moderator are not significant with the interaction term added, then complete 
moderation has occurred and if the predictor and moderator are significant with the 
interaction term added, then moderation has occurred, however the main effects are 
also significant. Therefore, the detail of moderating testing is shown in Table 4.14, 
Table 4.15 and Table 4.16. 
4.10.2 The Moderating effect of Block Ownership: Corporate Governance and 
ROA 
Table 4.14 show the moderating effect of block shareholding on the relationship 
between corporate governance and ROA. In step 1, the control variables are found 
significant. Step 2 found BOSIZE, BOGEND, NONED and MOWN and RSKMGT 
are found to be related with ROA. In step 3, when the moderating variable block 
shareholding (BLOOWN) is included, the R2 increased significantly from 18.6% in 
step 1, 37% in step 2 and 3 and 41.1% in step 4 when the interacting terms are added. 
This is an indication that there is effect of BLOOWN on performance.  
 
The dependent variable is plotted on the Y axis and independent variable on the X 




explanation is that as the BOSIZE and the blockholder ownership increases, ROA 
decreases, on the other hand BOSIZE and BLOOWN decreases, ROA increases. This 
suggest that the interaction of the blockholder ownership on BOSIZE lead to higher 
ROA. Therefore, blockholder ownership has fully moderated the relationship between 
BOSIZE and ROA. The result indicates that the BLOOWN moderates the relationship 
between BOSIZE and ROA. This means that the presence of BLOOWN is found to 
have positive effect on firm performance. The below Figure 4.2 shows that BLOOWN 




Figure 4.2: Moderating effect of block shareholding on ROA and BOSIZE 
 
Furthermore, on the moderating effect of blockholder ownership on the relationship 
between risk management committee and ROA, the dependent variable (ROA) is 
plotted on the Y axis and independent variable (RSKMGT) on the X axis. The 




explanation is that as the RSKMGT and the blockholder ownership increases, ROA 
decreases, on the other hand RSKMGT and BLOOWN decreases, ROA increases. 
This suggest that the interaction of the blockholder ownership with RSKMGT leads to 
higher ROA. Therefore, blockholder ownership has fully moderated the relationship 
between RSKMGT and ROA.  
 
BLOOWN is found to moderate the relationship between risk management committee 
(RSKMGT) and with ROA. Block shareholding importance is crucial in ensuring 
monitoring of the board activities through the function of risk reporting through the 
risk management committee. Figure 4.3 below presents the moderating effect of 
BLOOWN on ROA and RSKMGT which shows BLOOWN strengthens the positive 
relationship between RSKMGT and ROA. 
 
 




Additionally, the relationship between managerial ownership and ROA and 
moderating effect of blockholder ownership is explained below. Managerial 
ownership increasing and moving towards upside, ROA decreases. On the other hand, 
as managerial ownership decreases, ROA increases. This means the interaction of the 
blockholder ownership in MOWN leads to lower ROA. Therefore, block ownership 
has helped to moderate the relationship between MOWN and ROA. 
 
BLOOWN is also found to moderate the relationship between managerial 
shareholding (MOWN) and ROA. It shows that BLOOWN strengthens the negative 
relationship between MOWN and ROA. This is shown in figure 4.4. 
 
Figure 4.4: Moderating effect of block shareholding on ROA and MOWN 
On the other hand, BLOOWN are found to moderate the relationship with NONED 
and BOMEET with ROA. This indicates that that BLOOWN dampens the 
relationship between NONED as it is shown in in figure 4.5 and NONED is found not 






Figure 4.5 Moderating effect of block shareholding on NONED and ROA 
BOMEET is found to be positively significant at 1% and negatively significant at 
10% when the interaction term added.  This means that the BLOOWN dampens the 
positive relationship between BOMEET and ROA. However, BOGEND is found not 
to have any significant relationship with corporate governance and when the 
interaction effect is added. Figure 4.5 shows how BLOOWN moderates the 





Figure 4.6 Moderating effect of block shareholding on BOMEET and ROA 
Details of the regression results on the moderating effect of block shareholding 





Hierarchical Regression Results: Moderating effect of Block Ownership: Corporate Governance and ROA 
                                                                             Step 1                                Step2                                   Step3                                 Step 4 
ROA t-value P-value t-value P-value  t-value P-value t-
value 
P-value 
GEAR -5.31 0.000*** -1.70 0.089* -1.66    0.097* -1.73    0.084* 
FIMSIZ 5.96 0.000*** 6.18 0.000*** 6.09    0.000*** 7.06    0.000*** 
BOSIZE   -2.26 0.024 ** -2.19    0.028** -3.09    0.002*** 
NONED   0.37 0.708 0.36    0.718 0.91    0.362 
BOMEET   3.55 0.000*** 3.47    0.001*** 2.69    0.007*** 
BOGEND   0.78 0.433 0.80    0.426 0.44    0.660 
RSKMGT   2.00 0.045** 1.93    0.054* 1.89    0.059** 
MOWN   -2.31 0.021** -2.75    0.006*** -2.32    0.020** 
BODT   -3.98 0.000*** -3.91    0.000*** -3.28    0.001*** 
FINT   3.13 0.002*** 2.87    0.004*** 3.57    0.000*** 
OWNT   -0.81 0.420 -0.86    0.392 0.31    0.753 
BLOOWN     -0.57    0.566 2.42    0.015** 
BOSIZE*BLOOWN       -9.15    0.000*** 
NONED*BLOOWN       0.72    0.475 
BOMEET* BLOOWN       -1.63    0.104* 
BOGEND*BLOOWN       -1.03    0.304 
RSKMGT*BLOOWN       2.61    0.009*** 
MOWN*BLOOWN       -2.56    0.011** 
CONSTANT 9.75    0.000 -2.82 0.005 -2.60    0.009 -1.84    0.065 
R-squared                                           0.1869                               0.376                                       0.371                          0.411                                   
Wald chi2(8)                                      28.17                                 2042.11                                  51945.78                     2042.11                                              
Prob > chi2                                         0.000                                 0.000                                      0.000                          0.000                 
N                                                         248                                    248                                         248                             248 
Note: step 1 (CVs and DV), step 2 (IVs and DV) and step 3 is (IVs, MV and DV). Step 4(IVs, MV * DV). *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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4.10.3 The Moderating effect of Block Ownership: Corporate Governance and    
Tobin’s Q  
Table 4.15 present the moderating effect of block shareholding (BLOOWN) on the 
relationship between corporate governance and Tobin’s Q. The dependent variable is 
plotted on the Y axis and independent variable on the X axis. The moderator is 
classified into a low and high at the centre of the graph. 
 
The result indicates that the block shareholding (BLOOWN) is found to moderates the 
relationship between board gender (BOGEND) and Tobin’s Q. The result is found to 
be significantly associated in all the steps.  The relationship between BOGEND and 
Tobin’s Q is negatively significant at 10% with a direct relationship, when the 
interaction term is applied, it was also show negative significance at 10%.  The 
explanation is that as the BOGEND and the blockholder ownership increases, Tobin’s 
Q decreases, on the other hand BOGEND and BLOOWN decreases, Tobin’s Q 
increases. This suggest that the interaction of the blockholder ownership on BOSIZE 
lead to higher Tobin’s Q. Therefore, blockholder ownership has fully moderated the 
relationship between BOSIZE and Tobin’s Q. This result posits that the existence of 
the BLOOWN enhances the effectiveness of the board gender therefore leading to 
firm performance. Figure 4.5 explains the graphical illustration of the moderating 
effect of BLOOWN on the relationship between BOGEND and Tobin’s Q. BLOOWN 





 Figure 4.7: Moderating effect of block shareholding on Tobin’s Q and BOGEND 
 
Similarly, in Figure 4.8, the dependent variable (Tobin’s Q) is plotted on Y axis, the 
independent variable (MOWN) on X axis and moderating variable (BLOOWN) 
classified into the high and low centre of the graph. The interpretation is that as the 
MOWN and Tobin’s Q moving upward, Tobin’s Q is moving upward to the same 
direction, this means the ownership of the share by directors lead to higher market 
value. Therefore, BLOOWN is found to moderate the relationship between 
managerial shareholding and Tobin’s Q. The BLOOWN is found to serve as 
monitoring tools against director’s entrenchment benefit and the financial activities of 
the board of directors. BLOOWN is found to strengthen the positive relationship 
























Figure 4.8: Moderating effect of block shareholding on Tobin’s Q and MOWN 
On the contrary, NONED is found to have no significant relationship with both direct 
relationship and indirect relationship. Other corporate governance variables that 
BLOOWN is found not to moderate are relationship between BOSIZE, BOMEET and 
RSKMGT and Tobin’s Q.  Figure 4.8 shows the relationship between NONED and 
Tobin’s Q. it posits that BLOOWN strengthens the negative relationship between 






Figure 4.9: Moderating effect of block shareholding on Tobin’s Q and NONED 
 Details of the regression results on the moderating effect of block shareholding 








Hierarchical Regression Results: Moderating effect of Block Ownership: Corporate Governance Tobin’s Q  
                                                                       Step 1                                Step2                                Step3                  Step 4 
Tobin’s Q    Z P-value Z P-value Z P-value Z P-value 
GEAR 0.48 0.629 -1.70 0.089* 0.11    0.911 0.17    0.865 
FIMSIZ 0.03 0.977 6.18 0.000*** 0.89    0.374 1.01    0.311 
BOSIZE   -1.98 0.047** -2.90    0.004*** -2.37    0.018** 
NONED   -1.77    0.077* -1.68    0.093* -1.55    0.121 
BOMEET   -1.90    0.057* -1.89    0.059* -1.75    0.079*** 
BOGEND   0.56 0.575     0.66    0.508 1.01    0.314 
RSKMGT   0.48 0.633 0.31    0.760 0.59 0.555 
MOWN   2.77    0.205 0.50    0.618 0.39    0.696 
BODT   2.42    0.016** 2.77    0.006*** 3.08    0.002*** 
FINT   1.56    0.118 1.03    0.303 1.04    0.300 
OWNT   0.20 0.844     -0.02    0.985 -0.88    0.377 
BLOOWN     -3.47    0.001*** 0.50    0.618 
BOSIZE*BLOOWM       0.17    0.863 
NONED*BLOOWM       -1.26    0.208 
BOMEET* BLOOWM       -0.43    0.667 
BOGEND*BLOOWM       -0.34    0.734 
RSKMGT*BLOOWM       -1.87    0.062* 
MOWN*BLOOWM       0.42    0.676 
CONSTANT 9.75    0.000 7.05 0.000 7.33    0.000   6.52    0.000 
R-squared                                                      0.14                                        0.122                                  0.128                                        0.411                                   
Wald chi2                                                      127                                          2831                                  16430                                       2042.11                                               
Probability                                                    0.000                                      0.000                                  0.000                                        0.000 
N                                                                   248                                         248                                     248                                           248 
Note: step 1 (CVs and DV), step 2 (IVs and DV) and step 3 is (IVs, MV and DV). Step 4(IVs, MV * DV). *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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4.10.4 The Moderating effect of Block Ownership: Corporate Governance and 
VAIC 
Table 4.16 presents the moderating effect of block shareholding (BLOOWN) on the 
relationship between corporate governance and VAIC. The dependent variable 
(VAIC) is plotted on the Y axis and independent variable (CG) on the X axis. The 
moderator (BLOOWN) is classified into a low and high at the centre of the graph with 
the results of moderating effect of block shareholding (BLOOWN) on the relationship 
between corporate governance and VAIC. 
 
The explanation is that as the BOSIZE and the blockholder ownership increases, 
VAIC increases. On the other hand, BOSIZE and BLOOWN decreases, VAIC 
increases. This suggest that the interaction of the blockholder ownership on BOSIZE 
lead to higher VAIC. The results indicate that the BLOOWN moderates the 
relationship between board size (BOSIZE) and VAIC. This result is found to support 
agency issue of the board of directors are likely work for their interest and have been 
largely criticized for the decline in shareholders’ wealth and corporate failure. The 
BLOOWN is therefore serving as a monitoring mechanism on the board of director’s 






Figure 4.10: Moderating effect of block shareholding on VAIC and BOSIZE 
Furthermore, on the moderating relationship of BLOOWN on MOWN and VAIC, the 
dependent variable (VAIC) is plotted on the Y axis and independent variable 
(MOWN) on the X axis. The moderator (BLOOWN) is classified into a low and high 
at the centre of the graph.  BLOOWN is found to moderate the relationship between 
managerial ownership (MOWN) and Value added intellectual capital (VAIC). This is 
because the direct relationship is significant and when the interaction effect is added, 
it was also significant 1%. Therefore, BLOOWN is said to strengthens the positive 
relationship between MOWN and VAIC as shown in figure 4.10. BLOOWN is found 





 Figure 4.11: Moderating effect of block shareholding on VAIC and MOWN 
 Details of the regression results on the moderating effect of block shareholding 









Hierarchical Regression Results: Moderating effect of Block Ownership: Corporate Governance and VAIC 
                                                          Step 1                            Step2                                Step3                             Step 4 
VAIC     Z P-value       Z P-value    Z P-value Z P-value 
GEAR 0.75 0.455 1.55 0.000*** 1.59 0.000 2.29 0.022 
FIMSIZ -0.29 0.769 -1.82 0.000*** -1.58 0.000 6.40    0.340 
BOSIZE   5.95 0.000*** 5.64 0.000*** 5.07 0.000*** 
NONED   -4.78 0.000*** -4.78 0.000*** -0.15 0.000*** 
BOMEET   0.57 0.570 0.47 0.636 0.30 0.878 
BOGEND   3.79 0.000*** 3.67 0.000*** 4.67 0.000*** 
RSKMGT   2.06 0.039** 2.03 0.042** 2.39 0.017** 
MOWN   2.50 0.013** 2.49 0.013 3.38 0.001*** 
MOWN2   -3.02 0.003*** -3.02 0.002*** -3.83 0.000*** 
BODT   -2.23 0.026** -2.23 0.026** -1.79 0.074** 
FINT   4.83 0.000*** 4.98 0.000 4.11 0.000*** 
OWNT   0.90 0.367 0.80 0.422 -0.12 0.904 
BLOOWN     1.12    0.565 2.60 0.009*** 
BOSIZE*BLOOWN        2.39 0.017** 
NONED*BLOOWN       1.12 0.263 
BOMEET*BLOOWN       -1.89 0.203 
BOGEND*BLOOWN       -1.27 0.151 
RSKMGT*BLOOWN       1.12    0.262 
MOWN*BLOOWN       3.17 0.002*** 
CONSTANT 9.75    0.000 -1.68 0.000 -3.47 0.001 -2.59    0.028 
R-squared                                                    0.089                                       0.173                                       0.173                                       0.2038 
Wald chi2(8)                                               2106.82                                   234.45                                     238.95                                     140.40 
Prob > chi2                                                  0.000                                      0.000                                       0.000                                        0.000                 
N                                                                  248                                          248                                         248                                           248 
Note: step 1 (CVs and DV), step 2 (IVs and DV) and step 3 is (IVs, MV and DV). Step 4(IVs, MV * DV). 
 *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.1 
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Table 4.17 below shows the summary of the result of hypotheses testing of the 
moderating effect of block ownership structure on corporate governance mechanisms 
and firm performance as shown in table 4.14, table 4.15 and table 4.16 for ROA, 
Tobin’s Q and VAIC respectively.  
Table 4.17 
Summary of Hypotheses Testing: Moderating effect of Block Ownership on 
Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
Hypotheses ROA Tobin’s Q VAIC 
H11: blockholder 
ownership moderates 
the relationship between 
board characteristics 





BOMEET:   


































 not supported    
H12: Blockholder 
ownership  moderates 
the relationship between 
managerial 
shareholding and firm 













 supported    
H13: Blockholder 
ownership  moderates 
the relationship between 
risk management 
committee and firm 

















4.11  Summary of Chapter  
This chapter presents the results analysis such as homoscedasticity multicollinearity, 
autocorrelation and panel data assumptions such as validity test for panel data analysis 
and test for endogeneity. The multiple regression analysis is also presented in this 
chapter using the panel corrected standard errors (PCSEs) in STATA package.  
Details of the results of multiple regression, presentations and finding are therefore 





DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we present the summary of the major findings and provide a 
comprehensive overview of the research aims and objectives, the hypotheses 
development, the method used in meeting the objectives and the results of the study. 
Then, the detailed discussions of the results and the contributions of the study are 
presented. The restatement is followed by the impact of corporate governance on firm 
performance and the moderating effect of blockholder ownership (BLOOWN) on the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. Moreover, this 
chapter provides comprehensive discussions of the findings of the studies and to 
provide implication of the studies to the theoretical, practical and policy makers.   
5.2 Restatement of Findings  
This study is motivated by corporate governance, corporate disclosure and its effect 
on the performance of public listed companies. The main objective of this research is 
to examine the moderating effect of block ownership structure on the relationship 
between corporate reporting transparency, corporate governance mechanism and firm 
performance of non-financial companies in Nigeria. The specific objectives is divided 
into seven namely as follows; (1) to examine the significant relationship between 
board of directors characteristics and firm performance, (2) to examine the significant 




examine the significant relationship between corporate disclosure and firm 
performance, (4) to examine the significant relationship between risk management 
committee and firm performance, (5) to examine whether blockholder ownership 
moderates the relationship between board of directors’ characteristics and firm 
performance, (6) to examine whether block shareholding structure moderates the 
relationship between managerial shareholding structure and firm performance, and (7) 
to examine whether block shareholding structure moderates the relationship between 
risk management committee and firm performance. These objectives are achieved by 
taking into considerations corporate governance mechanisms, corporate reporting 
transparency attributes and firm performance for this study. Three firm performance 
proxies which are return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q and value added intellectual 
capital (VAIC) are considered for this study. Furthermore, in achieving the main 
objectives, hypotheses were developed to examine the association between corporate 
governance variables and also to examine the moderating relationship of blockholder 
ownership on the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
performance which is the direct and indirect relationship. The summary of the 
















Summary of Main Hypotheses and Findings 








governance and  
firm 
performance 
H1: There is a relationship 
between board size and 










H2: CEO duality role has a 
negative relationship with 
firm  









H3: There is a positive 
relationship between non-
executive directors and 













H4: There is a significant 
positive relationship 
between board meeting 












H5: There is a significant 
positive relationship 
between women on the 
board (Board Gender) and 












H6: there is a significant 
positive relationship 
between managerial 
ownership And firm 

















Table 5.1 (continued) 







H7 there is a positive 
relationship between 
risk management 
committee and firm 
performance  
Supported  Not supported  Supported  
 
H8: There is a positive 
relationship between 
financial transparency 










H9: There is a positive 
relationship between 
board process 
transparency and firm 












H10: There is a positive 
relationship between 
ownership transparency 




























Summary Hypotheses Testing: Moderating effect  






effect of block 
ownership 







H11: block ownership 
structure       moderates 
the relationship between 
board characteristics and 
firm performance in 
Nigeria:        
 
   
 Board size Supported Not supported 
Supported 




































relationship between risk 
management committee 











5.3 The Effect of Corporate Governance on Firm Performance 
5.3.1 Board size 
This study developed hypotheses in line with agency theory and resource dependency 
theory to support the research findings. Board size is hypothesized to have a 
significant relationship with firm performance. Board size (BOSIZE) presents a 
negative relationship with return on asset (ROA) and Tobin’s Q based on agency 
theory which states that small board is better and more effective in rendering firm 
services compared to larger board. The result of the findings is consistent with agency 
theory. Furthermore, Hughes (1995) states that small board size can lead to quick and 
excellent decision making and time management. This conclusion is also supported by  
Boyd (1996), Rossouw (2005) and  Xiaoyan (2013). This position is also in 
agreement with the revised code of corporate governance in Nigeria which states that 
companies should maintain minimum numbers of directors. It further states that at 
least that the composition of the board should include the non-executive directors and 
no two members of one family should sit in one board.  
 
Board size shows positive significance with value added intellectual capital (VAIC) 
indicating that the large board size is better for company because the benefit of large 
board at the long run can be translated to achievement. The positive significance is 
consistent with resource dependency theory meaning that, larger board size means 
more outside directors on the board to bring in their respective expertise in decision 
making. This is also important as board committees can be easily formed such as 
audit committee as this may increase audit independence  (Klein, 2002) and risk 




positive significance of this study is consistent with Abidin et al., (2000). This finding 
indicates that a larger board size and the intellectual components contribute further 
towards firm performance. This suggests that a larger board size means that there are 
more ideas and skills that can be shared among board members (Abidin et al., 2000). 
It also proposes that the board of directors in Nigeria companies perform more 
efficiently in a larger group. This is not consistent to the findings by Ho and Williams 
(2003), where they found that board size is statistically not significant against VAIC 
in their regression in UK and Sweden. This implies that board size (BOSIZE) plays a 
more vital role in Nigeria compared to these countries. The reason for the difference 
in significance level is that traditional financial measures only tell investors and 
management little about the true performance of the company without considering the 
importance of intellectual capital which will result in many assets  unaccounted for 
and unmonitored (Abidin et al., 2000). The finding is in line with the theoretical 
models and the stated hypothesis, which predicts significant relationship between 
board size and firm performance. Hence H1 is thus supported. 
5.3.2 CEO Duality 
Based on the agency theory, Board efficiency in monitoring executive’s rests on the 
influence that the chief executive officer (CEO) exerts on the board.  “CEO influence 
on the board is expected to be lower when the positions of CEO and chairman of the 
board are held by different individual” (Charitou, 2013. p. 11). CEO duties should be 
separated, thus the hypotheses in this study was developed to have a negative 




performance and CEO duality was not tested as a result of collinearity, it was 
automatically dropped by the STATA statistical package. This is as the result that all 
the public limited companies in Nigeria have complied with the separation, meaning 
that different persons handling the office of CEO and the chairman.  
 
The code of corporate governance in Nigeria states that this separation of power of 
CEO will improve good decision making and help prevent accounting and financial 
abuses similar to those experienced at Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and others and 
also can lead to better financial and general performance of the company.  (Adetunji 
& Olaniran, 2009; Bhagat & Bernard, 2002; Dahya, 2000; Ehikioya, 2009; Grove et 
al., 2011; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Hermalin, 2005). Specifically, investor activists 
believe the separating the positions is fundamentally essential for ensuring excellent 
performance because it will result in check and balances in company’s administration 
(Kamardin & Haron, 2011).  Furthermore, the shareholder activists believe separating 
the roles will help neutralize questionable practices and unhealthy practices such as 
excessive risk-taking (Coffee, 1999;  Gordon & Pound, 1993). This study could not 
conclude the separation of duties of chairman from CEO because the separation by 
public companies is 100% complied with in Nigeria following the adoption of NCCG, 
2011.  
5.3.3 Non-executive Director 
Based on the agency theory, non-executive directors may minimize management 




excellently as compared to their executive directors. The research hypothesized non-
executive director (NONED) to have a positive relationship with performance. The 
non-executive director is the proportion of non-executive director on the board. The 
results show insignificant result with ROA and negative significance with Tobin’s Q 
and VAIC. On the non-significance of ROA, Baysinger and Butler (1985) Klein 
(2002) and  Dalton eta al., (1998) posit that whichever measure of performance used 
results in non-significance. This is an indication that the appointment of the non-
executive directors on the board may be mere fulfilment of the code of best practice 
or for political reasons. This is so because, the appointments of NONED is to fulfil 
the regulatory requirements not for performance reason. Same conclusion was 
reached by Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat and Black (2001). This result 
is against the resource dependency which is supported by study like Steward (1991) 
who suggests that the presence of the non-executive directors reinforces the 
responsibility and authority to executive managers.  
 
 On the negative significance with Tobin’s Q and VAIC,  Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996) found that the non-executive director is found to have a significant relationship 
with performance.  This signifies that having a high proportion of non-executive 
directors do not translate to automatic performance but may be detrimental to 
companies as they may suppress strategic actions of the firm. This postulation is in 
agreement with Goodstein, Gautam, and Warren (1994). More so, the result of VAIC 
shows that the increase in the percentage of non-executive directors to total board 




be inferred that hypothesis not supported. In other words, as the percentage of non-
executive directors on the board increases, the value added efficiency of the firms’ 
total resources also decreases.  
 
Boards dominated by non-executive director do not seem to affect performance 
irrespective of the measures adopted. The reason here is because Nigeria is a typical 
developing country and most non-executive director’s selection most times is not 
based on expertise and experience but more often for political reasons, to legitimize 
business activities and for contacts and contracts (Adewuyi & Olowookere, 2013). As 
a result of this reason, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) suggest that such directors may not 
be able to contribute to the monitoring  of the company independently and reducing 
the agency conflicts between the shareholders and managers that is associated with 
the likely misallocation of excess resources.  
5.3.4 Board Meeting Frequency  
The study hypothesized a positive significant relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance. The result however was mixed, indicating positive 
significant relationship with ROA, negative significance with Tobin’s and no 
significant relationship with VAIC but somewhat positive.  
 
On the on positive significance relationship between board meeting (BOMEET) and 
ROA, the reason for positive significant relationship between board meeting and ROA 




board meeting assists the board to evaluate and pursue firm objectives in a timely 
manner and to proffer solution to any problem confronted by employees (Pfeffer, 
1987). This finding is also supported by Vafeas (1999) who posit that when board 
meet frequently after financial crises, it would increase performance of the company 
as a result of that. Carcello, eta al (2002) and Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) posit that 
the board meeting frequency and degree of board independence are related to 
monitoring performance. The frequency of the board meeting should be increased if 
the situation calls for high control and oversight (Khanchel, 2007; Shivdasani & 
Zenner, 2002). Therefore, the hypothesis of board meeting and ROA is supported. 
Hence, improved board meetings convert to enhance firm performance. 
 
The negative significance with Tobin’s Q in this study is consistent with the results of 
other studies such as  Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) and  Jensen (1993) who argued that 
day-to-day tasks are what constitutes most of the board’s meeting time, this can be 
limitations to the chances of external directors of the company to conduct a 
meaningful oversight role over management. Jensen (1993) further suggested that 
boards meeting should be less and qualitative.  Therefore, emphasizes should be on 
quality of the board meeting instead of concentrating on the numbers of meetings held 
during the financial year (Rebeiz & Salameh, 2006).   
 
Value added intellectual capital (VAIC) is found to have no significant relationship, 
the hypothesis between board meeting and VAIC is therefore rejected. The result 




rather, the concentrations should be on board meeting quality instead of the numbers 
of meetings help during the financial year (Rebeiz & Salameh, 2006). The 
recommendations of the SEC concerning board meetings should not be limited to only 
statutory meeting requirements but also to include and stress the quality of the 
meeting and how this quality will enhance firm performance.  
5.3.5 Board Gender Composition  
The research hypothesized board gender composition (BOGEND) to have a positive 
relationship with performance based on agency theory. The board gender composition 
is a better monitor of management as women on the board are less likely to sabotage 
the interest of investors (Carter et al 2003). The board gender composition is the 
proportion of the female directors on the board. The results show insignificant result 
with ROA and Tobin’s Q but found to have a positive significance with value added 
intellectual capital (VAIC). The composition of the female on the board can affect the 
quality of this monitoring role and thus corporate financial performance of the 
company (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2007).  
 
On the non-significance, greater diversity of gender in the board room may reduce firm 
performance as it may not add any value to the board quality and value (Campbell & 
Mínguez-Vera, 2007). Additionally, Earley and Elaine (2000) posit that members of 
same groups tend to communicate more frequently as they are more likely to share the 
same opinions. This opinion may be against the other group which may affect 




more opinions and critical questions, and thus more conflicts, decision-making will be 
more time consuming and less effective as member of same group tend to align in the 
same interest (Lau & Murnighan, 1998). Bajtelsmit (1999) and Jianakoplos and 
Bernasek (1998) posit that female on the board are more risk-averse than men, while 
Cox and Blake (1991) suggest that the female on the board increase the costs of the 
firm as a result of higher turnover and absenteeism. However Du Rietz and Henrekson 
(2000) Farrell and Hersch (2005) Rose (2007) Shrader, et al (1997) also posit no 
significant link between board gender composition  and firm performance which is in 
agreement with the current study which shows no significance relationship.  
 
Board gender composition is hypothesized to have positive relationship with VAIC 
based on resource dependency theory. The positive significance of board gender with 
VAIC is an indication of the importance of intellectual capital in organization. This 
means that the knowledge capital leads to firm performance (Abidin, et al., 2000). 
Furthermore,  Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2007) suggest that greater board 
diversity increases a firm’s competitive advantage and can lead to great firm 
performance compared to firm with relatively less diversity because of their integrity 
and knowledge. The diversity of the board or the female directors on the board is 
associated with high performance because of females innovation and creativity 
(Brammer, et al 2007). The effectiveness of board control can be increased as a result 
of women on board. This is because they are more strict and trustworthy than their 
male colleagues. Risky projects be avoided as a result of their participation of women 




2014; Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999). However the study shows significant positive 
relationship in agreement with the current study (Akpan & Amran, 2014; Campbell & 
Mínguez-Vera, 2007; Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003; 
Lückerath-Rovers, 2011). Therefore, it seems that any negative aspects of greater 
female board representation are outweighed by the positive aspects. 
 
 However, there is no policy statement in the code of corporate governance in Nigeria 
regarding the percentage of women to be included in the board room. Therefore, this 
study recommends 35% affirmative action by the Nigerian government to be 
implemented by the companies in Nigeria and inclusion of percentage of women to be 
in the board room in the next revision of the code of corporate governance in Nigeria. 
5.3.6 Risk Management Committee  
The research hypothesized risk management committee (RSKMGT) to have a positive 
relationship with firm performance based on signalling theory. The risk management 
committee is the one of the board committee that is represented by the number of 
board members serving in the committee. The result shows significant positive 
relationship with ROA and VAIC but shows insignificant relationship with Tobin’s Q.  
 
The positive significance in the study is in support of signalling theory and agency 
theory (Connelly et al., 2010; Spence, 1973). The positive relationship between risk 
management committee and ROA indicates that risk management committee is one of 




agreement with McShane, et al., (2011) which stipulates that corporate governance 
failure is as a result of chronic failures of risk management of business 
establishments. et al., (2009) and  Akindele (2012) also posit positive significant 
relationship when a senior and independent director is appointed to oversee the affair 
of the risk management department. 
 
 Furthermore, risk management committee is found to be positively associated with 
VAIC at 5% level of significance. This finding is in support of resource dependency 
theory which states that the more the board members the better for the company. The 
member of the board can be included in the risk management committee which can 
further lead to firm performance. The results are also in support of establishment of 
risk management committee by the SEC code of corporate governance and encourage 
all the board in Nigeria to establish the risk management committee to oversee the 
risk decision of the business.  
 
On the non- significance with the market measure of performance is an indication that 
risk management committee have nothing to contribute to the enhancement of the 
earning of the company. This means that the market does not perceive the 
establishment of risk management committee as a firm performance indicator. This 
assertion is in support of Guay and Kothari (2003) who suggest that firm should not 




5.3.7 Managerial Ownership 
The study uses two approaches to capture the impact of managerial ownership on firm 
performance. The first one is the use of the linear term for managerial shareholding 
(MOWN) for corporate governance and firm performance  and the second one is the 
adoption of quadratic term (curvilinear relationship) of the managerial shareholding 
following (Morck et al., 1988). The present study hypothesized a positive linear 
managerial shareholding and firm performance. The finding of this research shows 
that the linear term is applicable to ROA and Tobin’s Q and the quadratic term of the 
managerial ownership is applicable to VAIC.  
 
The results found negative significance between managerial shareholding and ROA 
and non-significant relationship with Tobin’s Q and VAIC at 5% level of significance 
when the quadratic term is added. This study supports entrenchment effect and 
therefore all hypotheses developed in this regard are not supported. This result is an 
indication that the cost of managerial ownership outweighs the benefit of it which 
states that because of the presence of directors’ ownership, the objectives of the firm 
will be aligned with directors’ interest. This findings is in line with the arguments of  
(Morck et al., 1988) which states that greater percentage of managerial ownership 
could lead to entrenchment effect as the outside shareholders find it difficult to 
control the actions of directors.  
 
Additionally, managerial entrenchment  suggest that directors of company find it 




have adequate control to follow their own interest instead of  owners interests (Morck 
et al., 1988; Short & Keasey, 1999). Kald and Nilsson (2000) also link managerial 
ownership to be negatively associated with Tobin’s Q. However, the  non-linear  
relationship with VAIC is in line with  the study of Morck et al., (1988). This finding 
of entrenchment effect could be a result of differences in the ownership structure and 
control mechanisms used by Nigeria’s firm.   
5.3.8 Corporate Reporting Disclosure. 
The study uses three disclosure indexes to capture the impact of corporate reporting 
disclosure and performance. The disclosure indexes adapted for this study are all 
hypothesized to have positive significance with performance based on signaling 
theory, namely (1) ownership transparency and disclosure (OWNT), (2) financial 
transparency and disclosure (FINT) and (3) board process transparency and disclosure 
(BODT). The development of the study hypotheses is in line with signaling theory 
Spence (1973), Botosan and Harris (2000) and Edogbanya and Kamardin (2016) who 
suggest that improvements of firm transparency through quality disclosure  in the 
annual report can reduce information asymmetries and enhance firm performance. 
5.3.8.1 Ownership Transparency and Disclosure 
The results of the ownership transparency and disclosure (OWNT) are found to have 
no significant relationship with ROA, Tobin’s Q and VAIC. This is in line with 
Chiang (2005) which suggest that information disclosed by companies is the only one 




shows that disclosure of management shareholding and ownership disclosure have no 
effect on performance. The trend in ownership transparency in financial reporting by 
public companies in Nigeria demonstrated increase in disclosure after the adoption of 
the revised code of corporate governance in 2011 as shown in figure 4.1. Despite the 
insignificant result of the ownership transparency and firm performance, the trend in 
ownership reporting witness increase significantly in the disclosure in the post 
adoption era of the revised code of corporate governance of 2011 and international 
financial reporting standards (IFRS). There is no sufficient relationship because the 
market is not efficient while the availability of information is alleged to be a key 
determinant of the efficiency of resource allocation decisions and growth in an 
economy (Bushman et al, 2004). This study therefore recommends to the regulatory 
agencies in Nigeria to stipulate punishment in terms of fine for non-disclosure of 
ownership process disclosure. If this recommendation is adopted, will make public 
companies to comply with this disclosure as most companies in Nigeria do not want 
any form of sanctions from the government. 
5.3.8.2 Financial Transparency and disclosure 
This variable is hypothesised based on signalling theory. The result of the financial 
transparency and disclosure (FINT) shows positive association with Tobin’s Q at a 
significant level of 10%. The positive significance is consistent with signaling theory 
and findings from the study of Chou and Gray (2002) who suggests corporate 
financial transparency is highly associated with corporate financial performance and 




transparency of the firm. This is why Meek, et al (1995) also posit that firm with good 
news such as profitability, earnings and dividend pay out to share will attract investor 
which on the long run  enhanced overall performance. Figure 4.1 showed the trend in 
financial transparency in financial reporting by public companies in Nigeria. The 
trends is an indication that the adoption of code of corporate governance of 2011 and 
international financial reporting standards in financial reporting witness increase in 
the disclosure by public companies in Nigeria. 
 
 On the non-significance, it is supported by studies like Ahmed (1999) and  
(Akhtaruddin, 2005) who found no significant association with reporting transparency 
and firm performance the non-significance  is often alleged, however, that firm annual 
statement do not comply with the disclosure requirements specified by the 
supervisory agencies, resulting in poor disclosure compliance by the public listed 
companies. Corporate disclosure is seen as a means to improve marketability of 
stocks, to improve corporate image, and to lessen the cost of capital. Corporations 
provide information on the ground that such information disclosure will not retort to 
the negative effect on the company image (Choi, 1973).  
5.3.8.3 Board Process Transparency and Disclosure  
The results of the board process transparency and disclosure (BODT) shows mixed 
result indicating negative significance for ROA and VAIC but shows significant 
positive result with Tobin’s Q. The negative significance is in agreement with 




and Gray (2002) support the significant positive relationship. The above result shows 
generally that disclosure of board process information in the published annual report 
in both print and website of the firm have a role to play in enhancing the performance 
of the company.  
 
On the negative significance, Chiang, eta al (2005) posit that corporation 
administrations might think that disclosure of this information is not related to 
investor and creditor decisions or might not want investors and creditors to learn this 
information. The positive significance in board management process transparency 
with VAIC is a sign that signalling the activities of the company can attract 
investment from both local and foreign investors. However, the Company and Allied 
Matter Act (CAMA) 2004 as amended to date stipulates the area of disclosure 
necessary to be included in the annual report as statutory requirement. However, the 
NCCG, 2011encourages companies to disclose more than the statutory requirement of 
CAMA (Edogbanya et al., 2015). As shown in Figure 4.1, the trend shows that the 
adoptions of the code of corporate governance and IFRS have really impacted the 
extent of reporting the board activities in Nigeria. 
5.4.9 Moderating effect Block Ownership on Corporate Governance and Firm 
Performance  
The study hypothesized that block ownership (BLOOWN) to moderate the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanism and firm performance. The 
result shows that block ownership strengthened the negative relationship between 




finding also support  Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) who posit block shareholding have 
greater incentives to align management interest with that of shareholders, this can 
result in better corporate firm performance and benefiting minority shareholders. In 
addition, the block ownership is also found to moderate the relationship between risk 
management committee and firm performance. 
 
 Blockholder ownership is found to strengthen the positive relationship between risk 
management committee and ROA. The result shows that blockholder ownership 
strengthens the positive relationship between risk management committee and ROA.  
Blockholder ownership is also found to moderate the relationship between managerial 
shareholding and firm performance. The result shows that blockholder ownership 
strengthens the negative relationship between managerial shareholding and ROA. 
This result shows that the presence of the block shareholders controls the 
opportunistic behavior of the executives. This finding support  Kroll, Walters, and 
Wright (2008) studies of Chinese firms showed a positive relationship between 
concentrated ownership and performance of firm. The study suggests that the control 
and monitoring of the management performance lies in the hand of large equity 
holders and play a substantial role in corporate governance of any organization. 
Similarly, motivations to perform direct monitoring are weaker for dispersed 
ownership due to free-rider problems (Grossman & Hart, 1982). More so, the 
blockholder ownership is found to dampen the relationship between non-executive 





On the moderating effect of blockholder ownership with Tobin’s Q, the study found 
blockholder ownership is found to strengthen the negative relationship between non-
executive director and TOBINS Q. This indicates that the presence of –non-executive 
directors may serve as monitoring mechanism on the executive director which could 
enhance performance, in the same vein, the blockholder ownership is found to 
moderate the relationship between managerial shareholding and Tobin’s Q. 
Furthermore, blockholder ownership is found to dampen the positive relationship 
between BOGEND and Tobin’s Q. The blockholder ownership is found to moderate 
the relationship between board size and VAIC. The result shows blockholder 
ownership strengthens the positive relationship between board size and VAIC. This 
result is consistent with resource dependency theory which supports the large board 
size.  However, blockholder ownership is found not to have any moderating effect 
between board meeting, non-executive directors and board gender and VAIC.  
 
Therefore, this study concludes that the presence of the blockholder ownership to 
have positive effect in monitoring the activities of the management. This is so because 
large shareholders are concluded in this research have a disciplinary effect on the 
management and thereby monitors company’s investment from outside the firm 





5.4 Implications of the Research  
The results produced from this study have numerous implications to both practice and 
theory and the findings of this study make several contributions to the theoretical 
development in corporate governance and firm performance. The results from this 
study were able to justify the underpinning theories adopted for this study such as 
agency theory, resource depend theory and signaling theory.  The internal corporate 
governance mechanism was also identified as a strong support for company 
performance and the external corporate governance such as block shareholding is 
found to moderate the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance. 
5.4.1 Theoretical Implication 
This study has combined agency theory, resource dependency theory and signaling 
theory to explain the framework under study.  These theories are used in 
conceptualization of the effect of corporate governance and firm performance. 
furthermore, the Company and Allied Matter Act (CAMA) 1990 is consulted to 
highlight the statutory requirements by companies in relations to disclosure and 
transparency and the revised code of corporate governance code of 2011 is employed 
in this research as well. The employments of this act and NCCG,2011 is to state the 
essence of disclosure in the annual report and monitoring roles in public limited 
companies in Nigeria. The explanation of the corporate governance mechanism and 
firm performance need more than one theory to explain their relationship (Kamardin 





The finding indicates that the theoretical perspective may require more than one 
theory to explain the phenomenal of the internal corporate governance and firm 
performance. Both agency theory and resource dependency theory support non-
executive director in Nigeria. For the board size, agency theory supports small board 
size but resource dependency theory supports large board as it suggests that the cost 
of large board will be translated to performance at the long run. This current study 
shows that agency theory is more applicable when explaining the relationship 
between board size and performance. The corporate reporting transparency, signaling 
theory was employed to predict the relationship between the variables; financial, 
board process and ownership transparency. This is an indication that company send 
signals when there are disclosing all material information about their operations. 
 
The main implication of this study to theory is the moderating effect of block 
ownership in explaining the relationship between the internal corporate governance 
mechanism under study and various dimensions of performance. The block ownership 
moderates the relationship between board characteristics and risk management 
committee and managerial shareholding. These findings explain the function of 
external corporate governance on the internal corporate practices. This is an indication 
that block ownership is one of the links in monitoring the activities of the directors. 
The findings also suggest that that the level of block shareholding do not moderate the 
board gender and board meeting as this may be as a result that the activities of women 





This study uses two approaches to capture the effect of managerial ownership and 
three proxies of firm performance.  Linear term is used for ROA and the quadratic 
term is used for Tobin’s Q and VAIC to test the convergence of interest hypotheses. 
This is to test the curvilinear relationship as literature have suggested (Short & 
Keasey, 1999). On the hand, the value added intellectual (VAIC) is added alongside 
other traditional measure of performance to predict the relationship between the 
internal corporate governance and firm performance.  
5.4.2 Practical Implications 
In practice, the results of this study provide recommendations, especially to the public 
limited companies, policymakers and regulatory bodies such as Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) and the Financial 
Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRC). The findings of the direct relationship and the 
moderating relationship between the corporate governance and firm performance are 
found to support board size, non-executive directors, board gender, board meeting 
corporate reporting transparency and risk management committee. 
 
In relation to board characteristics, small board size is supported for public listed 
company as the results for ROA and Tobin’s Q shows negative significance. This 
finding is in line with SEC code of corporate governance in Nigeria which states the 
minimum numbers of board of directors to be five but do not prescribe maximum 




should be negligible numbers of directors especially in Nigeria where the appointment 
of NONED may be just fulfilling the minimum regulatory requirements. This 
summation is in agreement with Hillier, Linn and McColgan (2005) who suggest that 
the fact that independent directors are on board does not guarantee good governance 
and internal monitoring of the executive directors. The finding on board meeting 
suggests more meeting enhances management decision that can be translated to firm 
performance. This means average of 8-9 meeting is suggested by this study. When 
strategic issues are discussed in the meeting of the board, the benefit could overweigh 
the cost of the meeting.  
 
Additionally, women representative on the board may not really show performance of 
the firm according to ROA and Tobin Q but shows positive significance with VAIC 
which shows that the intellectual capacity of women can lead to firm performance. 
The corporate governance code should encourage more women representation on the 
board; this current study recommends 25%- 35% women representation on the board. 
On the risk management committee, it is important for board to establish risk 
management committee. This finding is in line with the code of corporate governance 
in Nigeria. This current suggests that it should be made statutory because of its 
importance.  
 
Furthermore, the findings also indicate positive significance for financial 
transparency. This is an indication that companies who disclose more is signaling to 




therefore lead to firm performance. Additionally, board process disclosure and 
transparency and ownership disclosure is found to have some level of positive 
significance with performance. This study reiterates on the suggestion of the revised 
code of corporate governance that firm should disclose more than the statutory 
requirements. This is an indication that the more you disclose, the more the firm is 
attracted to investment from potential investors.  
 
The moderating effect of block ownership on the relationship between board size, 
non–executive director, board meeting and risk management committee highlight the 
importance of these variables to firm performance. The block shareholders are having 
voting right and therefore can effect changes on the board at the annual general 
meeting of the board. Their voting rights is a strong monitoring tool that can enhance 
firm performance. Other corporate governance attributes are found that blockholder 
ownership do not moderates their relationship with performance.   
 
The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in Nigeria is expected to ensure strict 
compliance by companies in disclosure of material fact in their annual report and 
statements. This is important to ensure that the public listed companies adhere to the 
disclosure requirements, particularly during the earlier years of IFRS convergence and 
adoption of the revised code of corporate governance in Nigeria.  The FRC should 
report any serious case of non-disclosure to Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) and the 
SEC so that the action can be taken against the non-compliance companies by the 





The findings from this study also encourage the public listed companies to adhere to 
the code of best practice that is in operation in Nigeria. In addition, the companies 
should be willing to train their staff in line with IFRS preparations, corporate 
governance and disclosure of material fact in the annual report and statements. This 
will lead to efficiency and staff performance in the company.  
5.4.3 Limitations to the Study and Suggestion for Future Research  
While this research contributes in several ways to the body of knowledge, the 
practical side and the methodology aspect, there are a number of limitations that need 
to be highlighted. The limitations of this research are discussed below. Firstly the 
sample is concentrated on the non-financial companies. Thus the finding may not be 
generalized to represents financial companies. This may be as a result of policies 
differences and different regulatory authorities.  The study was limited to the period 
(between 2010-2013) due to the availability of data on our variables of interest. The 
choice for this datasets is as a result of unavailability of published annual report by 
companies and the failure of the regulatory agencies to keep the reported annual 
report in their libraries as there is a complete absence of e-database of company’s 
annual report in Nigeria.  
5.4.4 Suggestion for Future Research  
Given the limitations of the present study, we recommend that future research should 




by expanding their coverage to include other variables such as audit committee 
characteristics and its relationship with intellectual capital as a measure of 
performance. The study also recommends for future research the inclusion of 
corruption index and it effect on performance, though it may be difficult to measure 
corruption from corporate perspective. Therefore, the research could employ 
qualitative method or survey method to achieve this objective. Secondly, the study 
also recommends the study on transparency across the West African countries but this 
will require a large dataset that include many countries. Thirdly, this study only 
examines the moderating effects of block ownership on the relationship between the 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance.  However, this study will 
also recommend future research on the moderating effect of the external audit 
functions such as the Big 4 on the internal corporate governance variables and firm 
performance. Future studies should look at the variability of regulatory framework 
and its effect on performance.  
5.5 Conclusions 
Despite the limitations discussed above, the findings of this research are still having 
crucial implications to theory, policy implantations and practices. This chapter 
provides a detailed summary from chapter one concerning the introduction of the 
thesis to chapter three on the research methodology as well as recapping on the results 
of the hypotheses in chapter four and five. Most importantly, this chapter discusses 
the findings from the panel regression analysis, the contributions, limitations and 




relationship but also moderating relationship. This is done by introducing the 
blockholder ownership to moderate or to test its moderating effect on the relationship 
between internal corporate governance mechanism and firm performance.  
 
This study indicates the importance of board characteristics such as board size, non-
executive directors, and board gender and board meetings. The role of the board as a 
whole are summarily related to performance. The study also mentioned the negative 
impact of relying heavily on the non-executive directors. This study concludes that 
the appointment of non-executive directors may be for political reasons and therefore 
may affect performance negatively or not. Board meeting is found out to affect 
performance when meeting is done not to merely fulfill statutory requirements but to 
discuss material fact that are affecting the firm. When this is done diligently, it could 
affect performance positively. The inclusion of the women on the board is also found 
to be crucial from intellectual capital perspective. The strong relationship between 
VAIC is an indication that their knowledge however could be used to achieve 
company’s objectives. 
 
This study found that the presence of the risk management committee in a firm shows 
strong indication that performance could be enhanced. This is because the committee 
could be risk sensitive as they may report serious risk that may deter firm 
performance. On the other hand, the managerial ownership is found to have any 




management may work for their interest instead of the owners. This means that the 
interest of managers is entrenched with that of shareholders. 
 
This study also indicates the need to have reasonable disclosure of firm dealing. The 
significant relationship of corporate reporting disclosureand transparency is an 
indication that firm should disclose in the area of financial, board management 
process and ownership transparency. In the light of the above explanation this study 
recommends for firm to disclose both good news and bad news in their annual report. 
This will enable the potential investors to take decisive decision and ways of curbing 
the bad news in to good news by taking strategic decision and proactive operational 
mechanism to achieve company’s goal. 
 
In summary, the study indicates that right board size, less non-executive directors, 
appropriate level of managerial ownership, presence of board women and reasonable 
numbers of board meeting which is represented by board diligence are all important 
element of corporate governance for enhanced firm performance. The moderating 
effect of block shareholding support the emphasis of monitoring role played as a 
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Appendix 1: Index and Score for Transparency and Disclosure 
A.  Ownership structure and investor relations 
1. A description of the share classes 
2. A review of shareholding by type (class) 
3. A description of voting rights 
4. A list of 20 largest shareholders 
5. Statement of percentage of total shareholding of 20 largest shareholders 
6. Number of shares held by 20 largest shareholders 
7. Notice of change in substantial holdings 
8. Number of holders of each class of equity holding 
9. List of and number of shares held by directors 
10. Information about investors relations 
11. Information about share performance and ownership 
Total items 11  
B.  Financial transparency and information disclosure 
 
1. The company’s accounting policy 
2. Consistency with international accounting standards/SAS 
3. Efficiency indicators (ROE/ROA) 
4. Gearing ratios 
5. Consolidated financial statements 
6. Off balance sheet financing information/contingent liabilities 
7. Social responsibility 
8. Corporate governance statement and awareness 
9. Stock price information 
10. Market capitalization 
11. Forward looking information 
12. Qualitative historical information 
13. Risk management 
14. Chairman’s statement 
15. Managing director’s review 
16. Internal control 
17. Information about Corporate Social Responsibility 




C.  Board and management structure and processes 
 
1. List of board members 
2. Background information about board of directors 
3. Background information about management staff 
4. List of board committees 
5. Audit committee 
6. Background Information about member of the audit committees 
7. Details of director remuneration 
8. Existence of remuneration committee or equivalent 
9. Details of performance-related pay and share options 
10. Related party transactions 
11. Information on board directors qualifications and experience  
12. Changes in board directors 
13. Information about staff training and development 
14. Information about the frequency of the Audit committee meeting 
Total items 14  




































Appendix B:  
 
Sampled Companies  
 
7up Bottling company   
ABC Transport   
Academy Press 
Afromedia Service 
Aluminum EXTRUSION   
Ashaka Cement  
AVON crowncaps & Containers NIG PLC  
B.O.C Gases PLC (Industrial Gases NIG. LTD)  
Berger Paint  
Beta Glass   
Cadbury Nigeria PLC  
Capital Hotel  
Cement Co of Northern PLC  
Chams  ICT 
Chellerams   
Conoil (National OIL) PLC  
Cutix Conglomerates   
Dangote cement   
DNA Tyre and Rubber Plc  
FIDSON   
Flour Mill of Nigeria  
GRIF   
Guiness  
Honeywell  
Interlinked Technologies  
International Breweries  
Japaul oil and Maritime Service Plc  
John Holt plc   
Julius Berger   
Lafarage  
Longman Nigeria learn african  
May and Baker 
Mcnichols Consolidated PLC  
MOBIL OIL NIGERIA plc  
Morison Industries PLC  
MRS OIL PLC (Chevron oil Nigeria PLC, Texaco Nigeria PLC)  
NCR Nigeria PLC ICT 
Nestle Nigeria PLC  
Nigeria Aviation Handling  
Nigeria Bweries  
Nigeria Enamelware PLC  




Northern Nigeria Flour Mill  
Pemier Paint PLC  
Pemier Paint PLC  
Presco Plc   
Red star express  
Road Nigeria     
SCOA Conglomerates  
Smart Product Nigeria  
Tantalizers  
The Tourist Compnay   
Total Nigeria PLC  
Transcorp   
Tripple GEE and  Company Plc  
UAC PLC Conglomerates  
University Press PLC  
Updc(UACN Property Development Co. PLC)  
Vitafoam NIG PLC  
DN Meyer    
First Aluminum  
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